Проект разделен на два репозитория

VM1_app/codebase/backend/deployment/secrets/SELECTEL_RUNBOOK.ru.md

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+# Selectel Secrets Manager для HAN Chat
+
+## Модель
+
+`han-secrets` читает только `SECRETS_SOURCE=selectel|file` из обычного `.env`,
+выбирает соответствующую root-only JSON-карту и вызывает `secrets_loader.py`.
+Загрузчик получает project-scoped IAM token, читает объявленные секреты и
+создаёт в `/run/han-chat/secrets`:
+
+- отдельные файлы с каноническими именами для Compose secrets;
+- узкие service dotenv-файлы для диагностики состава без вывода значений;
+- `manifest` вида `NAME=/absolute/path`, используемый валидатором.
+
+Каталог `/run` находится в tmpfs и имеет режим `0700`. Канонические файлы имеют
+`0444`: локальные пользователи не могут пройти через root-only каталог, а
+не-root UID контейнера может прочитать только явно смонтированный Compose
+secret. Значения не передаются через Docker Config.Env, argv, общий `.env` или
+логи. После полного root/docker-компромисса runtime-значения извлекаемы — это
+ограничение модели, а не гарантия Secret Manager.
+
+Сбой Selectel никогда автоматически не включает file fallback. Уже работающие
+контейнеры продолжают использовать текущие значения; новый sync завершается
+fail-closed.
+
+## 1. Ресурсы Selectel
+
+1. Создайте отдельный проект `han-chat-secrets-prod`.
+2. Создайте сервисного пользователя `han-chat-secrets-reader`.
+3. Назначьте ему `member` только в этом проекте. Не выдавайте account scope,
+   `iam.admin` и доступ к другим production-ресурсам. Если Selectel добавит
+   отдельную read-only роль Secrets Manager, замените `member` на неё.
+4. Ограничьте обращения к `api.selectel.ru` исходящим IP ВМ, если функция
+   доступна в аккаунте.
+5. Включите экспорт audit logs. Контролируйте события `secrets.secret*` и
+   `secrets.secret_version*`; alert на delete, смену current version вне окна,
+   массовые чтения и обращения не от штатного пользователя/IP.
+6. Выполните canary и убедитесь, что provider audit содержит metadata операции,
+   но не value, Base64 payload, IAM token или response body.
+
+Secrets Manager принимает project-scoped IAM token в `X-Auth-Token`. Token
+живёт до 24 часов, но загрузчик использует его только в памяти одного запуска.
+TLS и redirect policy отключать нельзя.
+
+## 2. Каталог секретов
+
+Скопируйте `config.example.json` в
+`/etc/han/secrets/production-like.selectel.json` и замените account, username,
+project, region и `remote`. Каноническое имя слева обязано совпадать с
+Compose/validator; `remote` — неизменяемый ключ в Selectel.
+
+Используйте консервативные provider keys с дефисами, например:
+
+- `han-chat-prod-pg-han-app-dsn`, `han-chat-prod-pg-bitrix-local-dsn`,
+  `han-chat-prod-pg-bitrix-sync-dsn`, `han-chat-prod-pg-sms-dsn`,
+  `han-chat-prod-pg-keycloak-password`, `han-chat-prod-pg-backup-dsn`;
+- `han-chat-prod-redis-api-password`, `han-chat-prod-redis-safety-password`,
+  `han-chat-prod-redis-health-password`, а также три credential-bearing URL;
+- `han-chat-prod-message-safety-token`, `han-chat-prod-bitrix-internal-token`,
+  `han-chat-prod-bitrix-forward-token`, `han-chat-prod-bitrix-sync-token`,
+  `han-chat-prod-keycloak-settings-token`, `han-chat-prod-sms-service-token`;
+- Keycloak bootstrap password, OTP HMAC и mock code только для среды, где mock
+  действительно включён;
+- Bitrix client secret, application token и token encryption key;
+- пары S3 app access/secret key;
+- i-Digital API key и callback username/password.
+
+Одинаковые пары env (`BITRIX_LOCAL_APP_INTERNAL_TOKEN` /
+`BITRIX_INTERNAL_API_TOKEN`, `BITRIX_API_FORWARD_TOKEN` /
+`BITRIX_API_INBOX_TOKEN`, `SMS_SERVICE_TOKEN` /
+`KEYCLOAK_SMS_SERVICE_TOKEN`) должны ссылаться на один `remote`.
+
+`literal: ""` разрешён только для заведомо пустого optional-параметра, например
+OTLP auth при self-hosted SigNoz или выключенного CAPTCHA server key. Секреты
+не записывайте в JSON. Не заводите planned/unused Message Safety DB, quarantine
+S3 и Bitrix sync credentials до появления потребляющего кода.
+
+Загружайте значения в Selectel через скрытый prompt/stdin. Не передавайте value
+позиционным аргументом CLI и не включайте `set -x`/`curl -v`.
+
+## 3. Установка на ВМ
+
+Повторный запуск `deployment/scripts/setup-vm.sh` после копирования проекта
+устанавливает loader, launcher, systemd template и этот runbook. Вручную:
+
+```sh
+sudo install -d -m 0700 /etc/han/secrets /etc/han/credentials
+sudo install -d -m 0755 /usr/local/lib/han-secrets
+sudo install -m 0750 secrets_loader.py han-secrets /usr/local/lib/han-secrets/
+sudo install -m 0750 han-compose /usr/local/bin/han-compose
+sudo install -m 0644 han-secrets@.service /etc/systemd/system/
+sudo install -m 0600 config.example.json \
+  /etc/han/secrets/production-like.selectel.json
+```
+
+Обычный `/opt/han-chat/backend/.env` содержит только несекретные параметры.
+Штатный режим:
+
+```dotenv
+SECRETS_SOURCE=selectel
+APP_ENV=production-like
+```
+
+## 4. Bootstrap credential
+
+Не храните пароль service user в `.env` или JSON. На целевой ВМ:
+
+```sh
+sudo systemd-creds encrypt --name=selectel-service-user-password - \
+  /etc/han/credentials/production.selectel-password.cred
+sudo chmod 0600 /etc/han/credentials/production.selectel-password.cred
+```
+
+Введите пароль через интерактивный stdin. Unit передаёт расшифрованный файл
+через приватный `$CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY`. Root всё равно может его извлечь;
+после инцидента credential и все доступные ему секреты необходимо ротировать.
+
+## 5. Проверка и запуск
+
+Все команды, которым нужны Compose secrets, запускайте от root через wrapper:
+
+```sh
+cd /opt/han-chat/backend
+sudo ./scripts/validate-env .env
+sudo systemctl daemon-reload
+sudo systemctl enable han-secrets@production.service
+sudo systemctl restart han-secrets@production.service
+sudo ./scripts/validate-env .env \
+  --runtime-manifest /run/han-chat/secrets/manifest
+sudo deployment/secrets/han-compose config --quiet
+sudo deployment/secrets/han-compose up -d --wait
+```
+
+Selectel sync запускается именно unit-файлом: только он предоставляет
+расшифрованный bootstrap credential через `$CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY`.
+`han-compose` и ops-скрипты используют уже синхронизированный manifest и
+отказываются работать, если `SECRETS_SOURCE`/loader config не совпадают с
+runtime state. После смены source, provider version или JSON-карты сначала
+выполняйте `systemctl restart han-secrets@production.service`.
+
+Не используйте `docker compose config` без `--quiet`, `docker inspect` для
+поиска конфигурации, `env`, `strace`, core dump или debug HTTP proxy. Проверка
+приёмки должна подтвердить отсутствие canary value в `docker inspect`, stdout,
+json logs, traces и shell history.
+
+На выделенной только под HAN Chat ВМ после canary и проверки file fallback
+установите fail-closed ordering:
+
+```sh
+sudo install -d -m 0755 /etc/systemd/system/docker.service.d
+sudo install -m 0644 \
+  deployment/secrets/docker-han-secrets.conf.example \
+  /etc/systemd/system/docker.service.d/han-secrets.conf
+sudo systemctl daemon-reload
+sudo systemctl restart docker
+```
+
+После этого проведите reboot rehearsal: materializer должен завершиться до
+autorestart контейнеров. Ошибка Selectel намеренно блокирует Docker. На ВМ с
+другими workloads такой глобальный `Requires=` запрещён: нужен отдельный Docker
+daemon/VM, иначе fail-closed HAN остановит несвязанные системы.
+
+## 6. Явный file fallback
+
+Подготовьте отдельную карту
+`/etc/han/secrets/production-like.file.json`: скопируйте Selectel-карту,
+установите `"mode": "file"`, удалите `selectel` и `http`, добавьте:
+
+```json
+"file": {
+  "path": "/etc/han/break-glass/secrets.env",
+  "max_bytes": 1048576
+}
+```
+
+`secrets` map остаётся тем же. Для записей с `literal: ""` строка в fallback
+не нужна; остальные канонические ключи обязательны. Fallback parser не исполняет
+shell: запрещены `export`, substitutions, multiline, неизвестные и дублирующиеся
+ключи. Файл — `root:root 0600`.
+
+При инциденте доставьте recovery-файл из защищённой офлайн-копии и только затем
+явно измените `.env`:
+
+```dotenv
+SECRETS_SOURCE=file
+```
+
+Перезапустите `han-secrets@production.service`, затем выполните
+validate/recreate через wrappers. После восстановления Selectel верните
+`SECRETS_SOURCE=selectel`, снова перезапустите unit, повторите проверки и
+удалите recovery-файл.
+Не храните его постоянно на ВМ: это вернуло бы исходный риск монолитного `.env`.
+
+## 7. Ротация и rollback
+
+1. Добавьте новую версию секрета, не меняя имя.
+2. Для canary при необходимости временно pin числовой `version` в JSON-карте.
+3. Выполните sync, validation и smoke без вывода конфигурации.
+4. Сделайте версию current, удалите pin, снова sync и пересоздайте только
+   потребителей.
+5. Для rollback активируйте предыдущую provider version; не храните snapshot
+   старого `.env`.
+
+Selectel не позволяет удалить отдельную версию — только секрет целиком. Старые
+значения должны быть отозваны в PostgreSQL/S3/Bitrix/i-Digital после окна
+rollback. Все значения из прежнего `.env` считайте раскрытыми и ротируйте после
+перехода.

VM1_app/codebase/backend/deployment/secrets/config.example.json

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+{
+  "version": 1,
+  "mode": "selectel",
+  "runtime_dir": "/run/han-chat/secrets",
+  "http": {
+    "timeout_seconds": 10,
+    "retries": 3,
+    "max_response_bytes": 1048576
+  },
+  "selectel": {
+    "account_id": "123456",
+    "username": "han-secrets-reader",
+    "project_name": "han-production",
+    "region": "ru-9",
+    "interface": "public",
+    "password_file": "selectel-service-user-password"
+  },
+  "secrets": {
+    "DATABASE_URL": {
+      "remote": "DATABASE_URL",
+      "consumers": ["api-backend", "api-migrate"],
+      "max_bytes": 4096
+    },
+    "BITRIX_DATABASE_URL": {
+      "remote": "BITRIX_DATABASE_URL",
+      "consumers": ["bitrix-local-app", "bitrix-local-migrate"],
+      "max_bytes": 4096
+    },
+    "BITRIX_SYNC_DATABASE_URL": {
+      "remote": "BITRIX_SYNC_DATABASE_URL",
+      "consumers": ["bitrix-sync", "bitrix-sync-migrate"],
+      "max_bytes": 4096
+    },
+    "SMS_DATABASE_URL": {
+      "remote": "SMS_DATABASE_URL",
+      "consumers": ["sms-service", "sms-worker", "sms-migrate"],
+      "max_bytes": 4096
+    },
+    "KEYCLOAK_DB_PASSWORD": {
+      "remote": "KEYCLOAK_DB_PASSWORD",
+      "consumers": ["keycloak"],
+      "max_bytes": 1024
+    },
+    "KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD": {
+      "remote": "KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD",
+      "consumers": ["keycloak"],
+      "max_bytes": 1024
+    },
+    "CURSOR_HMAC_SECRET": {
+      "remote": "CURSOR_HMAC_SECRET",
+      "consumers": ["api-backend"],
+      "max_bytes": 1024
+    },
+    "KEYCLOAK_OTP_HMAC_KEY": {
+      "remote": "KEYCLOAK_OTP_HMAC_KEY",
+      "consumers": ["keycloak"],
+      "max_bytes": 1024
+    },
+    "KEYCLOAK_OTP_MOCK_CODE": {
+      "remote": "KEYCLOAK_OTP_MOCK_CODE",
+      "consumers": ["keycloak"],
+      "max_bytes": 1024
+    },
+    "KEYCLOAK_YANDEX_CAPTCHA_SERVER_KEY": {
+      "remote": "KEYCLOAK_YANDEX_CAPTCHA_SERVER_KEY",
+      "consumers": ["keycloak"],
+      "max_bytes": 1024
+    },
+    "BITRIX_TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY": {
+      "remote": "BITRIX_TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY",
+      "consumers": ["api-backend", "bitrix-local-app", "bitrix-sync"],
+      "max_bytes": 1024
+    },
+    "REDIS_API_PASSWORD": {
+      "remote": "REDIS_API_PASSWORD",
+      "consumers": ["redis"],
+      "max_bytes": 1024
+    },
+    "REDIS_URL": {
+      "remote": "REDIS_URL",
+      "consumers": ["api-backend", "delivery-worker", "cleanup-worker"],
+      "max_bytes": 4096
+    },
+    "REDIS_REALTIME_URL": {
+      "remote": "REDIS_REALTIME_URL",
+      "consumers": ["api-backend"],
+      "max_bytes": 4096
+    },
+    "REDIS_SAFETY_PASSWORD": {
+      "remote": "REDIS_SAFETY_PASSWORD",
+      "consumers": ["redis"],
+      "max_bytes": 1024
+    },
+    "MESSAGE_SAFETY_REDIS_URL": {
+      "remote": "MESSAGE_SAFETY_REDIS_URL",
+      "consumers": ["message-safety", "safety-recovery-worker"],
+      "max_bytes": 4096
+    },
+    "REDIS_HEALTH_PASSWORD": {
+      "remote": "REDIS_HEALTH_PASSWORD",
+      "consumers": ["redis", "redis-exporter"],
+      "max_bytes": 1024
+    },
+    "MESSAGE_SAFETY_SERVICE_TOKEN": {
+      "remote": "MESSAGE_SAFETY_SERVICE_TOKEN",
+      "consumers": ["api-backend", "message-safety"],
+      "max_bytes": 1024
+    },
+    "BITRIX_LOCAL_APP_INTERNAL_TOKEN": {
+      "remote": "BITRIX_LOCAL_APP_INTERNAL_TOKEN",
+      "consumers": ["api-backend", "bitrix-local-app"],
+      "max_bytes": 1024
+    },
+    "BITRIX_INTERNAL_API_TOKEN": {
+      "remote": "BITRIX_LOCAL_APP_INTERNAL_TOKEN",
+      "consumers": ["api-backend", "bitrix-local-app"],
+      "max_bytes": 1024
+    },
+    "BITRIX_API_FORWARD_TOKEN": {
+      "remote": "BITRIX_API_FORWARD_TOKEN",
+      "consumers": ["api-backend", "bitrix-local-app"],
+      "max_bytes": 1024
+    },
+    "BITRIX_API_INBOX_TOKEN": {
+      "remote": "BITRIX_API_FORWARD_TOKEN",
+      "consumers": ["api-backend", "bitrix-local-app"],
+      "max_bytes": 1024
+    },
+    "BITRIX_SYNC_SERVICE_TOKEN": {
+      "remote": "BITRIX_SYNC_SERVICE_TOKEN",
+      "consumers": ["api-backend", "bitrix-sync"],
+      "max_bytes": 1024
+    },
+    "KEYCLOAK_SETTINGS_BRIDGE_TOKEN": {
+      "remote": "KEYCLOAK_SETTINGS_BRIDGE_TOKEN",
+      "consumers": ["api-backend", "keycloak"],
+      "max_bytes": 1024
+    },
+    "SMS_SERVICE_TOKEN": {
+      "remote": "SMS_SERVICE_TOKEN",
+      "consumers": ["sms-service", "sms-worker", "keycloak"],
+      "max_bytes": 1024
+    },
+    "KEYCLOAK_SMS_SERVICE_TOKEN": {
+      "remote": "SMS_SERVICE_TOKEN",
+      "consumers": ["sms-service", "sms-worker", "keycloak"],
+      "max_bytes": 1024
+    },
+    "IDGTL_SMS_API_KEY": {
+      "remote": "IDGTL_SMS_API_KEY",
+      "consumers": ["sms-service", "sms-worker"],
+      "max_bytes": 1024
+    },
+    "IDGTL_SMS_CALLBACK_USERNAME": {
+      "remote": "IDGTL_SMS_CALLBACK_USERNAME",
+      "consumers": ["sms-service", "sms-worker"],
+      "max_bytes": 1024
+    },
+    "IDGTL_SMS_CALLBACK_PASSWORD": {
+      "remote": "IDGTL_SMS_CALLBACK_PASSWORD",
+      "consumers": ["sms-service", "sms-worker"],
+      "max_bytes": 1024
+    },
+    "BITRIX_CLIENT_SECRET": {
+      "remote": "BITRIX_CLIENT_SECRET",
+      "consumers": ["bitrix-local-app"],
+      "max_bytes": 1024
+    },
+    "BITRIX_APPLICATION_TOKEN": {
+      "remote": "BITRIX_APPLICATION_TOKEN",
+      "consumers": ["bitrix-local-app"],
+      "max_bytes": 1024
+    },
+    "SELECTEL_S3_SECRET_KEY": {
+      "remote": "SELECTEL_S3_SECRET_KEY",
+      "consumers": ["api-backend"],
+      "max_bytes": 1024
+    },
+    "SELECTEL_S3_ACCESS_KEY": {
+      "remote": "SELECTEL_S3_ACCESS_KEY",
+      "consumers": ["api-backend"],
+      "max_bytes": 1024
+    },
+    "OTEL_REMOTE_AUTH_HEADER": {
+      "literal": "",
+      "consumers": ["otel-collector"],
+      "max_bytes": 4096
+    }
+  }
+}

VM1_app/codebase/backend/deployment/secrets/docker-han-secrets.conf.example

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+[Unit]
+# Enable only on a dedicated HAN Chat Docker host after the Selectel canary and
+# file fallback have both passed. A failed secret sync intentionally blocks
+# Docker startup so containers cannot race an empty /run directory.
+Requires=han-secrets@production.service
+After=han-secrets@production.service

VM1_app/codebase/backend/deployment/secrets/han-compose

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+#!/bin/sh
+set -eu
+
+DEPLOY_DIR=${HAN_DEPLOY_DIR:-/opt/han-chat/backend}
+SOURCE_DIR=$(CDPATH= cd -- "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)
+[ ! -f "$SOURCE_DIR/../../docker-compose.yml" ] || \
+  DEPLOY_DIR=$(CDPATH= cd -- "$SOURCE_DIR/../.." && pwd)
+cd "$DEPLOY_DIR"
+
+CONFIG_FILE=${CONFIG_FILE:-.env}
+LAUNCHER=${HAN_SECRETS_LAUNCHER:-/usr/local/lib/han-secrets/han-secrets}
+[ -x "$LAUNCHER" ] || LAUNCHER=deployment/secrets/han-secrets
+
+exec "$LAUNCHER" run --config "$CONFIG_FILE" -- \
+  docker compose --env-file "$CONFIG_FILE" "$@"

VM1_app/codebase/backend/deployment/secrets/han-secrets

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+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Synchronize runtime secrets and execute a command without exporting their values."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import json
+import os
+import subprocess
+import sys
+import tempfile
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from secrets_loader import LoaderError, load_json, run
+
+
+def load_public_config(path: Path) -> dict[str, str]:
+    values: dict[str, str] = {}
+    try:
+        lines = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").splitlines()
+    except OSError as exc:
+        raise LoaderError(
+            f"cannot read non-secret config: {exc.strerror or exc.__class__.__name__}"
+        ) from None
+    for number, raw in enumerate(lines, 1):
+        line = raw.strip()
+        if not line or line.startswith("#"):
+            continue
+        if "=" not in line:
+            raise LoaderError(f"non-secret config has invalid syntax at line {number}")
+        key, value = line.split("=", 1)
+        key = key.strip()
+        if not key or key in values:
+            raise LoaderError(f"non-secret config has an invalid key at line {number}")
+        values[key] = value.strip()
+    return values
+
+
+def loader_config_path(
+    public: dict[str, str],
+    explicit: Path | None,
+    environ: dict[str, str],
+) -> tuple[str, Path]:
+    source = public.get("SECRETS_SOURCE")
+    if source not in {"selectel", "file"}:
+        raise LoaderError("SECRETS_SOURCE must explicitly be selectel or file")
+    if explicit is not None:
+        return source, explicit
+    override = environ.get(f"HAN_SECRETS_{source.upper()}_CONFIG")
+    if override:
+        return source, Path(override)
+    environment = public.get("APP_ENV", "production")
+    return source, Path(f"/etc/han/secrets/{environment}.{source}.json")
+
+
+def prepare_environment(
+    config_path: Path,
+    source: str,
+    environ: dict[str, str],
+    *,
+    synchronize: bool,
+) -> dict[str, str]:
+    document = load_json(config_path)
+    if document.get("mode") != source:
+        raise LoaderError("selected loader configuration mode does not match SECRETS_SOURCE")
+    runtime = document.get("runtime_dir")
+    if not isinstance(runtime, str) or not Path(runtime).is_absolute():
+        raise LoaderError("loader configuration has an invalid runtime_dir")
+    runtime_dir = Path(runtime)
+    manifest = runtime_dir / "manifest"
+    state_path = runtime_dir / "state.json"
+    consumers: list[str] = []
+    if synchronize or (source == "file" and not state_path.is_file()):
+        consumers = run(config_path, environ=environ)
+        state = {
+            "version": 1,
+            "source": source,
+            "loader_config": str(config_path.resolve()),
+        }
+        descriptor, temporary = tempfile.mkstemp(
+            prefix=".state.", suffix=".tmp", dir=runtime_dir
+        )
+        temporary_path = Path(temporary)
+        try:
+            os.chmod(temporary_path, 0o600)
+            with os.fdopen(descriptor, "w", encoding="utf-8") as stream:
+                descriptor = -1
+                json.dump(state, stream, separators=(",", ":"))
+                stream.write("\n")
+                stream.flush()
+                os.fsync(stream.fileno())
+            os.replace(temporary_path, state_path)
+        except BaseException:
+            if descriptor >= 0:
+                os.close(descriptor)
+            temporary_path.unlink(missing_ok=True)
+            raise
+    elif not state_path.is_file():
+        raise LoaderError(
+            "runtime secrets are not synchronized; restart han-secrets systemd unit"
+        )
+    else:
+        state = load_json(state_path)
+        if (
+            state.get("version") != 1
+            or state.get("source") != source
+            or state.get("loader_config") != str(config_path.resolve())
+        ):
+            raise LoaderError(
+                "runtime secret state does not match selected source/config; synchronize first"
+            )
+    if not manifest.is_file():
+        raise LoaderError("runtime secret manifest was not materialized")
+    manifest_entries: dict[str, str] = {}
+    for line in manifest.read_text(encoding="utf-8").splitlines():
+        key, value_path = line.split("=", 1)
+        manifest_entries[key] = value_path
+    specs = document.get("secrets")
+    if not isinstance(specs, dict) or set(manifest_entries) != set(specs):
+        raise LoaderError("runtime secret manifest does not match loader configuration")
+    child = dict(environ)
+    child["HAN_SECRETS_ACTIVE"] = "1"
+    child["HAN_RUNTIME_SECRET_DIR"] = str(runtime_dir)
+    child["HAN_RUNTIME_SECRET_MANIFEST"] = str(manifest)
+    for key, value_path in manifest_entries.items():
+        if not Path(value_path).is_file():
+            raise LoaderError("runtime secret manifest references a missing file")
+        child[f"{key}_FILE"] = value_path
+    if synchronize or consumers:
+        print(
+            f"han-secrets: synchronized {len(consumers)} service scope(s) from {source}",
+            file=sys.stderr,
+        )
+    return child
+
+
+def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__)
+    parser.add_argument("action", choices=("sync", "run"))
+    parser.add_argument("--config", type=Path, default=Path(".env"))
+    parser.add_argument("--loader-config", type=Path)
+    arguments, command = parser.parse_known_args(argv)
+    if command and command[0] == "--":
+        command.pop(0)
+    if arguments.action == "run" and not command:
+        parser.error("run requires a command after --")
+    if arguments.action == "sync" and command:
+        parser.error("sync does not accept a command")
+
+    environment = dict(os.environ)
+    try:
+        public = load_public_config(arguments.config)
+        source, loader_config = loader_config_path(
+            public, arguments.loader_config, environment
+        )
+        child = prepare_environment(
+            loader_config,
+            source,
+            environment,
+            synchronize=arguments.action == "sync",
+        )
+    except (LoaderError, OSError, ValueError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
+        message = str(exc) if isinstance(exc, LoaderError) else exc.__class__.__name__
+        print(f"han-secrets: {message}", file=sys.stderr)
+        return 1
+    if arguments.action == "sync":
+        return 0
+    if os.name == "nt":
+        return subprocess.call(command, env=child)
+    os.execvpe(command[0], command, child)
+    return 127
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())

VM1_app/codebase/backend/deployment/secrets/han-secrets@.service

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=Materialize HAN service secrets (%i)
+Documentation=file:/usr/local/share/doc/han-secrets/SELECTEL_RUNBOOK.ru.md
+Wants=network-online.target
+After=network-online.target
+Before=han-stack@%i.service
+
+[Service]
+Type=oneshot
+User=root
+Group=root
+UMask=0077
+RuntimeDirectory=han-chat/secrets
+RuntimeDirectoryMode=0700
+ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 /usr/local/lib/han-secrets/han-secrets sync --config /opt/han-chat/backend/.env
+LoadCredentialEncrypted=selectel-service-user-password:/etc/han/credentials/%i.selectel-password.cred
+RemainAfterExit=yes
+StandardOutput=null
+StandardError=journal
+SyslogIdentifier=han-secrets-%i
+NoNewPrivileges=yes
+PrivateTmp=yes
+PrivateDevices=yes
+ProtectSystem=strict
+ProtectHome=yes
+ProtectKernelTunables=yes
+ProtectKernelModules=yes
+ProtectKernelLogs=yes
+ProtectControlGroups=yes
+ProtectClock=yes
+RestrictRealtime=yes
+RestrictSUIDSGID=yes
+LockPersonality=yes
+MemoryDenyWriteExecute=yes
+LimitCORE=0
+SystemCallArchitectures=native
+RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_INET AF_INET6
+CapabilityBoundingSet=
+AmbientCapabilities=
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target

VM1_app/codebase/backend/deployment/secrets/secrets_loader.py

@@ -0,0 +1,682 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Materialize narrowly scoped service dotenv files from Selectel Secrets Manager."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import base64
+import binascii
+import json
+import os
+import random
+import re
+import ssl
+import stat
+import sys
+import tempfile
+import time
+import urllib.error
+import urllib.parse
+import urllib.request
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping, NoReturn
+
+DEFAULT_IDENTITY_URL = "https://cloud.api.selcloud.ru/identity/v3/auth/tokens"
+MAX_CONFIG_BYTES = 1_048_576
+MAX_HTTP_BYTES = 1_048_576
+MAX_SECRET_BYTES = 65_536
+RETRYABLE_STATUS = frozenset({408, 425, 429, 500, 502, 503, 504})
+ENV_NAME_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Z][A-Z0-9_]*$")
+SERVICE_NAME_RE = re.compile(r"^[a-zA-Z0-9][a-zA-Z0-9_.-]*$")
+DOTENV_LINE_RE = re.compile(r"^([A-Z][A-Z0-9_]*)=(.*)$")
+
+
+class LoaderError(Exception):
+    """An expected, already-redacted loader failure."""
+
+
+def fail(message: str) -> NoReturn:
+    raise LoaderError(message)
+
+
+def _object(value: Any, label: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    if not isinstance(value, dict):
+        fail(f"{label} must be an object")
+    return value
+
+
+def _only_keys(value: Mapping[str, Any], allowed: set[str], label: str) -> None:
+    unknown = sorted(set(value) - allowed)
+    if unknown:
+        fail(f"{label} contains unsupported fields: {', '.join(unknown)}")
+
+
+def _required_string(value: Mapping[str, Any], key: str, label: str) -> str:
+    item = value.get(key)
+    if not isinstance(item, str) or not item:
+        fail(f"{label}.{key} must be a non-empty string")
+    return item
+
+
+def _bounded_int(value: Any, label: str, minimum: int, maximum: int) -> int:
+    if isinstance(value, bool) or not isinstance(value, int) or not minimum <= value <= maximum:
+        fail(f"{label} must be an integer from {minimum} through {maximum}")
+    return value
+
+
+def read_limited(path: Path, limit: int, label: str) -> bytes:
+    try:
+        with path.open("rb") as stream:
+            data = stream.read(limit + 1)
+    except OSError as exc:
+        fail(f"cannot read {label}: {exc.strerror or exc.__class__.__name__}")
+    if len(data) > limit:
+        fail(f"{label} exceeds {limit} bytes")
+    return data
+
+
+def require_private_regular_file(path: Path, label: str) -> None:
+    try:
+        metadata = path.lstat()
+    except OSError as exc:
+        fail(f"cannot inspect {label}: {exc.strerror or exc.__class__.__name__}")
+    if stat.S_ISLNK(metadata.st_mode) or not stat.S_ISREG(metadata.st_mode):
+        fail(f"{label} must be a regular file and not a symlink")
+    if os.name != "nt" and stat.S_IMODE(metadata.st_mode) & 0o077:
+        fail(f"{label} must not be accessible by group or other users")
+
+
+def load_json(path: Path) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    raw = read_limited(path, MAX_CONFIG_BYTES, "configuration")
+    try:
+        document = json.loads(raw.decode("utf-8"))
+    except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError):
+        fail("configuration is not valid UTF-8 JSON")
+    return _object(document, "configuration")
+
+
+def credential_value(selectel: Mapping[str, Any], environ: Mapping[str, str]) -> str:
+    methods = sum(key in selectel for key in ("password_file", "password_env"))
+    if methods != 1:
+        fail("selectel must set exactly one of password_file or password_env")
+    if "password_env" in selectel:
+        variable = _required_string(selectel, "password_env", "selectel")
+        if not ENV_NAME_RE.fullmatch(variable):
+            fail("selectel.password_env is not a valid environment variable name")
+        value = environ.get(variable)
+        if value is None or not value:
+            fail(f"credential environment variable {variable} is not set")
+        return value
+
+    configured = Path(_required_string(selectel, "password_file", "selectel"))
+    if configured.is_absolute():
+        path = configured
+    else:
+        directory = environ.get("CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY")
+        if not directory:
+            fail("relative password_file requires CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY")
+        path = Path(directory) / configured
+    require_private_regular_file(path, "credential")
+    raw = read_limited(path, 16_384, "credential")
+    try:
+        value = raw.decode("utf-8")
+    except UnicodeDecodeError:
+        fail("credential is not valid UTF-8")
+    value = value.removesuffix("\n").removesuffix("\r")
+    if not value or "\n" in value or "\r" in value or "\x00" in value:
+        fail("credential must contain exactly one non-empty text line")
+    return value
+
+
+class NoRedirect(urllib.request.HTTPRedirectHandler):
+    def redirect_request(self, req: Any, fp: Any, code: int, msg: str, headers: Any, newurl: str) -> None:
+        return None
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class HTTPResult:
+    status: int
+    headers: Mapping[str, str]
+    body: bytes
+
+
+class HTTPClient:
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        *,
+        timeout: float,
+        retries: int,
+        max_response_bytes: int,
+        cafile: str | None = None,
+        opener: Any | None = None,
+        sleeper: Callable[[float], None] = time.sleep,
+        jitter: Callable[[], float] = random.random,
+    ) -> None:
+        self.timeout = timeout
+        self.retries = retries
+        self.max_response_bytes = max_response_bytes
+        self.sleeper = sleeper
+        self.jitter = jitter
+        if opener is None:
+            try:
+                context = ssl.create_default_context(cafile=cafile)
+            except (OSError, ssl.SSLError) as exc:
+                fail(f"cannot initialize TLS trust store: {exc.__class__.__name__}")
+            self.opener = urllib.request.build_opener(
+                urllib.request.HTTPSHandler(context=context), NoRedirect()
+            )
+        else:
+            self.opener = opener
+
+    def request(
+        self,
+        method: str,
+        url: str,
+        *,
+        headers: Mapping[str, str] | None = None,
+        body: bytes | None = None,
+        expected: frozenset[int],
+    ) -> HTTPResult:
+        parsed = urllib.parse.urlsplit(url)
+        if parsed.scheme != "https" or not parsed.netloc or parsed.username or parsed.password:
+            fail("provider endpoint must be an HTTPS URL without embedded credentials")
+        request = urllib.request.Request(
+            url, data=body, headers=dict(headers or {}), method=method
+        )
+        for attempt in range(self.retries + 1):
+            try:
+                with self.opener.open(request, timeout=self.timeout) as response:
+                    status = int(response.status)
+                    content_length = response.headers.get("Content-Length")
+                    if content_length:
+                        try:
+                            if int(content_length) > self.max_response_bytes:
+                                fail("provider response exceeds configured limit")
+                        except ValueError:
+                            fail("provider returned an invalid Content-Length")
+                    response_body = response.read(self.max_response_bytes + 1)
+                    if len(response_body) > self.max_response_bytes:
+                        fail("provider response exceeds configured limit")
+                    if status not in expected:
+                        fail(f"provider request failed with HTTP {status}")
+                    return HTTPResult(status, response.headers, response_body)
+            except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
+                status = int(exc.code)
+                if status not in RETRYABLE_STATUS or attempt >= self.retries:
+                    fail(f"provider request failed with HTTP {status}")
+            except (urllib.error.URLError, TimeoutError, OSError):
+                if attempt >= self.retries:
+                    fail("provider request failed after retries")
+            delay = min(8.0, 0.25 * (2**attempt)) * (0.5 + self.jitter())
+            self.sleeper(delay)
+        fail("provider request failed")
+
+
+def parse_json_response(result: HTTPResult, label: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    try:
+        return _object(json.loads(result.body.decode("utf-8")), label)
+    except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError):
+        fail(f"{label} is not valid JSON")
+
+
+def project_token_and_catalog(
+    client: HTTPClient, selectel: Mapping[str, Any], password: str
+) -> tuple[str, list[Any]]:
+    identity_url = selectel.get("identity_url", DEFAULT_IDENTITY_URL)
+    if not isinstance(identity_url, str):
+        fail("selectel.identity_url must be a string")
+    account_id = _required_string(selectel, "account_id", "selectel")
+    username = _required_string(selectel, "username", "selectel")
+    project_name = _required_string(selectel, "project_name", "selectel")
+    payload = {
+        "auth": {
+            "identity": {
+                "methods": ["password"],
+                "password": {
+                    "user": {
+                        "name": username,
+                        "domain": {"name": account_id},
+                        "password": password,
+                    }
+                },
+            },
+            "scope": {
+                "project": {
+                    "name": project_name,
+                    "domain": {"name": account_id},
+                }
+            },
+        }
+    }
+    result = client.request(
+        "POST",
+        identity_url,
+        headers={"Content-Type": "application/json", "Accept": "application/json"},
+        body=json.dumps(payload, separators=(",", ":")).encode("utf-8"),
+        expected=frozenset({201}),
+    )
+    token = result.headers.get("X-Subject-Token")
+    if not isinstance(token, str) or not token:
+        fail("identity response omitted X-Subject-Token")
+    document = parse_json_response(result, "identity response")
+    token_data = document.get("token")
+    if not isinstance(token_data, dict):
+        fail("identity response omitted token metadata")
+    project = token_data.get("project")
+    if not isinstance(project, dict) or not project.get("id"):
+        fail("identity token is not project-scoped")
+    catalog = token_data.get("catalog")
+    if not isinstance(catalog, list):
+        fail("identity response omitted service catalog")
+    return token, catalog
+
+
+def secrets_endpoint(catalog: list[Any], region: str, interface: str) -> str:
+    matches: list[str] = []
+    for service in catalog:
+        if not isinstance(service, dict) or service.get("type") != "secrets-manager":
+            continue
+        endpoints = service.get("endpoints")
+        if not isinstance(endpoints, list):
+            continue
+        for endpoint in endpoints:
+            if (
+                isinstance(endpoint, dict)
+                and endpoint.get("region") == region
+                and endpoint.get("interface") == interface
+                and isinstance(endpoint.get("url"), str)
+            ):
+                matches.append(endpoint["url"].rstrip("/"))
+    if len(matches) != 1:
+        fail("service catalog did not contain exactly one matching Secrets Manager endpoint")
+    return matches[0]
+
+
+def decode_secret(document: Mapping[str, Any], name: str, limit: int) -> bytes:
+    # GET /v1/{name} returns the current value inside ``version`` while
+    # GET /v1/{name}/versions/{id} returns a version object directly.
+    payload: Mapping[str, Any] = document
+    version = document.get("version")
+    if isinstance(version, dict):
+        payload = version
+    encoded = payload.get("value")
+    if not isinstance(encoded, str):
+        fail(f"secret {name} response omitted base64 value")
+    try:
+        value = base64.b64decode(encoded, validate=True)
+    except (binascii.Error, ValueError):
+        fail(f"secret {name} has invalid base64 encoding")
+    if not value:
+        fail(f"secret {name} is empty")
+    if len(value) > limit:
+        fail(f"secret {name} exceeds its configured limit")
+    if b"\x00" in value or b"\n" in value or b"\r" in value:
+        fail(f"secret {name} cannot be represented as a dotenv value")
+    return value
+
+
+def fetch_selectel(
+    config: Mapping[str, Any],
+    specs: Mapping[str, Mapping[str, Any]],
+    environ: Mapping[str, str],
+    client_factory: Callable[..., HTTPClient] = HTTPClient,
+) -> dict[str, bytes]:
+    selectel = _object(config.get("selectel"), "selectel")
+    _only_keys(
+        selectel,
+        {
+            "account_id",
+            "username",
+            "project_name",
+            "region",
+            "interface",
+            "password_file",
+            "password_env",
+            "identity_url",
+            "secrets_url",
+            "ca_file",
+        },
+        "selectel",
+    )
+    http = _object(config.get("http", {}), "http")
+    _only_keys(http, {"timeout_seconds", "retries", "max_response_bytes"}, "http")
+    timeout = http.get("timeout_seconds", 10)
+    if isinstance(timeout, bool) or not isinstance(timeout, (int, float)) or not 0.1 <= timeout <= 60:
+        fail("http.timeout_seconds must be from 0.1 through 60")
+    retries = _bounded_int(http.get("retries", 3), "http.retries", 0, 8)
+    response_limit = _bounded_int(
+        http.get("max_response_bytes", MAX_HTTP_BYTES),
+        "http.max_response_bytes",
+        1024,
+        4 * MAX_HTTP_BYTES,
+    )
+    cafile = selectel.get("ca_file")
+    if cafile is not None and (not isinstance(cafile, str) or not cafile):
+        fail("selectel.ca_file must be a non-empty string")
+    client = client_factory(
+        timeout=float(timeout),
+        retries=retries,
+        max_response_bytes=response_limit,
+        cafile=cafile,
+    )
+    password = credential_value(selectel, environ)
+    token, catalog = project_token_and_catalog(client, selectel, password)
+    region = _required_string(selectel, "region", "selectel")
+    interface = selectel.get("interface", "public")
+    if interface not in {"public", "internal"}:
+        fail("selectel.interface must be public or internal")
+    override = selectel.get("secrets_url")
+    if override is not None and (not isinstance(override, str) or not override):
+        fail("selectel.secrets_url must be a non-empty string")
+    base_url = override.rstrip("/") if override else secrets_endpoint(catalog, region, interface)
+
+    values: dict[str, bytes] = {}
+    fetched: dict[tuple[str, int | None], bytes] = {}
+    for canonical, spec in specs.items():
+        if "literal" in spec:
+            values[canonical] = b""
+            continue
+        remote = _required_string(spec, "remote", f"secrets.{canonical}")
+        version = spec.get("version")
+        version_id: int | None = None
+        if version is not None:
+            version_id = _bounded_int(
+                version, f"secrets.{canonical}.version", 1, 2_147_483_647
+            )
+        cache_key = (remote, version_id)
+        if cache_key not in fetched:
+            path = f"/v1/{urllib.parse.quote(remote, safe='')}"
+            if version_id is not None:
+                path += f"/versions/{version_id}"
+            try:
+                result = client.request(
+                    "GET",
+                    base_url + path,
+                    headers={"X-Auth-Token": token, "Accept": "application/json"},
+                    expected=frozenset({200}),
+                )
+                document = parse_json_response(result, f"secret {canonical} response")
+                fetched[cache_key] = decode_secret(
+                    document, canonical, MAX_SECRET_BYTES
+                )
+            except LoaderError as exc:
+                fail(f"cannot load {canonical}: {exc}")
+        limit = _bounded_int(
+            spec.get("max_bytes", MAX_SECRET_BYTES),
+            f"secrets.{canonical}.max_bytes",
+            1,
+            MAX_SECRET_BYTES,
+        )
+        value = fetched[cache_key]
+        if len(value) > limit:
+            fail(f"secret {canonical} exceeds its configured limit")
+        values[canonical] = value
+    return values
+
+
+def parse_dotenv(path: Path, expected: set[str], max_bytes: int) -> dict[str, bytes]:
+    require_private_regular_file(path, "fallback dotenv")
+    raw = read_limited(path, max_bytes, "fallback dotenv")
+    try:
+        text = raw.decode("utf-8")
+    except UnicodeDecodeError:
+        fail("fallback dotenv is not valid UTF-8")
+    values: dict[str, bytes] = {}
+    for number, line in enumerate(text.splitlines(), 1):
+        if not line or line.startswith("#"):
+            continue
+        match = DOTENV_LINE_RE.fullmatch(line)
+        if not match:
+            fail(f"fallback dotenv has invalid syntax at line {number}")
+        name, encoded_value = match.groups()
+        if name not in expected:
+            fail(f"fallback dotenv contains undeclared key {name}")
+        if name in values:
+            fail(f"fallback dotenv contains duplicate key {name}")
+        if encoded_value.startswith('"'):
+            try:
+                decoded = json.loads(encoded_value)
+            except json.JSONDecodeError:
+                fail(f"fallback dotenv has invalid quoted value at line {number}")
+            if not isinstance(decoded, str):
+                fail(f"fallback dotenv has invalid quoted value at line {number}")
+            value = decoded.encode("utf-8")
+        elif encoded_value.startswith("'"):
+            if len(encoded_value) < 2 or not encoded_value.endswith("'"):
+                fail(f"fallback dotenv has invalid quoted value at line {number}")
+            value = encoded_value[1:-1].encode("utf-8")
+        else:
+            if any(character.isspace() for character in encoded_value) or any(
+                character in encoded_value for character in ("'", '"', "`", "$", "\\")
+            ):
+                fail(f"fallback dotenv requires quoting at line {number}")
+            value = encoded_value.encode("utf-8")
+        if not value or b"\x00" in value or b"\n" in value or b"\r" in value:
+            fail(f"fallback dotenv has an empty or unsafe value for {name}")
+        values[name] = value
+    missing = sorted(expected - set(values))
+    if missing:
+        fail(f"fallback dotenv is missing declared keys: {', '.join(missing)}")
+    return values
+
+
+def validate_specs(config: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, dict[str, Any]]:
+    raw_specs = _object(config.get("secrets"), "secrets")
+    if not raw_specs:
+        fail("secrets must not be empty")
+    specs: dict[str, dict[str, Any]] = {}
+    for canonical, raw_spec in raw_specs.items():
+        if not isinstance(canonical, str) or not ENV_NAME_RE.fullmatch(canonical):
+            fail("every canonical secret name must be an uppercase environment name")
+        spec = _object(raw_spec, f"secrets.{canonical}")
+        _only_keys(
+            spec,
+            {"remote", "consumers", "max_bytes", "version", "literal"},
+            f"secrets.{canonical}",
+        )
+        has_remote = "remote" in spec
+        has_literal = "literal" in spec
+        if has_remote == has_literal:
+            fail(f"secrets.{canonical} must set exactly one of remote or literal")
+        if has_literal and spec["literal"] != "":
+            fail(f"secrets.{canonical}.literal may only be an empty string")
+        consumers = spec.get("consumers")
+        if not isinstance(consumers, list) or not consumers:
+            fail(f"secrets.{canonical}.consumers must be a non-empty array")
+        if len(consumers) != len(set(item for item in consumers if isinstance(item, str))):
+            fail(f"secrets.{canonical}.consumers contains duplicates or invalid values")
+        for consumer in consumers:
+            if not isinstance(consumer, str) or not SERVICE_NAME_RE.fullmatch(consumer):
+                fail(f"secrets.{canonical}.consumers contains an invalid service name")
+        specs[canonical] = spec
+    return specs
+
+
+def dotenv_quote(value: bytes, name: str) -> str:
+    try:
+        text = value.decode("utf-8")
+    except UnicodeDecodeError:
+        fail(f"secret {name} is not valid UTF-8")
+    return json.dumps(text, ensure_ascii=False)
+
+
+def materialize(runtime_dir: Path, specs: Mapping[str, Mapping[str, Any]], values: Mapping[str, bytes]) -> None:
+    try:
+        runtime_dir.mkdir(mode=0o700, parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        if runtime_dir.is_symlink():
+            fail("runtime directory must not be a symlink")
+        os.chmod(runtime_dir, 0o700)
+    except OSError as exc:
+        fail(f"cannot prepare runtime directory: {exc.strerror or exc.__class__.__name__}")
+    consumers = sorted(
+        {consumer for spec in specs.values() for consumer in spec["consumers"]}
+    )
+    staged: list[tuple[Path, Path]] = []
+    try:
+        for consumer in consumers:
+            lines = [
+                f"{name}={dotenv_quote(values[name], name)}\n"
+                for name, spec in sorted(specs.items())
+                if consumer in spec["consumers"]
+            ]
+            descriptor, temporary = tempfile.mkstemp(
+                prefix=f".{consumer}.", suffix=".tmp", dir=runtime_dir
+            )
+            temporary_path = Path(temporary)
+            try:
+                os.chmod(temporary_path, 0o600)
+                stream = os.fdopen(descriptor, "w", encoding="utf-8", newline="\n")
+                descriptor = -1
+                with stream:
+                    stream.writelines(lines)
+                    stream.flush()
+                    os.fsync(stream.fileno())
+            except BaseException:
+                if descriptor >= 0:
+                    os.close(descriptor)
+                raise
+            staged.append((temporary_path, runtime_dir / f"{consumer}.env"))
+        for temporary_path, destination in staged:
+            os.replace(temporary_path, destination)
+        value_paths: dict[str, Path] = {}
+        for name, value in sorted(values.items()):
+            descriptor, temporary = tempfile.mkstemp(
+                prefix=f".{name}.", suffix=".tmp", dir=runtime_dir
+            )
+            temporary_path = Path(temporary)
+            try:
+                # Compose implements local secrets as bind mounts. The protected
+                # 0700 parent prevents host users from traversing to this 0444
+                # file while allowing a non-root container UID to read its mount.
+                os.chmod(temporary_path, 0o444)
+                with os.fdopen(descriptor, "wb") as stream:
+                    descriptor = -1
+                    stream.write(value)
+                    stream.flush()
+                    os.fsync(stream.fileno())
+            except BaseException:
+                if descriptor >= 0:
+                    os.close(descriptor)
+                temporary_path.unlink(missing_ok=True)
+                raise
+            destination = runtime_dir / name
+            os.replace(temporary_path, destination)
+            value_paths[name] = destination
+
+        manifest_lines = [
+            f"{name}={path.resolve()}\n" for name, path in sorted(value_paths.items())
+        ]
+        descriptor, temporary = tempfile.mkstemp(
+            prefix=".manifest.", suffix=".tmp", dir=runtime_dir
+        )
+        manifest_path = Path(temporary)
+        try:
+            os.chmod(manifest_path, 0o600)
+            with os.fdopen(descriptor, "w", encoding="utf-8", newline="\n") as stream:
+                descriptor = -1
+                stream.writelines(manifest_lines)
+                stream.flush()
+                os.fsync(stream.fileno())
+        except BaseException:
+            if descriptor >= 0:
+                os.close(descriptor)
+            manifest_path.unlink(missing_ok=True)
+            raise
+        os.replace(manifest_path, runtime_dir / "manifest")
+        if hasattr(os, "O_DIRECTORY"):
+            directory_fd = os.open(runtime_dir, os.O_RDONLY | os.O_DIRECTORY)
+            try:
+                os.fsync(directory_fd)
+            finally:
+                os.close(directory_fd)
+    except OSError as exc:
+        fail(f"cannot atomically materialize service files: {exc.strerror or exc.__class__.__name__}")
+    finally:
+        for temporary_path, _ in staged:
+            try:
+                temporary_path.unlink(missing_ok=True)
+            except OSError:
+                pass
+
+
+def run(
+    config_path: Path,
+    *,
+    runtime_override: Path | None = None,
+    environ: Mapping[str, str] | None = None,
+    client_factory: Callable[..., HTTPClient] = HTTPClient,
+) -> list[str]:
+    os.umask(0o077)
+    environment = os.environ if environ is None else environ
+    config = load_json(config_path)
+    _only_keys(config, {"version", "mode", "runtime_dir", "http", "selectel", "file", "secrets"}, "configuration")
+    if config.get("version") != 1:
+        fail("configuration.version must be 1")
+    mode = config.get("mode")
+    if mode not in {"selectel", "file"}:
+        fail("configuration.mode must explicitly be selectel or file")
+    specs = validate_specs(config)
+    if runtime_override is None:
+        configured_runtime = config.get("runtime_dir")
+        if not isinstance(configured_runtime, str) or not configured_runtime:
+            fail("configuration.runtime_dir must be a non-empty string")
+        runtime_dir = Path(configured_runtime)
+    else:
+        runtime_dir = runtime_override
+    if not runtime_dir.is_absolute():
+        fail("runtime directory must be an absolute path")
+
+    if mode == "selectel":
+        if "file" in config:
+            fail("file settings are forbidden in selectel mode")
+        values = fetch_selectel(config, specs, environment, client_factory)
+    else:
+        if "selectel" in config or "http" in config:
+            fail("selectel and http settings are forbidden in file mode")
+        file_config = _object(config.get("file"), "file")
+        _only_keys(file_config, {"path", "max_bytes"}, "file")
+        source = Path(_required_string(file_config, "path", "file"))
+        if not source.is_absolute():
+            fail("file.path must be absolute")
+        max_bytes = _bounded_int(
+            file_config.get("max_bytes", MAX_CONFIG_BYTES),
+            "file.max_bytes",
+            1,
+            4 * MAX_CONFIG_BYTES,
+        )
+        expected = {name for name, spec in specs.items() if "literal" not in spec}
+        values = parse_dotenv(source, expected, max_bytes)
+        values.update(
+            {name: b"" for name, spec in specs.items() if "literal" in spec}
+        )
+        for canonical, value in values.items():
+            limit = _bounded_int(
+                specs[canonical].get("max_bytes", MAX_SECRET_BYTES),
+                f"secrets.{canonical}.max_bytes",
+                1,
+                MAX_SECRET_BYTES,
+            )
+            if len(value) > limit:
+                fail(f"secret {canonical} exceeds its configured limit")
+
+    materialize(runtime_dir, specs, values)
+    return sorted({consumer for spec in specs.values() for consumer in spec["consumers"]})
+
+
+def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Materialize per-service secret dotenv files")
+    parser.add_argument("--config", required=True, type=Path)
+    parser.add_argument("--runtime-dir", type=Path)
+    arguments = parser.parse_args(argv)
+    try:
+        consumers = run(arguments.config, runtime_override=arguments.runtime_dir)
+    except LoaderError as exc:
+        print(f"secrets-loader: {exc}", file=sys.stderr)
+        return 1
+    print(f"secrets-loader: materialized {len(consumers)} service file(s)", file=sys.stderr)
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())