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Перенесены секреты из .env в SM

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This commit is contained in:
mi
2026-07-30 19:22:48 +03:00
parent 049c45db5c
commit e24ed9d8ef
58 changed files with 3350 additions and 1054 deletions
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backlog.md
+9
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@@ -49,6 +49,15 @@
21. Спрятать сеть за балансировщиком нагрузки
22. Автопродление TLS падает при перезагрузке nginx; сертификат действует до 14.10.2026. (Исправить reload внутри контейнера и проверить systemctl start an-chat-ssl-renew.service до успешного завершения.)
23. WireGuard-only SSH.
25. Перенести секреты из .env в KMS Selectel.
26. Запрет входа под root: В /etc/ssh/sshd_config установите PermitRootLogin no. Заходите под обычным пользователем (например, deploy) и используйте sudo для админских задач.
27. Удалите все ненужные пакеты, компиляторы (gcc, make) и сервисы. Чем меньше программ на сервере, тем меньше потенциальных уязвимостей.
28. Монтирование с флагами безопасности: Разделы диска (особенно /tmp и /var/tmp) следует монтировать с флагами noexec (запрет запуска исполняемых файлов) и nosuid (игнорирование битов setuid).
29. Systemd-ограничения: используйте директивы в юните
NoNewPrivileges=yes # Запрещает повышение привилегий через setuid
ProtectSystem=strict # Делает всю ОС доступной только для чтения
PrivateTmp=yes # Дает процессу свой изолированный /tmp
ProtectHome=yes # Скрывает домашние директории пользователей
24. Добавить логи (Для Python-сервисов добавить OTLP Log Exporter: api-backend; sms-service; sms-worker. Подключить LoggerProvider, BatchLogRecordProcessor и bounded queue. Передавать resource attributes: service.name; service.version; deployment.environment; service.namespace=han-chat.) Экспортировать структурированные поля request_id, trace_id, span_id, severity и event name. Оставить stdout как аварийный локальный журнал. Добавить canary-тесты, запрещающие экспорт токенов, cookie, телефонов, email, текстов сообщений, SQL и object keys.).
25. Nginx metrics/tracing в signoz
codebase/backend/.env.example
+9 -69
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@@ -1,4 +1,7 @@
# Copy to .env, replace every placeholder, then run: ./scripts/validate-env .env
# Non-secret deployment configuration only.
# Copy to .env, replace placeholders, then run: ./scripts/validate-env .env
# Secrets are supplied at runtime by deployment/secrets/han-secrets.
SECRETS_SOURCE=file
APP_ENV=production-like
RELEASE_VERSION=change-me-release
LOG_LEVEL=INFO
@@ -12,22 +15,15 @@ BITRIX_SYNC_IMAGE=han-chat-bitrix-sync:local
KEYCLOAK_IMAGE=han-chat-keycloak:local
SMS_SERVICE_IMAGE=han-chat-sms-service:local
# Managed PostgreSQL is external to Compose. All production DSNs must verify TLS.
# Managed PostgreSQL is external to Compose. Credential-bearing DSNs are secrets.
HAN_PG_HOST=managed-pg.private.example
HAN_PG_PORT=5433
HAN_PG_DATABASE=han_chat
PG_CA_HOST_PATH=/opt/han-chat/secrets/pg/ca.pem
# PgBouncer session mode uses each role's database-level search_path; do not pass libpq options.
DATABASE_URL=postgresql+asyncpg://han_app:change-me@managed-pg.private.example:5433/han_chat?sslmode=verify-full&sslrootcert=/run/secrets/pg-ca.pem
BITRIX_DATABASE_URL=postgresql://bitrix_local_app:change-me@managed-pg.private.example:5433/han_chat?sslmode=verify-full&sslrootcert=/run/secrets/pg-ca.pem
BITRIX_SYNC_APP_DATABASE_URL=postgresql://bitrix_sync_user:change-me@managed-pg.private.example:5433/han_chat?sslmode=verify-full&sslrootcert=/run/secrets/pg-ca.pem
BITRIX_SYNC_DATABASE_URL=postgresql://bitrix_sync_user:change-me@managed-pg.private.example:5433/han_chat?sslmode=verify-full&sslrootcert=/run/secrets/pg-ca.pem
MESSAGE_SAFETY_DATABASE_URL=postgresql://message_safety_app:change-me@managed-pg.private.example:5433/han_chat?sslmode=verify-full&sslrootcert=/run/secrets/pg-ca.pem
SMS_DATABASE_URL=postgresql+asyncpg://sms_user:change-me@managed-pg.private.example:5433/han_chat?sslmode=verify-full&sslrootcert=/run/secrets/pg-ca.pem
# PgBouncer session mode uses database-level search_path; runtime DSNs must not pass options/currentSchema.
KEYCLOAK_DB_URL=jdbc:postgresql://managed-pg.private.example:5433/han_chat?sslmode=verify-full&sslrootcert=/run/secrets/pg-ca.pem
KEYCLOAK_DB_SCHEMA=keycloak
KEYCLOAK_DB_USERNAME=keycloak_user
KEYCLOAK_DB_PASSWORD=change-me
PUBLIC_HOST=chat.example.ru
PUBLIC_WEB_URL=https://chat.example.ru
@@ -70,61 +66,21 @@ KEYCLOAK_REALM=han-chat
KEYCLOAK_AUDIENCE=han-chat-api
# На мок среде true,true. На продакшн false,false.
KEYCLOAK_OTP_MOCK_ENABLED=true
KEYCLOAK_OTP_MOCK_CODE=change-me
KEYCLOAK_OTP_MOCK_RISK_ACCEPTED=false
KEYCLOAK_YANDEX_CAPTCHA_ENABLED=false
# Обязательны только при KEYCLOAK_YANDEX_CAPTCHA_ENABLED=true.
# Public site key; the server key stays in Secrets Manager when CAPTCHA is enabled.
KEYCLOAK_YANDEX_CAPTCHA_CLIENT_KEY=
KEYCLOAK_YANDEX_CAPTCHA_SERVER_KEY=
# (openssl rand -hex 32)
KEYCLOAK_OTP_HMAC_KEY=change-me
KEYCLOAK_OTP_SETTINGS_MAX_STALE_SEC=300
KEYCLOAK_SETTINGS_BRIDGE_URL=http://api-backend:8000/internal/settings/v1/otp
KEYCLOAK_SMS_SERVICE_URL=http://sms-service:8080
# Должен совпадать с SMS_SERVICE_TOKEN.
KEYCLOAK_SMS_SERVICE_TOKEN=change-me
KEYCLOAK_ADMIN=bootstrap-admin
# (openssl rand -hex 32)
KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD=change-me
# (openssl rand -hex 32)
CURSOR_HMAC_SECRET=change-me
# Redis пароль 1 (openssl rand -hex 32)
REDIS_API_PASSWORD=change-me
REDIS_URL=redis://api_backend:change-me@redis:6379/0
REDIS_REALTIME_URL=redis://api_backend:change-me@redis:6379/1
# Redis пароль 2 (openssl rand -hex 32)
REDIS_SAFETY_PASSWORD=change-me
MESSAGE_SAFETY_REDIS_URL=redis://message_safety:change-me@redis:6379/2
# Redis пароль 3 (openssl rand -hex 32)
REDIS_HEALTH_PASSWORD=change-me
REDIS_MAXMEMORY=384mb
REDIS_EVICTION_POLICY=volatile-lru
#token1 (openssl rand -hex 32)
MESSAGE_SAFETY_SERVICE_TOKEN=change-me
#token2 (openssl rand -hex 32)
BITRIX_LOCAL_APP_INTERNAL_TOKEN=change-me
BITRIX_INTERNAL_API_TOKEN=change-me
#token3 (openssl rand -hex 32)
BITRIX_API_FORWARD_TOKEN=change-me
BITRIX_API_INBOX_TOKEN=change-me
#token4 (openssl rand -hex 32)
BITRIX_SYNC_SERVICE_TOKEN=change-me
#token5 (openssl rand -hex 32)
KEYCLOAK_SETTINGS_BRIDGE_TOKEN=change-me
#token6 (openssl rand -hex 32), должен совпадать с KEYCLOAK_SMS_SERVICE_TOKEN
SMS_SERVICE_TOKEN=change-me
# Тестовый продюсер Internal Notifications API. В БД хранится только hash.
NOTIFICATIONS_TOKEN_PRODUCER_TEST=change-me
# i-Digital Direct. Перед production заменить placeholders согласованными значениями.
# i-Digital Direct non-secret configuration.
IDGTL_SMS_BASE_URL=https://direct.i-dgtl.ru
IDGTL_SMS_API_KEY=change-me
IDGTL_SMS_CALLBACK_PUBLIC_URL=https://chat.example.ru/callbacks/idgtl/sms
IDGTL_SMS_CALLBACK_USERNAME=change-me
IDGTL_SMS_CALLBACK_PASSWORD=change-me
BITRIX_LOCAL_APP_BASE_URL=http://bitrix-local-app:8080
BITRIX_API_INBOX_PATH=/internal/openlines/v1/inbox
@@ -139,28 +95,17 @@ MESSAGE_SAFETY_RULES_VERSION=2026-01-01
#Отключение синхронизации (при отключенной синхронизации параметры ниже не работают)
BITRIX_SYNC_ENABLED=false
BITRIX_SYNC_CRM_BASE_URL=https://example.bitrix24.ru
BITRIX_SYNC_CRM_WEBHOOK_URL=change-me
BITRIX_SYNC_CONTACT_MAP_INTERVAL_SEC=60
BITRIX_SYNC_CONTACT_UPDATE_INTERVAL_SEC=30
BITRIX_SYNC_CRM_MAX_CONCURRENCY=2
BITRIX_SYNC_CONTACT_LIST_BATCH_SIZE=50
# (openssl rand -hex 32)
BITRIX_SYNC_WEBHOOK_TOKEN=change-me
# Сначала регистрируется приложение в Битрикс24, потом тут прописываются секреты
BITRIX_CLIENT_ID=change-me
BITRIX_CLIENT_SECRET=change-me
BITRIX_APPLICATION_TOKEN=change-me
BITRIX_CLIENT_ID=change-me-client-id
BITRIX_CONNECTOR_ID=han_mobile_app
BITRIX_CONNECTOR_NAME=HAN Mobile App
BITRIX_OPEN_LINE_ID=<N>
BITRIX_EXPECTED_DOMAIN=<ваш-портал>.bitrix24.ru
BITRIX_PUBLIC_BASE_URL=https://chat.example.ru/bitrix
# ENCRYPTION_KEY обязательно через base64
# Generate with: python -c "import base64,secrets; print(base64.urlsafe_b64encode(secrets.token_bytes(32)).decode())"
BITRIX_TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY=change-me
BITRIX_HTTP_TIMEOUT_SEC=10
BITRIX_LOCAL_APP_HTTP_TIMEOUT_SEC=20
@@ -168,10 +113,6 @@ SELECTEL_S3_ENDPOINT_URL=https://s3.ru-7.storage.selcloud.ru
SELECTEL_S3_BUCKET_DOCUMENTS=han-chat-documents
SELECTEL_S3_BUCKET_ATTACHMENTS=han-chat-attachments
SELECTEL_S3_BUCKET_QUARANTINE=han-chat-quarantine
SELECTEL_S3_ACCESS_KEY=change-me
SELECTEL_S3_SECRET_KEY=change-me
SELECTEL_S3_QUARANTINE_READ_ACCESS_KEY=change-me
SELECTEL_S3_QUARANTINE_READ_SECRET_KEY=change-me
OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT=http://otel-collector:4317
OTEL_SERVICE_NAME_API=api-backend
@@ -181,7 +122,6 @@ SMS_METRICS_PORT=9464
#Если есть внешний OTLP-сервис, замените (Точный формат авторизации зависит от провайдера):
#Если внешнего OTLP-сервиса пока нет, otlp.example.invalid:4317 можно временно оставить, но Collector будет постоянно пытаться подключиться, писать предупреждения и накапливать очередь.
OTEL_REMOTE_ENDPOINT=otlp.example.invalid:4317
OTEL_REMOTE_AUTH_HEADER=change-me
# true только для plaintext OTLP внутри доверенной приватной сети (например self-hosted SigNoz).
OTEL_REMOTE_TLS_INSECURE=false
# SDK отправляет все spans локальному Collector; решение о хранении принимает tail_sampling.
codebase/backend/api-backend/Dockerfile
+3 -2
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@@ -13,7 +13,8 @@ COPY --from=builder /build/dist/*.whl /tmp/
RUN pip install --no-cache-dir /tmp/*.whl && rm -f /tmp/*.whl
COPY alembic.ini ./
COPY alembic ./alembic
COPY --chmod=0555 container-entrypoint.sh /usr/local/bin/han-container-entrypoint
USER 10001:10001
EXPOSE 8000
ENTRYPOINT ["uvicorn"]
CMD ["app.main:app", "--host", "0.0.0.0", "--port", "8000", "--no-proxy-headers"]
ENTRYPOINT ["/usr/local/bin/han-container-entrypoint"]
CMD ["uvicorn", "app.main:app", "--host", "0.0.0.0", "--port", "8000", "--no-proxy-headers"]
codebase/backend/api-backend/alembic/env.py
+2 -2
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@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
import asyncio
import os
from logging.config import fileConfig
from sqlalchemy import pool
@@ -6,12 +7,11 @@ from sqlalchemy import pool
from alembic import context
from app.db import Base
from app.postgres import create_postgres_engine
from app.settings import get_settings
config = context.config
if config.config_file_name:
fileConfig(config.config_file_name)
database_url = get_settings().database_url
database_url = os.environ["DATABASE_URL"]
config.set_main_option("sqlalchemy.url", database_url.replace("%", "%%"))
target_metadata = Base.metadata
codebase/backend/api-backend/app/logging_security.py
+47
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@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
from __future__ import annotations
import re
from collections.abc import Mapping
from typing import Any
REDACTED = "[REDACTED]"
_SENSITIVE_KEY = re.compile(
r"(authorization|cookie|password|passwd|secret|token|api[_-]?key|"
r"database[_-]?url|redis[_-]?url|dsn|callback[_-]?url)",
re.IGNORECASE,
)
_URI_USERINFO = re.compile(r"(?P<scheme>[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*://)[^/@\s]+@", re.IGNORECASE)
_QUERY_SECRET = re.compile(
r"(?P<prefix>[?&](?:token|access_token|api_key|key|secret|password)=)[^&#\s]+",
re.IGNORECASE,
)
_AUTH_VALUE = re.compile(r"\b(Bearer|Basic)\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]+", re.IGNORECASE)
def sanitize_text(value: str) -> str:
value = _URI_USERINFO.sub(r"\g<scheme>[REDACTED]@", value)
value = _QUERY_SECRET.sub(r"\g<prefix>[REDACTED]", value)
return _AUTH_VALUE.sub(r"\1 [REDACTED]", value)
def sanitize_value(value: Any) -> Any:
if isinstance(value, str):
return sanitize_text(value)
if isinstance(value, Mapping):
return {
str(key): REDACTED if _SENSITIVE_KEY.search(str(key)) else sanitize_value(item)
for key, item in value.items()
}
if isinstance(value, list):
return [sanitize_value(item) for item in value]
if isinstance(value, tuple):
return tuple(sanitize_value(item) for item in value)
return value
def redact_event(
_logger: Any,
_method_name: str,
event_dict: dict[str, Any],
) -> dict[str, Any]:
return sanitize_value(event_dict)
codebase/backend/api-backend/app/main.py
+7 -1
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@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ from app.integrations import (
S3Client,
SafetyClient,
)
from app.logging_security import redact_event
from app.metrics import AUTH_BOOTSTRAP, HTTP_DURATION, HTTP_REQUESTS, RATE_LIMIT_DECISIONS
from app.notification_routes import router as notification_router
from app.notification_service import synchronize_source_tokens
@@ -96,6 +97,7 @@ def configure_logging(level: str) -> None:
processors=[
structlog.contextvars.merge_contextvars,
add_trace_context,
redact_event,
structlog.processors.TimeStamper(fmt="iso", utc=True, key="timestamp"),
structlog.stdlib.add_log_level,
structlog.processors.JSONRenderer(),
@@ -342,7 +344,11 @@ async def http_error(request: Request, exc: StarletteHTTPException):
@app.exception_handler(Exception)
async def unhandled_error(request: Request, exc: Exception):
log.exception("request.failed", error_code="internal_error")
log.error(
"request.failed",
error_code="internal_error",
error_type=type(exc).__name__,
)
return error_response(request, "internal_error", "Internal server error", 500)
codebase/backend/api-backend/container-entrypoint.sh
+23
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@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
#!/bin/sh
set -eu
for name in ${HAN_SECRET_VARS:-}; do
case "$name" in
""|[0-9]*|*[!A-Z0-9_]*)
echo "container secrets: invalid variable name" >&2
exit 64
;;
*) ;;
esac
eval "file=\${${name}_FILE:-}"
if [ -z "$file" ] || [ ! -r "$file" ]; then
echo "container secrets: missing file for $name" >&2
exit 66
fi
value=$(cat "$file")
export "$name=$value"
unset "${name}_FILE"
done
unset HAN_SECRET_VARS
exec "$@"
codebase/backend/api-backend/docker-compose.yml
+50 -11
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@@ -5,39 +5,54 @@ services:
expose:
- "8000"
environment:
HAN_SECRET_VARS: >-
DATABASE_URL REDIS_URL REDIS_REALTIME_URL MESSAGE_SAFETY_SERVICE_TOKEN
BITRIX_LOCAL_APP_INTERNAL_TOKEN BITRIX_API_INBOX_TOKEN
KEYCLOAK_SETTINGS_BRIDGE_TOKEN SELECTEL_S3_ACCESS_KEY SELECTEL_S3_SECRET_KEY
CURSOR_HMAC_SECRET
DATABASE_URL_FILE: /run/secrets/api_database_url
REDIS_URL_FILE: /run/secrets/api_redis_url
REDIS_REALTIME_URL_FILE: /run/secrets/api_redis_realtime_url
MESSAGE_SAFETY_SERVICE_TOKEN_FILE: /run/secrets/message_safety_service_token
BITRIX_LOCAL_APP_INTERNAL_TOKEN_FILE: /run/secrets/bitrix_local_app_internal_token
BITRIX_API_INBOX_TOKEN_FILE: /run/secrets/bitrix_api_inbox_token
KEYCLOAK_SETTINGS_BRIDGE_TOKEN_FILE: /run/secrets/keycloak_settings_bridge_token
SELECTEL_S3_ACCESS_KEY_FILE: /run/secrets/selectel_s3_access_key
SELECTEL_S3_SECRET_KEY_FILE: /run/secrets/selectel_s3_secret_key
CURSOR_HMAC_SECRET_FILE: /run/secrets/cursor_hmac_secret
APP_ENV: ${APP_ENV}
API_PORT: ${API_PORT:-8000}
LOG_LEVEL: ${LOG_LEVEL:-INFO}
DATABASE_URL: ${DATABASE_URL}
REDIS_URL: ${REDIS_URL}
REDIS_REALTIME_URL: ${REDIS_REALTIME_URL}
KEYCLOAK_PUBLIC_URL: ${KEYCLOAK_PUBLIC_URL}
KEYCLOAK_INTERNAL_URL: ${KEYCLOAK_INTERNAL_URL}
KEYCLOAK_REALM: ${KEYCLOAK_REALM}
KEYCLOAK_AUDIENCE: ${KEYCLOAK_AUDIENCE}
MESSAGE_SAFETY_URL: ${MESSAGE_SAFETY_URL}
MESSAGE_SAFETY_SERVICE_TOKEN: ${MESSAGE_SAFETY_SERVICE_TOKEN}
MESSAGE_SAFETY_POST_TIMEOUT_SEC: ${MESSAGE_SAFETY_POST_TIMEOUT_SEC:-5}
MESSAGE_SAFETY_TASK_POLL_INTERVAL_SEC: ${MESSAGE_SAFETY_TASK_POLL_INTERVAL_SEC:-2}
MESSAGE_SAFETY_TASK_POLL_MAX_SEC: ${MESSAGE_SAFETY_TASK_POLL_MAX_SEC:-300}
MESSAGE_SAFETY_CIRCUIT_FAILURE_THRESHOLD: ${MESSAGE_SAFETY_CIRCUIT_FAILURE_THRESHOLD:-5}
MESSAGE_SAFETY_CIRCUIT_OPEN_SEC: ${MESSAGE_SAFETY_CIRCUIT_OPEN_SEC:-30}
BITRIX_LOCAL_APP_BASE_URL: ${BITRIX_LOCAL_APP_BASE_URL}
BITRIX_LOCAL_APP_INTERNAL_TOKEN: ${BITRIX_LOCAL_APP_INTERNAL_TOKEN}
BITRIX_API_INBOX_TOKEN: ${BITRIX_API_INBOX_TOKEN}
BITRIX_LOCAL_APP_HTTP_TIMEOUT_SEC: ${BITRIX_LOCAL_APP_HTTP_TIMEOUT_SEC:-20}
BITRIX_LOCAL_APP_CIRCUIT_FAILURE_THRESHOLD: ${BITRIX_LOCAL_APP_CIRCUIT_FAILURE_THRESHOLD:-5}
BITRIX_LOCAL_APP_CIRCUIT_OPEN_SEC: ${BITRIX_LOCAL_APP_CIRCUIT_OPEN_SEC:-30}
KEYCLOAK_SETTINGS_BRIDGE_TOKEN: ${KEYCLOAK_SETTINGS_BRIDGE_TOKEN}
SELECTEL_S3_ENDPOINT_URL: ${SELECTEL_S3_ENDPOINT_URL}
SELECTEL_S3_BUCKET_DOCUMENTS: ${SELECTEL_S3_BUCKET_DOCUMENTS}
SELECTEL_S3_BUCKET_ATTACHMENTS: ${SELECTEL_S3_BUCKET_ATTACHMENTS}
SELECTEL_S3_BUCKET_QUARANTINE: ${SELECTEL_S3_BUCKET_QUARANTINE}
SELECTEL_S3_ACCESS_KEY: ${SELECTEL_S3_ACCESS_KEY}
SELECTEL_S3_SECRET_KEY: ${SELECTEL_S3_SECRET_KEY}
OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT: ${OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT}
CURSOR_HMAC_SECRET: ${CURSOR_HMAC_SECRET}
NOTIFICATIONS_TOKEN_PRODUCER_TEST: ${NOTIFICATIONS_TOKEN_PRODUCER_TEST}
secrets:
- api_database_url
- api_redis_url
- api_redis_realtime_url
- message_safety_service_token
- bitrix_local_app_internal_token
- bitrix_api_inbox_token
- keycloak_settings_bridge_token
- selectel_s3_access_key
- selectel_s3_secret_key
- cursor_hmac_secret
healthcheck:
test:
- CMD
@@ -48,6 +63,8 @@ services:
timeout: 3s
retries: 5
restart: unless-stopped
ulimits:
core: {soft: 0, hard: 0}
networks:
- backend
- observability
@@ -55,3 +72,25 @@ services:
networks:
backend:
observability:
secrets:
api_database_url:
file: ${HAN_SECRETS_DIR:-/run/han-chat/secrets}/DATABASE_URL
api_redis_url:
file: ${HAN_SECRETS_DIR:-/run/han-chat/secrets}/REDIS_URL
api_redis_realtime_url:
file: ${HAN_SECRETS_DIR:-/run/han-chat/secrets}/REDIS_REALTIME_URL
message_safety_service_token:
file: ${HAN_SECRETS_DIR:-/run/han-chat/secrets}/MESSAGE_SAFETY_SERVICE_TOKEN
bitrix_local_app_internal_token:
file: ${HAN_SECRETS_DIR:-/run/han-chat/secrets}/BITRIX_LOCAL_APP_INTERNAL_TOKEN
bitrix_api_inbox_token:
file: ${HAN_SECRETS_DIR:-/run/han-chat/secrets}/BITRIX_API_INBOX_TOKEN
keycloak_settings_bridge_token:
file: ${HAN_SECRETS_DIR:-/run/han-chat/secrets}/KEYCLOAK_SETTINGS_BRIDGE_TOKEN
selectel_s3_access_key:
file: ${HAN_SECRETS_DIR:-/run/han-chat/secrets}/SELECTEL_S3_ACCESS_KEY
selectel_s3_secret_key:
file: ${HAN_SECRETS_DIR:-/run/han-chat/secrets}/SELECTEL_S3_SECRET_KEY
cursor_hmac_secret:
file: ${HAN_SECRETS_DIR:-/run/han-chat/secrets}/CURSOR_HMAC_SECRET
codebase/backend/api-backend/tests/unit/test_logging_security.py
+31
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@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
from app.logging_security import REDACTED, redact_event, sanitize_text
def test_redacts_sensitive_fields_recursively() -> None:
event = {
"authorization": "Bearer top-secret",
"nested": {
"database_url": "postgresql://user:password@db/app",
"safe": "kept",
},
}
redacted = redact_event(None, "info", event)
assert redacted["authorization"] == REDACTED
assert redacted["nested"]["database_url"] == REDACTED
assert redacted["nested"]["safe"] == "kept"
def test_redacts_credentials_embedded_in_text() -> None:
value = (
"POST https://callback-user:callback-password@example.test/cb"
"?token=query-secret Authorization=Bearer header-secret"
)
redacted = sanitize_text(value)
assert "callback-password" not in redacted
assert "query-secret" not in redacted
assert "header-secret" not in redacted
assert redacted.count(REDACTED) == 3
codebase/backend/bitrix-local-app/Dockerfile
+2
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@@ -6,7 +6,9 @@ COPY app ./app
COPY alembic ./alembic
COPY alembic.ini pyproject.toml ./
RUN pip install --no-cache-dir .
COPY --chmod=0555 container-entrypoint.sh /usr/local/bin/han-container-entrypoint
USER app
EXPOSE 8080
HEALTHCHECK --interval=30s --timeout=3s CMD python -c "import urllib.request; urllib.request.urlopen('http://127.0.0.1:8080/health/live', timeout=2)"
ENTRYPOINT ["/usr/local/bin/han-container-entrypoint"]
CMD ["uvicorn", "app.main:app", "--host", "0.0.0.0", "--port", "8080"]
codebase/backend/bitrix-local-app/app/main.py
+8 -5
View File
@@ -766,7 +766,7 @@ def create_app(settings: Settings | None = None) -> FastAPI:
timeout=cfg.bitrix_http_timeout_sec,
)
except Exception as exc:
logger.exception(
logger.error(
"outbound delivery failed",
extra={
"request_id": request.state.request_id,
@@ -1153,8 +1153,11 @@ async def worker_loop(app: FastAPI, kind: str) -> None:
await process_outbound(app)
else:
await process_setup(app)
except Exception:
logger.exception("worker iteration failed", extra={"worker_kind": kind})
except Exception as exc:
logger.error(
"worker iteration failed",
extra={"worker_kind": kind, "error_type": type(exc).__name__},
)
try:
await asyncio.wait_for(app.state.stop.wait(), app.state.settings.bitrix_worker_poll_sec)
except TimeoutError:
@@ -1197,7 +1200,7 @@ async def process_inbox(app: FastAPI) -> None:
)
await session.commit()
except Exception as exc:
logger.exception(
logger.error(
"inbound forward failed",
extra={
"inbox_id": str(row.id),
@@ -1275,7 +1278,7 @@ async def process_outbound(app: FastAPI) -> None:
timeout=app.state.settings.bitrix_http_timeout_sec,
)
except Exception as exc:
logger.exception(
logger.error(
"outbound retry failed",
extra={
"outbound_id": str(row.id),
codebase/backend/bitrix-local-app/container-entrypoint.sh
+23
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
#!/bin/sh
set -eu
for name in ${HAN_SECRET_VARS:-}; do
case "$name" in
""|[0-9]*|*[!A-Z0-9_]*)
echo "container secrets: invalid variable name" >&2
exit 64
;;
*) ;;
esac
eval "file=\${${name}_FILE:-}"
if [ -z "$file" ] || [ ! -r "$file" ]; then
echo "container secrets: missing file for $name" >&2
exit 66
fi
value=$(cat "$file")
export "$name=$value"
unset "${name}_FILE"
done
unset HAN_SECRET_VARS
exec "$@"
codebase/backend/bitrix-sync/Dockerfile
+2
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,9 @@ COPY app ./app
COPY alembic ./alembic
COPY alembic.ini pyproject.toml ./
RUN pip install --no-cache-dir .
COPY --chmod=0555 container-entrypoint.sh /usr/local/bin/han-container-entrypoint
USER app
EXPOSE 8080
HEALTHCHECK --interval=30s --timeout=3s CMD python -c "import urllib.request; urllib.request.urlopen('http://127.0.0.1:8080/health/live', timeout=2)"
ENTRYPOINT ["/usr/local/bin/han-container-entrypoint"]
CMD ["uvicorn", "app.main:app", "--host", "0.0.0.0", "--port", "8080"]
codebase/backend/bitrix-sync/container-entrypoint.sh
+23
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
#!/bin/sh
set -eu
for name in ${HAN_SECRET_VARS:-}; do
case "$name" in
""|[0-9]*|*[!A-Z0-9_]*)
echo "container secrets: invalid variable name" >&2
exit 64
;;
*) ;;
esac
eval "file=\${${name}_FILE:-}"
if [ -z "$file" ] || [ ! -r "$file" ]; then
echo "container secrets: missing file for $name" >&2
exit 66
fi
value=$(cat "$file")
export "$name=$value"
unset "${name}_FILE"
done
unset HAN_SECRET_VARS
exec "$@"
codebase/backend/deployment/DEPLOYMENT_GUIDE.ru.md
+44 -35
View File
@@ -262,7 +262,7 @@ han-chat-documents
## 8. Создание файла окружения
На VM:
`.env` содержит только несекретную конфигурацию. На VM:
```sh
cd /opt/han-chat/backend
@@ -272,7 +272,18 @@ chmod 600 .env
nano .env
```
Замените все `change-me` и адреса `example.*`.
Замените несекретные адреса `example.*`. Не добавляйте в `.env` пароли, токены,
ключи, credential-bearing DSN или пути `*_FILE`. Установите отдельно проверенный
launcher `deployment/secrets/han-secrets` из ops-пакета. Его интерфейс:
```sh
deployment/secrets/han-secrets run --config .env -- <command>
```
Launcher читает `SECRETS_SOURCE=file|selectel`, устанавливает
`HAN_SECRETS_ACTIVE=1`, выдаёт значения только дочернему процессу и не печатает
их. Рекомендуемый `HAN_RUNTIME_SECRET_MANIFEST` содержит только пары
`SECRET_KEY=/absolute/protected/path`; файлы имеют mode `0400`/`0600`.
### 8.1. Основные адреса
@@ -295,7 +306,7 @@ KEYCLOAK_AUDIENCE=han-chat-api
### 8.2. PostgreSQL
Укажите фактические host, port, database, пользователей и пароли:
В `.env` укажите только host, port, database и путь к публичному CA:
```dotenv
HAN_PG_HOST=<PG_HOST>
@@ -303,17 +314,13 @@ HAN_PG_PORT=6432
HAN_PG_DATABASE=han_chat
PG_CA_HOST_PATH=/opt/han-chat/backend/secrets/pg/ca.pem
DATABASE_URL=postgresql+asyncpg://han_app:<PASSWORD>@<PG_HOST>:5433/han_chat?sslmode=verify-full&sslrootcert=/run/secrets/pg-ca.pem
BITRIX_DATABASE_URL=postgresql://bitrix_local_app:<PASSWORD>@<PG_HOST>:5433/han_chat?sslmode=verify-full&sslrootcert=/run/secrets/pg-ca.pem
BITRIX_SYNC_DATABASE_URL=postgresql://bitrix_sync_user:<PASSWORD>@<PG_HOST>:5433/han_chat?sslmode=verify-full&sslrootcert=/run/secrets/pg-ca.pem
MESSAGE_SAFETY_DATABASE_URL=postgresql://message_safety_app:<PASSWORD>@<PG_HOST>:5433/han_chat?sslmode=verify-full&sslrootcert=/run/secrets/pg-ca.pem
KEYCLOAK_DB_URL=jdbc:postgresql://<PG_HOST>:5433/han_chat?sslmode=verify-full&sslrootcert=/run/secrets/pg-ca.pem
KEYCLOAK_DB_SCHEMA=keycloak
KEYCLOAK_DB_USERNAME=keycloak_user
KEYCLOAK_DB_PASSWORD=<PASSWORD>
```
Все service DSN, включая JDBC и backup DSN, формирует secret backend. Runtime
validator проверяет `verify-full`, `sslrootcert` и запрет `options/currentSchema`
без вывода строк подключения.
Порт `5433` используется с PgBouncer в режиме `session`. Не добавляйте
`options=-csearch_path...` или JDBC-параметр `currentSchema`: они передают
startup parameter `search_path`, который Selectel PgBouncer отклоняет. Для
@@ -323,9 +330,12 @@ Keycloak схема задаётся отдельно через `KEYCLOAK_DB_SC
Если пароль содержит `@`, `:`, `/`, `?`, `#` или `%`, его необходимо
URL-кодировать внутри PostgreSQL URL.
### 8.3. Генерация секретов
### 8.3. Подготовка runtime-секретов
Для обычных токенов используйте:
Генерируйте секреты вне shell history средствами secret manager. Не выполняйте
`export TOKEN=...` и не вставляйте значения в команды. Имена обязательных
runtime-переменных определены в `scripts/validate-env`; парные токены связываются
в secret backend.
```sh
openssl rand -hex 32
@@ -337,7 +347,8 @@ openssl rand -hex 32
python3 -c 'import base64,secrets; print(base64.urlsafe_b64encode(secrets.token_bytes(32)).decode())'
```
Заполните все секреты. Две пары должны совпадать:
Ни один из этих секретов не добавляется в `.env`. Пары проверяются runtime
validator без вывода значений.
```dotenv
BITRIX_LOCAL_APP_INTERNAL_TOKEN=<TOKEN_A>
@@ -361,7 +372,8 @@ KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD=<UNIQUE_ADMIN_PASSWORD>
### 8.4. Redis
Создайте три разных пароля и продублируйте их в URL:
Создайте три разных пароля в secret backend; там же сформируйте Redis URL.
Следующий блок описывает логический контракт и не является содержимым `.env`:
```dotenv
REDIS_API_PASSWORD=<REDIS_API_PASSWORD>
@@ -380,11 +392,10 @@ MESSAGE_SAFETY_REDIS_URL=redis://message_safety:<REDIS_SAFETY_PASSWORD>@redis:63
```dotenv
KEYCLOAK_OTP_MOCK_ENABLED=true
KEYCLOAK_OTP_MOCK_RISK_ACCEPTED=true
KEYCLOAK_OTP_MOCK_CODE=<ТЕСТОВЫЙ_КОД_НЕ_КОРОЧЕ_16_СИМВОЛОВ>
```
Этот код будет вводиться пользователем при тестовой авторизации. Не используйте
его как production-механизм доставки OTP.
`KEYCLOAK_OTP_MOCK_CODE` хранится только в secret backend. Не используйте mock
как production-механизм доставки OTP.
Целевой real mode задаёт `modules/module-11-idgtl-sms.md`: Keycloak генерирует и локально проверяет OTP, `sms-service` надёжно записывает заказ/журнал, worker вызывает i-Digital Direct, callback обновляет только delivery journal. Нельзя просто установить `KEYCLOAK_OTP_MOCK_ENABLED=false`.
@@ -397,13 +408,10 @@ SELECTEL_S3_ENDPOINT_URL=https://s3.storage.selcloud.ru
SELECTEL_S3_BUCKET_QUARANTINE=han-chat-quarantine
SELECTEL_S3_BUCKET_ATTACHMENTS=han-chat-attachments
SELECTEL_S3_BUCKET_DOCUMENTS=han-chat-documents
SELECTEL_S3_ACCESS_KEY=<API_ACCESS_KEY>
SELECTEL_S3_SECRET_KEY=<API_SECRET_KEY>
SELECTEL_S3_QUARANTINE_READ_ACCESS_KEY=<SAFETY_READ_ACCESS_KEY>
SELECTEL_S3_QUARANTINE_READ_SECRET_KEY=<SAFETY_READ_SECRET_KEY>
```
Обе пары S3 credentials хранятся только в secret backend.
API backend принудительно использует virtual-hosted addressing:
`https://<bucket>.s3.storage.selcloud.ru/<object-key>`. Это обязательно для
браузерных presigned PUT и CORS в Selectel; path-style URL для этого сценария не
@@ -411,20 +419,17 @@ API backend принудительно использует virtual-hosted addre
### 8.7. Bitrix24
До установки локального приложения заполните:
До установки локального приложения загрузите credentials в secret backend.
В `.env` остаются только несекретные connector/public URL параметры:
```dotenv
BITRIX_CLIENT_ID=<BITRIX_CLIENT_ID>
BITRIX_CLIENT_SECRET=<BITRIX_CLIENT_SECRET>
BITRIX_CONNECTOR_ID=han_mobile_app
BITRIX_OPEN_LINE_ID=8
BITRIX_PUBLIC_BASE_URL=https://chat.example.ru/bitrix
BITRIX_TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY=<URLSAFE_BASE64_KEY>
```
`BITRIX_APPLICATION_TOKEN` можно окончательно задать после создания приложения в
Bitrix24. До этого используйте отдельное случайное значение, проходящее
валидацию окружения.
`BITRIX_APPLICATION_TOKEN` сохраняется в secret backend после создания
приложения и никогда не помещается в `.env`.
### 8.8. TLS и наблюдаемость
@@ -448,8 +453,11 @@ ACME_EMAIL=<ADMIN_EMAIL>
```sh
cd /opt/han-chat/backend
./scripts/validate-env .env
docker compose --env-file .env config --quiet
docker compose --env-file .env config --services
sudo systemctl restart han-secrets@production.service
sudo ./scripts/validate-env .env \
--runtime-manifest /run/han-chat/secrets/manifest
sudo deployment/secrets/han-compose config --quiet
sudo deployment/secrets/han-compose config --services
python3 -m unittest discover -s tests -v
```
@@ -670,7 +678,8 @@ curl -i https://chat.example.ru/internal/safety/v1/messages/check
https://chat.example.ru/
```
Для тестовой авторизации используйте значение `KEYCLOAK_OTP_MOCK_CODE` из `.env`.
Для тестовой авторизации получите mock code утверждённым защищённым способом,
не читая его из `.env` и не помещая в shell history.
## 16. Подключение Bitrix24
@@ -685,7 +694,7 @@ Placement: https://chat.example.ru/bitrix/placement
После установки:
1. Получите и сохраните application token.
2. Запишите его в `BITRIX_APPLICATION_TOKEN` файла `.env`.
2. Сохраните его как `BITRIX_APPLICATION_TOKEN` в secret backend.
3. Пересоздайте сервис:
```sh
@@ -735,7 +744,7 @@ docker compose --env-file .env up -d --force-recreate <SERVICE_NAME>
1. Создайте backup/PITR marker PostgreSQL.
2. Сохраните текущие image digests.
3. Получите новый код.
4. Проверьте `.env`.
4. Проверьте несекретный `.env` и runtime secret set.
5. Пересоберите образы.
6. Примените миграции и seed.
7. Пересоздайте сервисы.
codebase/backend/deployment/RUNBOOK.md
+16 -10
View File
@@ -60,16 +60,20 @@ verify key-based deploy access in a separate SSH session.
## Gate 6 — environment and secrets
```sh
umask 077
cp .env.example .env
chmod 600 .env
# Replace placeholders using a protected editor/secret manager.
# Replace non-secret configuration placeholders only.
./scripts/validate-env .env
docker compose --env-file .env config --quiet
sudo systemctl restart han-secrets@production.service
sudo ./scripts/validate-env .env \
--runtime-manifest /run/han-chat/secrets/manifest
sudo deployment/secrets/han-compose config --quiet
```
- [ ] Token pairs match, PG verifies TLS, public URLs are HTTPS.
- [ ] Mock OTP risk is accepted and all secrets are unique >=128-bit values.
- [ ] `SECRETS_SOURCE=file|selectel`; `.env` contains no secret keys or credential-bearing DSNs.
- [ ] `deployment/secrets/han-secrets` sets `HAN_SECRETS_ACTIVE=1`, does not log values,
and optionally exposes a paths-only `HAN_RUNTIME_SECRET_MANIFEST`.
- [ ] Runtime token pairs match, PG verifies TLS, public URLs are HTTPS.
- [ ] Mock OTP risk is accepted and runtime secrets are unique >=128-bit values.
- [ ] `NOTIFICATIONS_TOKEN_PRODUCER_TEST` is unique and supplied only through secret/env; the `producer_test` source seed stores only its hash.
- [ ] `FRONTEND_DEV_PROXY_ENABLED=false` and Safety/nginx timeout budgets match.
@@ -211,8 +215,7 @@ For local acceptance only, start the redacted debug collector with:
Provider backup/PITR is authoritative. A supplemental verified logical dump:
```sh
PG_BACKUP_DSN='postgresql://...?...sslmode=verify-full&sslrootcert=...' \
deployment/scripts/backup.sh /opt/han-chat/backups
deployment/scripts/backup.sh /opt/han-chat/backups
```
Quarterly, restore PG and S3 into an isolated VPC, deploy the same image digests,
@@ -225,10 +228,13 @@ Only roll back to images compatible with the current schema:
```sh
SCHEMA_BACKWARD_COMPATIBLE_CONFIRMED=true \
deployment/scripts/rollback.sh /secure/path/previous-release.env
ENV_FILE=/secure/path/previous-release.env deployment/scripts/smoke.sh
deployment/scripts/rollback.sh <PREVIOUS_IMMUTABLE_RELEASE>
deployment/scripts/smoke.sh
```
Rollback reuses the current runtime secret set and non-secret config. Do not
create or restore an environment snapshot.
## Real SMS rollout addendum
This runbook remains mock-only until module-11 artifacts exist. An SMS release requires schema/role `sms`, versioned migrations and an active approved `auth_otp` seed, `sms-service`/worker, the exact callback route, paired service tokens, Direct `TOKEN_1`, approved sender/template, separate callback credentials, a reconfirmed callback source IP, and a static worker egress IP.
codebase/backend/deployment/RUNBOOK.ru.md
+17 -10
View File
@@ -63,16 +63,21 @@ sudo deployment/scripts/setup-vm.sh
## Этап 6 — окружение и секреты
```sh
umask 077
cp .env.example .env
chmod 600 .env
# Замените заглушки через защищенный редактор или менеджер секретов.
# Замените только несекретные placeholders.
./scripts/validate-env .env
docker compose --env-file .env config --quiet
sudo systemctl restart han-secrets@production.service
sudo ./scripts/validate-env .env \
--runtime-manifest /run/han-chat/secrets/manifest
sudo deployment/secrets/han-compose config --quiet
```
- [ ] Парные токены совпадают, PostgreSQL проверяет TLS, публичные URL используют HTTPS.
- [ ] Риск mock OTP принят; все секреты уникальны и содержат не менее 128 бит энтропии.
- [ ] `SECRETS_SOURCE=file|selectel`; `.env` не содержит secret keys и DSN с credentials.
- [ ] `deployment/secrets/han-secrets` устанавливает `HAN_SECRETS_ACTIVE=1`,
не пишет значения в лог и при возможности передаёт paths-only manifest
через `HAN_RUNTIME_SECRET_MANIFEST`.
- [ ] Runtime-пары токенов совпадают, PostgreSQL проверяет TLS.
- [ ] Риск mock OTP принят; runtime-секреты уникальны и содержат не менее 128 бит энтропии.
- [ ] `NOTIFICATIONS_TOKEN_PRODUCER_TEST` сгенерирован отдельно, передан только через secret/env; seed `notification_sources.code='producer_test'` содержит только его hash.
- [ ] Установлено `FRONTEND_DEV_PROXY_ENABLED=false`; таймауты Safety и nginx согласованы.
@@ -233,8 +238,7 @@ deployment/scripts/smoke.sh
Основным механизмом являются backup/PITR провайдера. Дополнительный проверенный логический дамп:
```sh
PG_BACKUP_DSN='postgresql://...?...sslmode=verify-full&sslrootcert=...' \
deployment/scripts/backup.sh /opt/han-chat/backups
deployment/scripts/backup.sh /opt/han-chat/backups
```
Ежеквартально восстанавливайте PostgreSQL и S3 в изолированной VPC, развертывайте те же
@@ -248,10 +252,13 @@ smoke-тесты и фиксируйте фактические RPO/RTO. Redis
```sh
SCHEMA_BACKWARD_COMPATIBLE_CONFIRMED=true \
deployment/scripts/rollback.sh /secure/path/previous-release.env
ENV_FILE=/secure/path/previous-release.env deployment/scripts/smoke.sh
deployment/scripts/rollback.sh <PREVIOUS_IMMUTABLE_RELEASE>
deployment/scripts/smoke.sh
```
Откат использует текущие runtime-секреты и текущий несекретный config. Snapshot
старого `.env` не создаётся и не восстанавливается.
## Дополнение: rollout реальной SMS-авторизации
Текущий runbook остаётся mock-only, пока артефакты module-11 не реализованы. Для SMS release обязательны: schema/role `sms`, migrations/seed active approved `auth_otp`, `sms-service`/worker, exact callback route, парные service tokens, Direct `TOKEN_1`, согласованные sender/template, отдельные callback credentials, подтверждённый callback source IP и статический egress IP worker.
codebase/backend/deployment/docker-compose.jobs.yml
+76 -34
View File
@@ -1,83 +1,123 @@
x-no-sms-secrets: &no-sms-secrets
SMS_DATABASE_URL: ""
SMS_SERVICE_TOKEN: ""
KEYCLOAK_SMS_SERVICE_TOKEN: ""
IDGTL_SMS_API_KEY: ""
IDGTL_SMS_CALLBACK_USERNAME: ""
IDGTL_SMS_CALLBACK_PASSWORD: ""
x-api-job-secrets: &api-job-secrets
- api_database_url
- api_redis_url
- api_redis_realtime_url
- message_safety_service_token
- bitrix_local_app_internal_token
- bitrix_api_inbox_token
- keycloak_settings_bridge_token
- selectel_s3_access_key
- selectel_s3_secret_key
- cursor_hmac_secret
x-api-job-environment: &api-job-environment
HAN_SECRET_VARS: >-
DATABASE_URL REDIS_URL REDIS_REALTIME_URL MESSAGE_SAFETY_SERVICE_TOKEN
BITRIX_LOCAL_APP_INTERNAL_TOKEN BITRIX_API_INBOX_TOKEN
KEYCLOAK_SETTINGS_BRIDGE_TOKEN SELECTEL_S3_ACCESS_KEY SELECTEL_S3_SECRET_KEY
CURSOR_HMAC_SECRET
DATABASE_URL_FILE: /run/secrets/api_database_url
REDIS_URL_FILE: /run/secrets/api_redis_url
REDIS_REALTIME_URL_FILE: /run/secrets/api_redis_realtime_url
MESSAGE_SAFETY_SERVICE_TOKEN_FILE: /run/secrets/message_safety_service_token
BITRIX_LOCAL_APP_INTERNAL_TOKEN_FILE: /run/secrets/bitrix_local_app_internal_token
BITRIX_API_INBOX_TOKEN_FILE: /run/secrets/bitrix_api_inbox_token
KEYCLOAK_SETTINGS_BRIDGE_TOKEN_FILE: /run/secrets/keycloak_settings_bridge_token
SELECTEL_S3_ACCESS_KEY_FILE: /run/secrets/selectel_s3_access_key
SELECTEL_S3_SECRET_KEY_FILE: /run/secrets/selectel_s3_secret_key
CURSOR_HMAC_SECRET_FILE: /run/secrets/cursor_hmac_secret
APP_ENV: ${APP_ENV:-production-like}
LOG_LEVEL: ${LOG_LEVEL:-INFO}
KEYCLOAK_PUBLIC_URL: ${KEYCLOAK_PUBLIC_URL}
KEYCLOAK_INTERNAL_URL: ${KEYCLOAK_INTERNAL_URL:-http://keycloak:8080/auth}
KEYCLOAK_REALM: ${KEYCLOAK_REALM:-han-chat}
KEYCLOAK_AUDIENCE: ${KEYCLOAK_AUDIENCE:-han-chat-api}
MESSAGE_SAFETY_URL: ${MESSAGE_SAFETY_URL:-http://message-safety:8080}
MESSAGE_SAFETY_POST_TIMEOUT_SEC: ${MESSAGE_SAFETY_POST_TIMEOUT_SEC:-5}
MESSAGE_SAFETY_TASK_POLL_INTERVAL_SEC: ${MESSAGE_SAFETY_TASK_POLL_INTERVAL_SEC:-2}
MESSAGE_SAFETY_TASK_POLL_MAX_SEC: ${MESSAGE_SAFETY_TASK_POLL_MAX_SEC:-300}
BITRIX_LOCAL_APP_BASE_URL: ${BITRIX_LOCAL_APP_BASE_URL:-http://bitrix-local-app:8080}
BITRIX_LOCAL_APP_HTTP_TIMEOUT_SEC: ${BITRIX_LOCAL_APP_HTTP_TIMEOUT_SEC:-20}
SELECTEL_S3_ENDPOINT_URL: ${SELECTEL_S3_ENDPOINT_URL}
SELECTEL_S3_BUCKET_DOCUMENTS: ${SELECTEL_S3_BUCKET_DOCUMENTS}
SELECTEL_S3_BUCKET_ATTACHMENTS: ${SELECTEL_S3_BUCKET_ATTACHMENTS}
SELECTEL_S3_BUCKET_QUARANTINE: ${SELECTEL_S3_BUCKET_QUARANTINE}
TRUSTED_PROXY_CIDRS: ${TRUSTED_PROXY_CIDRS:-127.0.0.1/32}
services:
migrate-api:
image: ${API_BACKEND_IMAGE:-han-chat-api-backend:local}
profiles: ["ops"]
env_file:
- path: ../.env
required: false
environment: *no-sms-secrets
entrypoint: []
environment:
HAN_SECRET_VARS: DATABASE_URL
DATABASE_URL_FILE: /run/secrets/api_database_url
secrets:
- api_database_url
command: ["alembic", "upgrade", "head"]
volumes:
- ${PG_CA_HOST_PATH}:/run/secrets/pg-ca.pem:ro
networks: [backend, egress]
restart: "no"
security_opt: ["no-new-privileges:true"]
ulimits:
core: {soft: 0, hard: 0}
migrate-bitrix-local:
image: ${BITRIX_LOCAL_APP_IMAGE:-han-chat-bitrix-local-app:local}
profiles: ["ops"]
env_file:
- path: ../.env
required: false
environment: *no-sms-secrets
entrypoint: []
environment:
HAN_SECRET_VARS: BITRIX_DATABASE_URL
BITRIX_DATABASE_URL_FILE: /run/secrets/bitrix_database_url
secrets:
- bitrix_database_url
command: ["alembic", "upgrade", "head"]
volumes:
- ${PG_CA_HOST_PATH}:/run/secrets/pg-ca.pem:ro
networks: [backend, egress]
restart: "no"
security_opt: ["no-new-privileges:true"]
ulimits:
core: {soft: 0, hard: 0}
migrate-bitrix-sync:
image: ${BITRIX_SYNC_IMAGE:-han-chat-bitrix-sync:local}
profiles: ["ops"]
env_file:
- path: ../.env
required: false
environment: *no-sms-secrets
entrypoint: []
environment:
HAN_SECRET_VARS: BITRIX_SYNC_DATABASE_URL
BITRIX_SYNC_DATABASE_URL_FILE: /run/secrets/bitrix_sync_database_url
secrets:
- bitrix_sync_database_url
command: ["alembic", "upgrade", "head"]
volumes:
- ${PG_CA_HOST_PATH}:/run/secrets/pg-ca.pem:ro
networks: [backend, egress]
restart: "no"
security_opt: ["no-new-privileges:true"]
ulimits:
core: {soft: 0, hard: 0}
migrate-sms:
image: ${SMS_SERVICE_IMAGE:-han-chat-sms-service:local}
profiles: ["ops"]
environment:
SMS_DATABASE_URL: ${SMS_DATABASE_URL}
SMS_SERVICE_TOKEN: ${SMS_SERVICE_TOKEN}
IDGTL_SMS_BASE_URL: ${IDGTL_SMS_BASE_URL:-https://direct.i-dgtl.ru}
IDGTL_SMS_CALLBACK_PUBLIC_URL: ${IDGTL_SMS_CALLBACK_PUBLIC_URL}
IDGTL_SMS_CALLBACK_USERNAME: ${IDGTL_SMS_CALLBACK_USERNAME}
IDGTL_SMS_CALLBACK_PASSWORD: ${IDGTL_SMS_CALLBACK_PASSWORD}
entrypoint: []
HAN_SECRET_VARS: SMS_DATABASE_URL
SMS_DATABASE_URL_FILE: /run/secrets/sms_database_url
secrets:
- sms_database_url
command: ["alembic", "upgrade", "head"]
volumes:
- ${PG_CA_HOST_PATH}:/run/secrets/pg-ca.pem:ro
networks: [backend, egress]
restart: "no"
security_opt: ["no-new-privileges:true"]
ulimits:
core: {soft: 0, hard: 0}
seed-settings:
image: ${API_BACKEND_IMAGE:-han-chat-api-backend:local}
profiles: ["ops"]
env_file:
- path: ../.env
required: false
environment: *no-sms-secrets
entrypoint: []
environment: *api-job-environment
secrets: *api-job-secrets
command:
- /bin/sh
- -ec
@@ -91,6 +131,8 @@ services:
networks: [backend, egress]
restart: "no"
security_opt: ["no-new-privileges:true"]
ulimits:
core: {soft: 0, hard: 0}
toolbox:
image: curlimages/curl:8.11.1
codebase/backend/deployment/scripts/backup.sh
+17 -3
View File
@@ -1,10 +1,22 @@
#!/bin/sh
set -eu
cd "$(dirname "$0")/../.."
CONFIG_FILE=${CONFIG_FILE:-.env}
SECRETS_LAUNCHER=${SECRETS_LAUNCHER:-deployment/secrets/han-secrets}
if [ -z "${PG_BACKUP_DSN:-}" ]; then
echo "PG_BACKUP_DSN is required (managed PostgreSQL TLS DSN, supplied via secure environment)." >&2
if [ "${HAN_SECRETS_ACTIVE:-0}" != "1" ]; then
[ -x "$SECRETS_LAUNCHER" ] || {
echo "Secret launcher is required: $SECRETS_LAUNCHER" >&2
exit 66
}
exec "$SECRETS_LAUNCHER" run --config "$CONFIG_FILE" -- "$0" "$@"
fi
if [ -z "${PG_BACKUP_DSN_FILE:-}" ] || [ ! -r "$PG_BACKUP_DSN_FILE" ]; then
echo "PG_BACKUP_DSN_FILE is required from the secret launcher." >&2
exit 64
fi
PG_BACKUP_DSN=$(cat "$PG_BACKUP_DSN_FILE")
case "$PG_BACKUP_DSN" in
*sslmode=verify-full*sslrootcert=*) ;;
*) echo "PG_BACKUP_DSN must enforce sslmode=verify-full and sslrootcert." >&2; exit 64 ;;
@@ -16,7 +28,9 @@ mkdir -p "$output_dir"
stamp=$(date -u +%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ)
archive="$output_dir/han-chat-$stamp.dump"
pg_dump --dbname="$PG_BACKUP_DSN" --format=custom --no-owner --no-privileges --file="$archive"
PGDATABASE="$PG_BACKUP_DSN" pg_dump \
--format=custom --no-owner --no-privileges --file="$archive"
unset PG_BACKUP_DSN
pg_restore --list "$archive" >/dev/null
sha256sum "$archive" > "$archive.sha256"
chmod 600 "$archive" "$archive.sha256"
codebase/backend/deployment/scripts/migrate.sh
+24 -10
View File
@@ -1,20 +1,34 @@
#!/bin/sh
set -eu
cd "$(dirname "$0")/../.."
CONFIG_FILE=${CONFIG_FILE:-.env}
SECRETS_LAUNCHER=${SECRETS_LAUNCHER:-deployment/secrets/han-secrets}
if [ "${HAN_SECRETS_ACTIVE:-0}" != "1" ]; then
[ -x "$SECRETS_LAUNCHER" ] || {
echo "Secret launcher is required: $SECRETS_LAUNCHER" >&2
exit 66
}
exec "$SECRETS_LAUNCHER" run --config "$CONFIG_FILE" -- "$0" "$@"
fi
if [ "${PITR_MARKER_CONFIRMED:-false}" != "true" ]; then
echo "Refusing migration: create provider PITR marker, then set PITR_MARKER_CONFIRMED=true" >&2
exit 64
fi
./scripts/validate-env "${ENV_FILE:-.env}"
docker compose --env-file "${ENV_FILE:-.env}" config --quiet
docker compose --env-file "${ENV_FILE:-.env}" --profile ops run --rm migrate-api alembic current
docker compose --env-file "${ENV_FILE:-.env}" --profile ops run --rm migrate-bitrix-local alembic current
docker compose --env-file "${ENV_FILE:-.env}" --profile ops run --rm migrate-bitrix-sync alembic current
docker compose --env-file "${ENV_FILE:-.env}" --profile ops run --rm migrate-sms alembic current
docker compose --env-file "${ENV_FILE:-.env}" --profile ops run --rm migrate-api
docker compose --env-file "${ENV_FILE:-.env}" --profile ops run --rm migrate-bitrix-local
docker compose --env-file "${ENV_FILE:-.env}" --profile ops run --rm migrate-bitrix-sync
docker compose --env-file "${ENV_FILE:-.env}" --profile ops run --rm migrate-sms
if [ -n "${HAN_RUNTIME_SECRET_MANIFEST:-}" ]; then
./scripts/validate-env "$CONFIG_FILE" --runtime-manifest "$HAN_RUNTIME_SECRET_MANIFEST"
else
./scripts/validate-env "$CONFIG_FILE" --runtime-env
fi
docker compose --env-file "$CONFIG_FILE" config --quiet
docker compose --env-file "$CONFIG_FILE" --profile ops run --rm migrate-api alembic current
docker compose --env-file "$CONFIG_FILE" --profile ops run --rm migrate-bitrix-local alembic current
docker compose --env-file "$CONFIG_FILE" --profile ops run --rm migrate-bitrix-sync alembic current
docker compose --env-file "$CONFIG_FILE" --profile ops run --rm migrate-sms alembic current
docker compose --env-file "$CONFIG_FILE" --profile ops run --rm migrate-api
docker compose --env-file "$CONFIG_FILE" --profile ops run --rm migrate-bitrix-local
docker compose --env-file "$CONFIG_FILE" --profile ops run --rm migrate-bitrix-sync
docker compose --env-file "$CONFIG_FILE" --profile ops run --rm migrate-sms
echo "Migrations completed; record revisions in release evidence."
codebase/backend/deployment/scripts/rollback.sh
+21 -8
View File
@@ -1,21 +1,34 @@
#!/bin/sh
set -eu
cd "$(dirname "$0")/../.."
CONFIG_FILE=${CONFIG_FILE:-.env}
SECRETS_LAUNCHER=${SECRETS_LAUNCHER:-deployment/secrets/han-secrets}
previous_env=${1:-}
if [ -z "$previous_env" ] || [ ! -r "$previous_env" ]; then
echo "Usage: $0 /secure/path/previous-release.env" >&2
previous_release=${1:-}
if [ -z "$previous_release" ]; then
echo "Usage: $0 <previous-immutable-release>" >&2
exit 64
fi
if [ "${HAN_SECRETS_ACTIVE:-0}" != "1" ]; then
[ -x "$SECRETS_LAUNCHER" ] || {
echo "Secret launcher is required: $SECRETS_LAUNCHER" >&2
exit 66
}
exec "$SECRETS_LAUNCHER" run --config "$CONFIG_FILE" -- "$0" "$@"
fi
if [ "${SCHEMA_BACKWARD_COMPATIBLE_CONFIRMED:-false}" != "true" ]; then
echo "Refusing rollback: set SCHEMA_BACKWARD_COMPATIBLE_CONFIRMED=true after migration review." >&2
exit 64
fi
./scripts/validate-env "$previous_env"
docker compose --env-file "$previous_env" config --quiet
docker compose --env-file "$previous_env" up -d --remove-orphans
docker compose --env-file "$previous_env" ps
if [ -n "${HAN_RUNTIME_SECRET_MANIFEST:-}" ]; then
./scripts/validate-env "$CONFIG_FILE" --runtime-manifest "$HAN_RUNTIME_SECRET_MANIFEST"
else
./scripts/validate-env "$CONFIG_FILE" --runtime-env
fi
RELEASE_VERSION="$previous_release" docker compose --env-file "$CONFIG_FILE" config --quiet
RELEASE_VERSION="$previous_release" docker compose --env-file "$CONFIG_FILE" up -d --remove-orphans
docker compose --env-file "$CONFIG_FILE" ps
echo "Application images rolled back without Alembic downgrade."
echo "Run deployment/scripts/smoke.sh with ENV_FILE=$previous_env and verify outbox/inbox idempotency."
echo "Run deployment/scripts/smoke.sh and verify outbox/inbox idempotency."
codebase/backend/deployment/scripts/seed.sh
+13 -2
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,18 @@
#!/bin/sh
set -eu
cd "$(dirname "$0")/../.."
CONFIG_FILE=${ENV_FILE:-.env}
SECRETS_LAUNCHER=${SECRETS_LAUNCHER:-deployment/secrets/han-secrets}
./scripts/validate-env "${ENV_FILE:-.env}"
docker compose --env-file "${ENV_FILE:-.env}" --profile ops run --rm seed-settings
if [ "${HAN_SECRETS_ACTIVE:-0}" != "1" ]; then
[ -x "$SECRETS_LAUNCHER" ] || {
echo "Secret launcher is required: $SECRETS_LAUNCHER" >&2
exit 66
}
exec "$SECRETS_LAUNCHER" run --config "$CONFIG_FILE" -- "$0" "$@"
fi
./scripts/validate-env "$CONFIG_FILE" \
--runtime-manifest "$HAN_RUNTIME_SECRET_MANIFEST"
docker compose --env-file "$CONFIG_FILE" --profile ops run --rm seed-settings
echo "Seed and mandatory-settings validation completed."
codebase/backend/deployment/scripts/setup-vm.sh
+48 -3
View File
@@ -435,6 +435,46 @@ configure_application_security() {
fi
}
install_secret_loader_if_possible() {
step "Загрузчик секретов"
local source_dir="${DEPLOY_DIR}/deployment/secrets"
if [[ ! -f "${source_dir}/secrets_loader.py" || ! -f "${source_dir}/han-secrets" ]]; then
log "Проект еще не скопирован: загрузчик секретов будет установлен при повторном запуске"
return
fi
chmod 0750 "${source_dir}/han-secrets" "${source_dir}/han-compose"
install -d -m 0700 -o root -g root \
/etc/han \
/etc/han/secrets \
/etc/han/credentials
install -d -m 0755 -o root -g root \
/usr/local/lib/han-secrets \
/usr/local/share/doc/han-secrets
install -m 0750 -o root -g root \
"${source_dir}/secrets_loader.py" \
/usr/local/lib/han-secrets/secrets_loader.py
install -m 0750 -o root -g root \
"${source_dir}/han-secrets" \
/usr/local/lib/han-secrets/han-secrets
install -m 0750 -o root -g root \
"${source_dir}/han-compose" \
/usr/local/bin/han-compose
install -m 0644 -o root -g root \
"${source_dir}/han-secrets@.service" \
/etc/systemd/system/han-secrets@.service
install -m 0644 -o root -g root \
"${source_dir}/SELECTEL_RUNBOOK.ru.md" \
/usr/local/share/doc/han-secrets/SELECTEL_RUNBOOK.ru.md
if [[ ! -e /etc/han/secrets/production.selectel.json.example ]]; then
install -m 0600 -o root -g root \
"${source_dir}/config.example.json" \
/etc/han/secrets/production.selectel.json.example
fi
systemctl daemon-reload
log "Загрузчик установлен, но не включен: сначала выполните SELECTEL_RUNBOOK.ru.md"
}
install_ssl_timer_if_possible() {
step "Таймер продления TLS"
local renew_script="${DEPLOY_DIR}/deployment/scripts/ssl-renew.sh"
@@ -504,14 +544,18 @@ HSTS max-age: ${HSTS_MAX_AGE_SECONDS}
${DEPLOY_DIR}
3. Поместите CA PostgreSQL:
${DEPLOY_DIR}/secrets/pg/ca.pem
4. Создайте и заполните окружение:
4. Создайте только несекретный config:
cd ${DEPLOY_DIR}
cp .env.example .env
chmod 600 .env
./scripts/validate-env .env
5. Продолжите с Gate 7 в:
5. Настройте Selectel, encrypted bootstrap credential и fallback map:
deployment/secrets/SELECTEL_RUNBOOK.ru.md
6. Выполняйте Compose только через:
sudo deployment/secrets/han-compose <command>
7. Продолжите с Gate 7 в:
deployment/RUNBOOK.ru.md
6. После копирования проекта повторно запустите этот скрипт для установки TLS-таймера.
8. После копирования проекта повторно запустите этот скрипт для установки unit-файлов.
Важно: членство в группе docker начнет действовать после нового входа в систему.
EOF
@@ -538,6 +582,7 @@ main() {
configure_docker_firewall
configure_ssh
configure_application_security
install_secret_loader_if_possible
install_ssl_timer_if_possible
verify
summary
codebase/backend/deployment/scripts/smoke.sh
+15 -3
View File
@@ -2,11 +2,23 @@
set -eu
cd "$(dirname "$0")/../.."
ENV_FILE=${ENV_FILE:-.env}
./scripts/validate-env "$ENV_FILE"
CONFIG_FILE=${CONFIG_FILE:-.env}
SECRETS_LAUNCHER=${SECRETS_LAUNCHER:-deployment/secrets/han-secrets}
if [ "${HAN_SECRETS_ACTIVE:-0}" != "1" ]; then
[ -x "$SECRETS_LAUNCHER" ] || {
echo "Secret launcher is required: $SECRETS_LAUNCHER" >&2
exit 66
}
exec "$SECRETS_LAUNCHER" run --config "$CONFIG_FILE" -- "$0" "$@"
fi
if [ -n "${HAN_RUNTIME_SECRET_MANIFEST:-}" ]; then
./scripts/validate-env "$CONFIG_FILE" --runtime-manifest "$HAN_RUNTIME_SECRET_MANIFEST"
else
./scripts/validate-env "$CONFIG_FILE" --runtime-env
fi
env_value() {
python3 - "$ENV_FILE" "$1" <<'PY'
python3 - "$CONFIG_FILE" "$1" <<'PY'
import sys
from pathlib import Path
codebase/backend/deployment/scripts/ssl-renew.sh
+11 -1
View File
@@ -1,13 +1,23 @@
#!/bin/sh
set -eu
cd "$(dirname "$0")/../.."
CONFIG_FILE=${CONFIG_FILE:-.env}
SECRETS_LAUNCHER=${SECRETS_LAUNCHER:-deployment/secrets/han-secrets}
if [ "${HAN_SECRETS_ACTIVE:-0}" != "1" ]; then
[ -x "$SECRETS_LAUNCHER" ] || {
echo "Secret launcher is required: $SECRETS_LAUNCHER" >&2
exit 66
}
exec "$SECRETS_LAUNCHER" run --config "$CONFIG_FILE" -- "$0" "$@"
fi
lock=/tmp/han-chat-cert-renew.lock
exec 9>"$lock"
flock -n 9 || { echo '{"event":"tls.renew.skipped","reason":"lock_busy"}'; exit 0; }
compose() {
docker compose --env-file .env "$@"
docker compose --env-file "$CONFIG_FILE" "$@"
}
nginx_container="$(compose ps --status running --quiet nginx)"
codebase/backend/deployment/scripts/verify-observability.sh
+16 -3
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,18 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -Eeuo pipefail
cd "$(dirname "$0")/../.."
CONFIG_FILE="${CONFIG_FILE:-.env}"
SECRETS_LAUNCHER="${SECRETS_LAUNCHER:-deployment/secrets/han-secrets}"
if [[ "${HAN_SECRETS_ACTIVE:-0}" != 1 ]]; then
[[ -x "$SECRETS_LAUNCHER" ]] || {
echo "Secret launcher is required: $SECRETS_LAUNCHER" >&2
exit 66
}
exec "$SECRETS_LAUNCHER" run --config "$CONFIG_FILE" -- "$0" "$@"
fi
compose() { docker compose --env-file "$CONFIG_FILE" "$@"; }
NETWORK="${OBSERVABILITY_NETWORK:-han-chat-observability}"
COLLECTOR_SERVICE="${COLLECTOR_SERVICE:-otel-collector}"
@@ -8,7 +21,7 @@ errors=0
ok() { printf 'OK %s\n' "$*"; }
fail() { printf 'FAIL %s\n' "$*" >&2; errors=$((errors + 1)); }
collector_id="$(docker compose ps -q "$COLLECTOR_SERVICE" 2>/dev/null || true)"
collector_id="$(compose ps -q "$COLLECTOR_SERVICE" 2>/dev/null || true)"
if [[ -n "$collector_id" ]] &&
[[ "$(docker inspect --format '{{.State.Status}}' "$collector_id")" == running ]]; then
ok "Collector service is running"
@@ -17,7 +30,7 @@ else
fi
for service in sms-service sms-worker; do
if docker compose exec -T "$service" python - <<'PY' >/dev/null 2>&1
if compose exec -T "$service" python - <<'PY' >/dev/null 2>&1
import os
import urllib.request
port = os.environ.get("SMS_METRICS_PORT", "9464") if "worker" in os.environ.get("OTEL_SERVICE_NAME", "") else "8080"
@@ -38,7 +51,7 @@ docker run --rm --network "$NETWORK" \
|| fail "telemetrygen failed"
bad_logs="$(
docker compose logs --since=10m "$COLLECTOR_SERVICE" 2>&1 |
compose logs --since=10m "$COLLECTOR_SERVICE" 2>&1 |
grep -Ei 'queue is full|connection refused|tls:|Unauthenticated|Permanent error' || true
)"
if [[ -z "$bad_logs" ]]; then
codebase/backend/deployment/secrets/SELECTEL_RUNBOOK.ru.md
+206
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,206 @@
# Selectel Secrets Manager для HAN Chat
## Модель
`han-secrets` читает только `SECRETS_SOURCE=selectel|file` из обычного `.env`,
выбирает соответствующую root-only JSON-карту и вызывает `secrets_loader.py`.
Загрузчик получает project-scoped IAM token, читает объявленные секреты и
создаёт в `/run/han-chat/secrets`:
- отдельные файлы с каноническими именами для Compose secrets;
- узкие service dotenv-файлы для диагностики состава без вывода значений;
- `manifest` вида `NAME=/absolute/path`, используемый валидатором.
Каталог `/run` находится в tmpfs и имеет режим `0700`. Канонические файлы имеют
`0444`: локальные пользователи не могут пройти через root-only каталог, а
не-root UID контейнера может прочитать только явно смонтированный Compose
secret. Значения не передаются через Docker Config.Env, argv, общий `.env` или
логи. После полного root/docker-компромисса runtime-значения извлекаемы — это
ограничение модели, а не гарантия Secret Manager.
Сбой Selectel никогда автоматически не включает file fallback. Уже работающие
контейнеры продолжают использовать текущие значения; новый sync завершается
fail-closed.
## 1. Ресурсы Selectel
1. Создайте отдельный проект `han-chat-secrets-prod`.
2. Создайте сервисного пользователя `han-chat-secrets-reader`.
3. Назначьте ему `member` только в этом проекте. Не выдавайте account scope,
`iam.admin` и доступ к другим production-ресурсам. Если Selectel добавит
отдельную read-only роль Secrets Manager, замените `member` на неё.
4. Ограничьте обращения к `api.selectel.ru` исходящим IP ВМ, если функция
доступна в аккаунте.
5. Включите экспорт audit logs. Контролируйте события `secrets.secret*` и
`secrets.secret_version*`; alert на delete, смену current version вне окна,
массовые чтения и обращения не от штатного пользователя/IP.
6. Выполните canary и убедитесь, что provider audit содержит metadata операции,
но не value, Base64 payload, IAM token или response body.
Secrets Manager принимает project-scoped IAM token в `X-Auth-Token`. Token
живёт до 24 часов, но загрузчик использует его только в памяти одного запуска.
TLS и redirect policy отключать нельзя.
## 2. Каталог секретов
Скопируйте `config.example.json` в
`/etc/han/secrets/production-like.selectel.json` и замените account, username,
project, region и `remote`. Каноническое имя слева обязано совпадать с
Compose/validator; `remote` — неизменяемый ключ в Selectel.
Используйте консервативные provider keys с дефисами, например:
- `han-chat-prod-pg-han-app-dsn`, `han-chat-prod-pg-bitrix-local-dsn`,
`han-chat-prod-pg-bitrix-sync-dsn`, `han-chat-prod-pg-sms-dsn`,
`han-chat-prod-pg-keycloak-password`, `han-chat-prod-pg-backup-dsn`;
- `han-chat-prod-redis-api-password`, `han-chat-prod-redis-safety-password`,
`han-chat-prod-redis-health-password`, а также три credential-bearing URL;
- `han-chat-prod-message-safety-token`, `han-chat-prod-bitrix-internal-token`,
`han-chat-prod-bitrix-forward-token`, `han-chat-prod-bitrix-sync-token`,
`han-chat-prod-keycloak-settings-token`, `han-chat-prod-sms-service-token`;
- Keycloak bootstrap password, OTP HMAC и mock code только для среды, где mock
действительно включён;
- Bitrix client secret, application token и token encryption key;
- пары S3 app access/secret key;
- i-Digital API key и callback username/password.
Одинаковые пары env (`BITRIX_LOCAL_APP_INTERNAL_TOKEN` /
`BITRIX_INTERNAL_API_TOKEN`, `BITRIX_API_FORWARD_TOKEN` /
`BITRIX_API_INBOX_TOKEN`, `SMS_SERVICE_TOKEN` /
`KEYCLOAK_SMS_SERVICE_TOKEN`) должны ссылаться на один `remote`.
`literal: ""` разрешён только для заведомо пустого optional-параметра, например
OTLP auth при self-hosted SigNoz или выключенного CAPTCHA server key. Секреты
не записывайте в JSON. Не заводите planned/unused Message Safety DB, quarantine
S3 и Bitrix sync credentials до появления потребляющего кода.
Загружайте значения в Selectel через скрытый prompt/stdin. Не передавайте value
позиционным аргументом CLI и не включайте `set -x`/`curl -v`.
## 3. Установка на ВМ
Повторный запуск `deployment/scripts/setup-vm.sh` после копирования проекта
устанавливает loader, launcher, systemd template и этот runbook. Вручную:
```sh
sudo install -d -m 0700 /etc/han/secrets /etc/han/credentials
sudo install -d -m 0755 /usr/local/lib/han-secrets
sudo install -m 0750 secrets_loader.py han-secrets /usr/local/lib/han-secrets/
sudo install -m 0750 han-compose /usr/local/bin/han-compose
sudo install -m 0644 han-secrets@.service /etc/systemd/system/
sudo install -m 0600 config.example.json \
/etc/han/secrets/production-like.selectel.json
```
Обычный `/opt/han-chat/backend/.env` содержит только несекретные параметры.
Штатный режим:
```dotenv
SECRETS_SOURCE=selectel
APP_ENV=production-like
```
## 4. Bootstrap credential
Не храните пароль service user в `.env` или JSON. На целевой ВМ:
```sh
sudo systemd-creds encrypt --name=selectel-service-user-password - \
/etc/han/credentials/production.selectel-password.cred
sudo chmod 0600 /etc/han/credentials/production.selectel-password.cred
```
Введите пароль через интерактивный stdin. Unit передаёт расшифрованный файл
через приватный `$CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY`. Root всё равно может его извлечь;
после инцидента credential и все доступные ему секреты необходимо ротировать.
## 5. Проверка и запуск
Все команды, которым нужны Compose secrets, запускайте от root через wrapper:
```sh
cd /opt/han-chat/backend
sudo ./scripts/validate-env .env
sudo systemctl daemon-reload
sudo systemctl enable han-secrets@production.service
sudo systemctl restart han-secrets@production.service
sudo ./scripts/validate-env .env \
--runtime-manifest /run/han-chat/secrets/manifest
sudo deployment/secrets/han-compose config --quiet
sudo deployment/secrets/han-compose up -d --wait
```
Selectel sync запускается именно unit-файлом: только он предоставляет
расшифрованный bootstrap credential через `$CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY`.
`han-compose` и ops-скрипты используют уже синхронизированный manifest и
отказываются работать, если `SECRETS_SOURCE`/loader config не совпадают с
runtime state. После смены source, provider version или JSON-карты сначала
выполняйте `systemctl restart han-secrets@production.service`.
Не используйте `docker compose config` без `--quiet`, `docker inspect` для
поиска конфигурации, `env`, `strace`, core dump или debug HTTP proxy. Проверка
приёмки должна подтвердить отсутствие canary value в `docker inspect`, stdout,
json logs, traces и shell history.
На выделенной только под HAN Chat ВМ после canary и проверки file fallback
установите fail-closed ordering:
```sh
sudo install -d -m 0755 /etc/systemd/system/docker.service.d
sudo install -m 0644 \
deployment/secrets/docker-han-secrets.conf.example \
/etc/systemd/system/docker.service.d/han-secrets.conf
sudo systemctl daemon-reload
sudo systemctl restart docker
```
После этого проведите reboot rehearsal: materializer должен завершиться до
autorestart контейнеров. Ошибка Selectel намеренно блокирует Docker. На ВМ с
другими workloads такой глобальный `Requires=` запрещён: нужен отдельный Docker
daemon/VM, иначе fail-closed HAN остановит несвязанные системы.
## 6. Явный file fallback
Подготовьте отдельную карту
`/etc/han/secrets/production-like.file.json`: скопируйте Selectel-карту,
установите `"mode": "file"`, удалите `selectel` и `http`, добавьте:
```json
"file": {
"path": "/etc/han/break-glass/secrets.env",
"max_bytes": 1048576
}
```
`secrets` map остаётся тем же. Для записей с `literal: ""` строка в fallback
не нужна; остальные канонические ключи обязательны. Fallback parser не исполняет
shell: запрещены `export`, substitutions, multiline, неизвестные и дублирующиеся
ключи. Файл — `root:root 0600`.
При инциденте доставьте recovery-файл из защищённой офлайн-копии и только затем
явно измените `.env`:
```dotenv
SECRETS_SOURCE=file
```
Перезапустите `han-secrets@production.service`, затем выполните
validate/recreate через wrappers. После восстановления Selectel верните
`SECRETS_SOURCE=selectel`, снова перезапустите unit, повторите проверки и
удалите recovery-файл.
Не храните его постоянно на ВМ: это вернуло бы исходный риск монолитного `.env`.
## 7. Ротация и rollback
1. Добавьте новую версию секрета, не меняя имя.
2. Для canary при необходимости временно pin числовой `version` в JSON-карте.
3. Выполните sync, validation и smoke без вывода конфигурации.
4. Сделайте версию current, удалите pin, снова sync и пересоздайте только
потребителей.
5. Для rollback активируйте предыдущую provider version; не храните snapshot
старого `.env`.
Selectel не позволяет удалить отдельную версию — только секрет целиком. Старые
значения должны быть отозваны в PostgreSQL/S3/Bitrix/i-Digital после окна
rollback. Все значения из прежнего `.env` считайте раскрытыми и ротируйте после
перехода.
codebase/backend/deployment/secrets/config.example.json
+190
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{
"version": 1,
"mode": "selectel",
"runtime_dir": "/run/han-chat/secrets",
"http": {
"timeout_seconds": 10,
"retries": 3,
"max_response_bytes": 1048576
},
"selectel": {
"account_id": "123456",
"username": "han-secrets-reader",
"project_name": "han-production",
"region": "ru-9",
"interface": "public",
"password_file": "selectel-service-user-password"
},
"secrets": {
"DATABASE_URL": {
"remote": "DATABASE_URL",
"consumers": ["api-backend", "api-migrate"],
"max_bytes": 4096
},
"BITRIX_DATABASE_URL": {
"remote": "BITRIX_DATABASE_URL",
"consumers": ["bitrix-local-app", "bitrix-local-migrate"],
"max_bytes": 4096
},
"BITRIX_SYNC_DATABASE_URL": {
"remote": "BITRIX_SYNC_DATABASE_URL",
"consumers": ["bitrix-sync", "bitrix-sync-migrate"],
"max_bytes": 4096
},
"SMS_DATABASE_URL": {
"remote": "SMS_DATABASE_URL",
"consumers": ["sms-service", "sms-worker", "sms-migrate"],
"max_bytes": 4096
},
"KEYCLOAK_DB_PASSWORD": {
"remote": "KEYCLOAK_DB_PASSWORD",
"consumers": ["keycloak"],
"max_bytes": 1024
},
"KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD": {
"remote": "KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD",
"consumers": ["keycloak"],
"max_bytes": 1024
},
"CURSOR_HMAC_SECRET": {
"remote": "CURSOR_HMAC_SECRET",
"consumers": ["api-backend"],
"max_bytes": 1024
},
"KEYCLOAK_OTP_HMAC_KEY": {
"remote": "KEYCLOAK_OTP_HMAC_KEY",
"consumers": ["keycloak"],
"max_bytes": 1024
},
"KEYCLOAK_OTP_MOCK_CODE": {
"remote": "KEYCLOAK_OTP_MOCK_CODE",
"consumers": ["keycloak"],
"max_bytes": 1024
},
"KEYCLOAK_YANDEX_CAPTCHA_SERVER_KEY": {
"remote": "KEYCLOAK_YANDEX_CAPTCHA_SERVER_KEY",
"consumers": ["keycloak"],
"max_bytes": 1024
},
"BITRIX_TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY": {
"remote": "BITRIX_TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY",
"consumers": ["api-backend", "bitrix-local-app", "bitrix-sync"],
"max_bytes": 1024
},
"REDIS_API_PASSWORD": {
"remote": "REDIS_API_PASSWORD",
"consumers": ["redis"],
"max_bytes": 1024
},
"REDIS_URL": {
"remote": "REDIS_URL",
"consumers": ["api-backend", "delivery-worker", "cleanup-worker"],
"max_bytes": 4096
},
"REDIS_REALTIME_URL": {
"remote": "REDIS_REALTIME_URL",
"consumers": ["api-backend"],
"max_bytes": 4096
},
"REDIS_SAFETY_PASSWORD": {
"remote": "REDIS_SAFETY_PASSWORD",
"consumers": ["redis"],
"max_bytes": 1024
},
"MESSAGE_SAFETY_REDIS_URL": {
"remote": "MESSAGE_SAFETY_REDIS_URL",
"consumers": ["message-safety", "safety-recovery-worker"],
"max_bytes": 4096
},
"REDIS_HEALTH_PASSWORD": {
"remote": "REDIS_HEALTH_PASSWORD",
"consumers": ["redis", "redis-exporter"],
"max_bytes": 1024
},
"MESSAGE_SAFETY_SERVICE_TOKEN": {
"remote": "MESSAGE_SAFETY_SERVICE_TOKEN",
"consumers": ["api-backend", "message-safety"],
"max_bytes": 1024
},
"BITRIX_LOCAL_APP_INTERNAL_TOKEN": {
"remote": "BITRIX_LOCAL_APP_INTERNAL_TOKEN",
"consumers": ["api-backend", "bitrix-local-app"],
"max_bytes": 1024
},
"BITRIX_INTERNAL_API_TOKEN": {
"remote": "BITRIX_LOCAL_APP_INTERNAL_TOKEN",
"consumers": ["api-backend", "bitrix-local-app"],
"max_bytes": 1024
},
"BITRIX_API_FORWARD_TOKEN": {
"remote": "BITRIX_API_FORWARD_TOKEN",
"consumers": ["api-backend", "bitrix-local-app"],
"max_bytes": 1024
},
"BITRIX_API_INBOX_TOKEN": {
"remote": "BITRIX_API_FORWARD_TOKEN",
"consumers": ["api-backend", "bitrix-local-app"],
"max_bytes": 1024
},
"BITRIX_SYNC_SERVICE_TOKEN": {
"remote": "BITRIX_SYNC_SERVICE_TOKEN",
"consumers": ["api-backend", "bitrix-sync"],
"max_bytes": 1024
},
"KEYCLOAK_SETTINGS_BRIDGE_TOKEN": {
"remote": "KEYCLOAK_SETTINGS_BRIDGE_TOKEN",
"consumers": ["api-backend", "keycloak"],
"max_bytes": 1024
},
"SMS_SERVICE_TOKEN": {
"remote": "SMS_SERVICE_TOKEN",
"consumers": ["sms-service", "sms-worker", "keycloak"],
"max_bytes": 1024
},
"KEYCLOAK_SMS_SERVICE_TOKEN": {
"remote": "SMS_SERVICE_TOKEN",
"consumers": ["sms-service", "sms-worker", "keycloak"],
"max_bytes": 1024
},
"IDGTL_SMS_API_KEY": {
"remote": "IDGTL_SMS_API_KEY",
"consumers": ["sms-service", "sms-worker"],
"max_bytes": 1024
},
"IDGTL_SMS_CALLBACK_USERNAME": {
"remote": "IDGTL_SMS_CALLBACK_USERNAME",
"consumers": ["sms-service", "sms-worker"],
"max_bytes": 1024
},
"IDGTL_SMS_CALLBACK_PASSWORD": {
"remote": "IDGTL_SMS_CALLBACK_PASSWORD",
"consumers": ["sms-service", "sms-worker"],
"max_bytes": 1024
},
"BITRIX_CLIENT_SECRET": {
"remote": "BITRIX_CLIENT_SECRET",
"consumers": ["bitrix-local-app"],
"max_bytes": 1024
},
"BITRIX_APPLICATION_TOKEN": {
"remote": "BITRIX_APPLICATION_TOKEN",
"consumers": ["bitrix-local-app"],
"max_bytes": 1024
},
"SELECTEL_S3_SECRET_KEY": {
"remote": "SELECTEL_S3_SECRET_KEY",
"consumers": ["api-backend"],
"max_bytes": 1024
},
"SELECTEL_S3_ACCESS_KEY": {
"remote": "SELECTEL_S3_ACCESS_KEY",
"consumers": ["api-backend"],
"max_bytes": 1024
},
"OTEL_REMOTE_AUTH_HEADER": {
"literal": "",
"consumers": ["otel-collector"],
"max_bytes": 4096
}
}
}
codebase/backend/deployment/secrets/docker-han-secrets.conf.example
+6
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@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
[Unit]
# Enable only on a dedicated HAN Chat Docker host after the Selectel canary and
# file fallback have both passed. A failed secret sync intentionally blocks
# Docker startup so containers cannot race an empty /run directory.
Requires=han-secrets@production.service
After=han-secrets@production.service
codebase/backend/deployment/secrets/han-compose
+15
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@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
#!/bin/sh
set -eu
DEPLOY_DIR=${HAN_DEPLOY_DIR:-/opt/han-chat/backend}
SOURCE_DIR=$(CDPATH= cd -- "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)
[ ! -f "$SOURCE_DIR/../../docker-compose.yml" ] || \
DEPLOY_DIR=$(CDPATH= cd -- "$SOURCE_DIR/../.." && pwd)
cd "$DEPLOY_DIR"
CONFIG_FILE=${CONFIG_FILE:-.env}
LAUNCHER=${HAN_SECRETS_LAUNCHER:-/usr/local/lib/han-secrets/han-secrets}
[ -x "$LAUNCHER" ] || LAUNCHER=deployment/secrets/han-secrets
exec "$LAUNCHER" run --config "$CONFIG_FILE" -- \
docker compose --env-file "$CONFIG_FILE" "$@"
codebase/backend/deployment/secrets/han-secrets
+175
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@@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Synchronize runtime secrets and execute a command without exporting their values."""
from __future__ import annotations
import argparse
import json
import os
import subprocess
import sys
import tempfile
from pathlib import Path
from secrets_loader import LoaderError, load_json, run
def load_public_config(path: Path) -> dict[str, str]:
values: dict[str, str] = {}
try:
lines = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").splitlines()
except OSError as exc:
raise LoaderError(
f"cannot read non-secret config: {exc.strerror or exc.__class__.__name__}"
) from None
for number, raw in enumerate(lines, 1):
line = raw.strip()
if not line or line.startswith("#"):
continue
if "=" not in line:
raise LoaderError(f"non-secret config has invalid syntax at line {number}")
key, value = line.split("=", 1)
key = key.strip()
if not key or key in values:
raise LoaderError(f"non-secret config has an invalid key at line {number}")
values[key] = value.strip()
return values
def loader_config_path(
public: dict[str, str],
explicit: Path | None,
environ: dict[str, str],
) -> tuple[str, Path]:
source = public.get("SECRETS_SOURCE")
if source not in {"selectel", "file"}:
raise LoaderError("SECRETS_SOURCE must explicitly be selectel or file")
if explicit is not None:
return source, explicit
override = environ.get(f"HAN_SECRETS_{source.upper()}_CONFIG")
if override:
return source, Path(override)
environment = public.get("APP_ENV", "production")
return source, Path(f"/etc/han/secrets/{environment}.{source}.json")
def prepare_environment(
config_path: Path,
source: str,
environ: dict[str, str],
*,
synchronize: bool,
) -> dict[str, str]:
document = load_json(config_path)
if document.get("mode") != source:
raise LoaderError("selected loader configuration mode does not match SECRETS_SOURCE")
runtime = document.get("runtime_dir")
if not isinstance(runtime, str) or not Path(runtime).is_absolute():
raise LoaderError("loader configuration has an invalid runtime_dir")
runtime_dir = Path(runtime)
manifest = runtime_dir / "manifest"
state_path = runtime_dir / "state.json"
consumers: list[str] = []
if synchronize or (source == "file" and not state_path.is_file()):
consumers = run(config_path, environ=environ)
state = {
"version": 1,
"source": source,
"loader_config": str(config_path.resolve()),
}
descriptor, temporary = tempfile.mkstemp(
prefix=".state.", suffix=".tmp", dir=runtime_dir
)
temporary_path = Path(temporary)
try:
os.chmod(temporary_path, 0o600)
with os.fdopen(descriptor, "w", encoding="utf-8") as stream:
descriptor = -1
json.dump(state, stream, separators=(",", ":"))
stream.write("\n")
stream.flush()
os.fsync(stream.fileno())
os.replace(temporary_path, state_path)
except BaseException:
if descriptor >= 0:
os.close(descriptor)
temporary_path.unlink(missing_ok=True)
raise
elif not state_path.is_file():
raise LoaderError(
"runtime secrets are not synchronized; restart han-secrets systemd unit"
)
else:
state = load_json(state_path)
if (
state.get("version") != 1
or state.get("source") != source
or state.get("loader_config") != str(config_path.resolve())
):
raise LoaderError(
"runtime secret state does not match selected source/config; synchronize first"
)
if not manifest.is_file():
raise LoaderError("runtime secret manifest was not materialized")
manifest_entries: dict[str, str] = {}
for line in manifest.read_text(encoding="utf-8").splitlines():
key, value_path = line.split("=", 1)
manifest_entries[key] = value_path
specs = document.get("secrets")
if not isinstance(specs, dict) or set(manifest_entries) != set(specs):
raise LoaderError("runtime secret manifest does not match loader configuration")
child = dict(environ)
child["HAN_SECRETS_ACTIVE"] = "1"
child["HAN_RUNTIME_SECRET_DIR"] = str(runtime_dir)
child["HAN_RUNTIME_SECRET_MANIFEST"] = str(manifest)
for key, value_path in manifest_entries.items():
if not Path(value_path).is_file():
raise LoaderError("runtime secret manifest references a missing file")
child[f"{key}_FILE"] = value_path
if synchronize or consumers:
print(
f"han-secrets: synchronized {len(consumers)} service scope(s) from {source}",
file=sys.stderr,
)
return child
def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__)
parser.add_argument("action", choices=("sync", "run"))
parser.add_argument("--config", type=Path, default=Path(".env"))
parser.add_argument("--loader-config", type=Path)
arguments, command = parser.parse_known_args(argv)
if command and command[0] == "--":
command.pop(0)
if arguments.action == "run" and not command:
parser.error("run requires a command after --")
if arguments.action == "sync" and command:
parser.error("sync does not accept a command")
environment = dict(os.environ)
try:
public = load_public_config(arguments.config)
source, loader_config = loader_config_path(
public, arguments.loader_config, environment
)
child = prepare_environment(
loader_config,
source,
environment,
synchronize=arguments.action == "sync",
)
except (LoaderError, OSError, ValueError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
message = str(exc) if isinstance(exc, LoaderError) else exc.__class__.__name__
print(f"han-secrets: {message}", file=sys.stderr)
return 1
if arguments.action == "sync":
return 0
if os.name == "nt":
return subprocess.call(command, env=child)
os.execvpe(command[0], command, child)
return 127
if __name__ == "__main__":
raise SystemExit(main())
codebase/backend/deployment/secrets/han-secrets@.service
+42
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@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
[Unit]
Description=Materialize HAN service secrets (%i)
Documentation=file:/usr/local/share/doc/han-secrets/SELECTEL_RUNBOOK.ru.md
Wants=network-online.target
After=network-online.target
Before=han-stack@%i.service
[Service]
Type=oneshot
User=root
Group=root
UMask=0077
RuntimeDirectory=han-chat/secrets
RuntimeDirectoryMode=0700
ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 /usr/local/lib/han-secrets/han-secrets sync --config /opt/han-chat/backend/.env
LoadCredentialEncrypted=selectel-service-user-password:/etc/han/credentials/%i.selectel-password.cred
RemainAfterExit=yes
StandardOutput=null
StandardError=journal
SyslogIdentifier=han-secrets-%i
NoNewPrivileges=yes
PrivateTmp=yes
PrivateDevices=yes
ProtectSystem=strict
ProtectHome=yes
ProtectKernelTunables=yes
ProtectKernelModules=yes
ProtectKernelLogs=yes
ProtectControlGroups=yes
ProtectClock=yes
RestrictRealtime=yes
RestrictSUIDSGID=yes
LockPersonality=yes
MemoryDenyWriteExecute=yes
LimitCORE=0
SystemCallArchitectures=native
RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_INET AF_INET6
CapabilityBoundingSet=
AmbientCapabilities=
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target
codebase/backend/deployment/secrets/secrets_loader.py
+682
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@@ -0,0 +1,682 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Materialize narrowly scoped service dotenv files from Selectel Secrets Manager."""
from __future__ import annotations
import argparse
import base64
import binascii
import json
import os
import random
import re
import ssl
import stat
import sys
import tempfile
import time
import urllib.error
import urllib.parse
import urllib.request
from dataclasses import dataclass
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Any, Callable, Mapping, NoReturn
DEFAULT_IDENTITY_URL = "https://cloud.api.selcloud.ru/identity/v3/auth/tokens"
MAX_CONFIG_BYTES = 1_048_576
MAX_HTTP_BYTES = 1_048_576
MAX_SECRET_BYTES = 65_536
RETRYABLE_STATUS = frozenset({408, 425, 429, 500, 502, 503, 504})
ENV_NAME_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Z][A-Z0-9_]*$")
SERVICE_NAME_RE = re.compile(r"^[a-zA-Z0-9][a-zA-Z0-9_.-]*$")
DOTENV_LINE_RE = re.compile(r"^([A-Z][A-Z0-9_]*)=(.*)$")
class LoaderError(Exception):
"""An expected, already-redacted loader failure."""
def fail(message: str) -> NoReturn:
raise LoaderError(message)
def _object(value: Any, label: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
if not isinstance(value, dict):
fail(f"{label} must be an object")
return value
def _only_keys(value: Mapping[str, Any], allowed: set[str], label: str) -> None:
unknown = sorted(set(value) - allowed)
if unknown:
fail(f"{label} contains unsupported fields: {', '.join(unknown)}")
def _required_string(value: Mapping[str, Any], key: str, label: str) -> str:
item = value.get(key)
if not isinstance(item, str) or not item:
fail(f"{label}.{key} must be a non-empty string")
return item
def _bounded_int(value: Any, label: str, minimum: int, maximum: int) -> int:
if isinstance(value, bool) or not isinstance(value, int) or not minimum <= value <= maximum:
fail(f"{label} must be an integer from {minimum} through {maximum}")
return value
def read_limited(path: Path, limit: int, label: str) -> bytes:
try:
with path.open("rb") as stream:
data = stream.read(limit + 1)
except OSError as exc:
fail(f"cannot read {label}: {exc.strerror or exc.__class__.__name__}")
if len(data) > limit:
fail(f"{label} exceeds {limit} bytes")
return data
def require_private_regular_file(path: Path, label: str) -> None:
try:
metadata = path.lstat()
except OSError as exc:
fail(f"cannot inspect {label}: {exc.strerror or exc.__class__.__name__}")
if stat.S_ISLNK(metadata.st_mode) or not stat.S_ISREG(metadata.st_mode):
fail(f"{label} must be a regular file and not a symlink")
if os.name != "nt" and stat.S_IMODE(metadata.st_mode) & 0o077:
fail(f"{label} must not be accessible by group or other users")
def load_json(path: Path) -> dict[str, Any]:
raw = read_limited(path, MAX_CONFIG_BYTES, "configuration")
try:
document = json.loads(raw.decode("utf-8"))
except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError):
fail("configuration is not valid UTF-8 JSON")
return _object(document, "configuration")
def credential_value(selectel: Mapping[str, Any], environ: Mapping[str, str]) -> str:
methods = sum(key in selectel for key in ("password_file", "password_env"))
if methods != 1:
fail("selectel must set exactly one of password_file or password_env")
if "password_env" in selectel:
variable = _required_string(selectel, "password_env", "selectel")
if not ENV_NAME_RE.fullmatch(variable):
fail("selectel.password_env is not a valid environment variable name")
value = environ.get(variable)
if value is None or not value:
fail(f"credential environment variable {variable} is not set")
return value
configured = Path(_required_string(selectel, "password_file", "selectel"))
if configured.is_absolute():
path = configured
else:
directory = environ.get("CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY")
if not directory:
fail("relative password_file requires CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY")
path = Path(directory) / configured
require_private_regular_file(path, "credential")
raw = read_limited(path, 16_384, "credential")
try:
value = raw.decode("utf-8")
except UnicodeDecodeError:
fail("credential is not valid UTF-8")
value = value.removesuffix("\n").removesuffix("\r")
if not value or "\n" in value or "\r" in value or "\x00" in value:
fail("credential must contain exactly one non-empty text line")
return value
class NoRedirect(urllib.request.HTTPRedirectHandler):
def redirect_request(self, req: Any, fp: Any, code: int, msg: str, headers: Any, newurl: str) -> None:
return None
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class HTTPResult:
status: int
headers: Mapping[str, str]
body: bytes
class HTTPClient:
def __init__(
self,
*,
timeout: float,
retries: int,
max_response_bytes: int,
cafile: str | None = None,
opener: Any | None = None,
sleeper: Callable[[float], None] = time.sleep,
jitter: Callable[[], float] = random.random,
) -> None:
self.timeout = timeout
self.retries = retries
self.max_response_bytes = max_response_bytes
self.sleeper = sleeper
self.jitter = jitter
if opener is None:
try:
context = ssl.create_default_context(cafile=cafile)
except (OSError, ssl.SSLError) as exc:
fail(f"cannot initialize TLS trust store: {exc.__class__.__name__}")
self.opener = urllib.request.build_opener(
urllib.request.HTTPSHandler(context=context), NoRedirect()
)
else:
self.opener = opener
def request(
self,
method: str,
url: str,
*,
headers: Mapping[str, str] | None = None,
body: bytes | None = None,
expected: frozenset[int],
) -> HTTPResult:
parsed = urllib.parse.urlsplit(url)
if parsed.scheme != "https" or not parsed.netloc or parsed.username or parsed.password:
fail("provider endpoint must be an HTTPS URL without embedded credentials")
request = urllib.request.Request(
url, data=body, headers=dict(headers or {}), method=method
)
for attempt in range(self.retries + 1):
try:
with self.opener.open(request, timeout=self.timeout) as response:
status = int(response.status)
content_length = response.headers.get("Content-Length")
if content_length:
try:
if int(content_length) > self.max_response_bytes:
fail("provider response exceeds configured limit")
except ValueError:
fail("provider returned an invalid Content-Length")
response_body = response.read(self.max_response_bytes + 1)
if len(response_body) > self.max_response_bytes:
fail("provider response exceeds configured limit")
if status not in expected:
fail(f"provider request failed with HTTP {status}")
return HTTPResult(status, response.headers, response_body)
except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
status = int(exc.code)
if status not in RETRYABLE_STATUS or attempt >= self.retries:
fail(f"provider request failed with HTTP {status}")
except (urllib.error.URLError, TimeoutError, OSError):
if attempt >= self.retries:
fail("provider request failed after retries")
delay = min(8.0, 0.25 * (2**attempt)) * (0.5 + self.jitter())
self.sleeper(delay)
fail("provider request failed")
def parse_json_response(result: HTTPResult, label: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
try:
return _object(json.loads(result.body.decode("utf-8")), label)
except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError):
fail(f"{label} is not valid JSON")
def project_token_and_catalog(
client: HTTPClient, selectel: Mapping[str, Any], password: str
) -> tuple[str, list[Any]]:
identity_url = selectel.get("identity_url", DEFAULT_IDENTITY_URL)
if not isinstance(identity_url, str):
fail("selectel.identity_url must be a string")
account_id = _required_string(selectel, "account_id", "selectel")
username = _required_string(selectel, "username", "selectel")
project_name = _required_string(selectel, "project_name", "selectel")
payload = {
"auth": {
"identity": {
"methods": ["password"],
"password": {
"user": {
"name": username,
"domain": {"name": account_id},
"password": password,
}
},
},
"scope": {
"project": {
"name": project_name,
"domain": {"name": account_id},
}
},
}
}
result = client.request(
"POST",
identity_url,
headers={"Content-Type": "application/json", "Accept": "application/json"},
body=json.dumps(payload, separators=(",", ":")).encode("utf-8"),
expected=frozenset({201}),
)
token = result.headers.get("X-Subject-Token")
if not isinstance(token, str) or not token:
fail("identity response omitted X-Subject-Token")
document = parse_json_response(result, "identity response")
token_data = document.get("token")
if not isinstance(token_data, dict):
fail("identity response omitted token metadata")
project = token_data.get("project")
if not isinstance(project, dict) or not project.get("id"):
fail("identity token is not project-scoped")
catalog = token_data.get("catalog")
if not isinstance(catalog, list):
fail("identity response omitted service catalog")
return token, catalog
def secrets_endpoint(catalog: list[Any], region: str, interface: str) -> str:
matches: list[str] = []
for service in catalog:
if not isinstance(service, dict) or service.get("type") != "secrets-manager":
continue
endpoints = service.get("endpoints")
if not isinstance(endpoints, list):
continue
for endpoint in endpoints:
if (
isinstance(endpoint, dict)
and endpoint.get("region") == region
and endpoint.get("interface") == interface
and isinstance(endpoint.get("url"), str)
):
matches.append(endpoint["url"].rstrip("/"))
if len(matches) != 1:
fail("service catalog did not contain exactly one matching Secrets Manager endpoint")
return matches[0]
def decode_secret(document: Mapping[str, Any], name: str, limit: int) -> bytes:
# GET /v1/{name} returns the current value inside ``version`` while
# GET /v1/{name}/versions/{id} returns a version object directly.
payload: Mapping[str, Any] = document
version = document.get("version")
if isinstance(version, dict):
payload = version
encoded = payload.get("value")
if not isinstance(encoded, str):
fail(f"secret {name} response omitted base64 value")
try:
value = base64.b64decode(encoded, validate=True)
except (binascii.Error, ValueError):
fail(f"secret {name} has invalid base64 encoding")
if not value:
fail(f"secret {name} is empty")
if len(value) > limit:
fail(f"secret {name} exceeds its configured limit")
if b"\x00" in value or b"\n" in value or b"\r" in value:
fail(f"secret {name} cannot be represented as a dotenv value")
return value
def fetch_selectel(
config: Mapping[str, Any],
specs: Mapping[str, Mapping[str, Any]],
environ: Mapping[str, str],
client_factory: Callable[..., HTTPClient] = HTTPClient,
) -> dict[str, bytes]:
selectel = _object(config.get("selectel"), "selectel")
_only_keys(
selectel,
{
"account_id",
"username",
"project_name",
"region",
"interface",
"password_file",
"password_env",
"identity_url",
"secrets_url",
"ca_file",
},
"selectel",
)
http = _object(config.get("http", {}), "http")
_only_keys(http, {"timeout_seconds", "retries", "max_response_bytes"}, "http")
timeout = http.get("timeout_seconds", 10)
if isinstance(timeout, bool) or not isinstance(timeout, (int, float)) or not 0.1 <= timeout <= 60:
fail("http.timeout_seconds must be from 0.1 through 60")
retries = _bounded_int(http.get("retries", 3), "http.retries", 0, 8)
response_limit = _bounded_int(
http.get("max_response_bytes", MAX_HTTP_BYTES),
"http.max_response_bytes",
1024,
4 * MAX_HTTP_BYTES,
)
cafile = selectel.get("ca_file")
if cafile is not None and (not isinstance(cafile, str) or not cafile):
fail("selectel.ca_file must be a non-empty string")
client = client_factory(
timeout=float(timeout),
retries=retries,
max_response_bytes=response_limit,
cafile=cafile,
)
password = credential_value(selectel, environ)
token, catalog = project_token_and_catalog(client, selectel, password)
region = _required_string(selectel, "region", "selectel")
interface = selectel.get("interface", "public")
if interface not in {"public", "internal"}:
fail("selectel.interface must be public or internal")
override = selectel.get("secrets_url")
if override is not None and (not isinstance(override, str) or not override):
fail("selectel.secrets_url must be a non-empty string")
base_url = override.rstrip("/") if override else secrets_endpoint(catalog, region, interface)
values: dict[str, bytes] = {}
fetched: dict[tuple[str, int | None], bytes] = {}
for canonical, spec in specs.items():
if "literal" in spec:
values[canonical] = b""
continue
remote = _required_string(spec, "remote", f"secrets.{canonical}")
version = spec.get("version")
version_id: int | None = None
if version is not None:
version_id = _bounded_int(
version, f"secrets.{canonical}.version", 1, 2_147_483_647
)
cache_key = (remote, version_id)
if cache_key not in fetched:
path = f"/v1/{urllib.parse.quote(remote, safe='')}"
if version_id is not None:
path += f"/versions/{version_id}"
try:
result = client.request(
"GET",
base_url + path,
headers={"X-Auth-Token": token, "Accept": "application/json"},
expected=frozenset({200}),
)
document = parse_json_response(result, f"secret {canonical} response")
fetched[cache_key] = decode_secret(
document, canonical, MAX_SECRET_BYTES
)
except LoaderError as exc:
fail(f"cannot load {canonical}: {exc}")
limit = _bounded_int(
spec.get("max_bytes", MAX_SECRET_BYTES),
f"secrets.{canonical}.max_bytes",
1,
MAX_SECRET_BYTES,
)
value = fetched[cache_key]
if len(value) > limit:
fail(f"secret {canonical} exceeds its configured limit")
values[canonical] = value
return values
def parse_dotenv(path: Path, expected: set[str], max_bytes: int) -> dict[str, bytes]:
require_private_regular_file(path, "fallback dotenv")
raw = read_limited(path, max_bytes, "fallback dotenv")
try:
text = raw.decode("utf-8")
except UnicodeDecodeError:
fail("fallback dotenv is not valid UTF-8")
values: dict[str, bytes] = {}
for number, line in enumerate(text.splitlines(), 1):
if not line or line.startswith("#"):
continue
match = DOTENV_LINE_RE.fullmatch(line)
if not match:
fail(f"fallback dotenv has invalid syntax at line {number}")
name, encoded_value = match.groups()
if name not in expected:
fail(f"fallback dotenv contains undeclared key {name}")
if name in values:
fail(f"fallback dotenv contains duplicate key {name}")
if encoded_value.startswith('"'):
try:
decoded = json.loads(encoded_value)
except json.JSONDecodeError:
fail(f"fallback dotenv has invalid quoted value at line {number}")
if not isinstance(decoded, str):
fail(f"fallback dotenv has invalid quoted value at line {number}")
value = decoded.encode("utf-8")
elif encoded_value.startswith("'"):
if len(encoded_value) < 2 or not encoded_value.endswith("'"):
fail(f"fallback dotenv has invalid quoted value at line {number}")
value = encoded_value[1:-1].encode("utf-8")
else:
if any(character.isspace() for character in encoded_value) or any(
character in encoded_value for character in ("'", '"', "`", "$", "\\")
):
fail(f"fallback dotenv requires quoting at line {number}")
value = encoded_value.encode("utf-8")
if not value or b"\x00" in value or b"\n" in value or b"\r" in value:
fail(f"fallback dotenv has an empty or unsafe value for {name}")
values[name] = value
missing = sorted(expected - set(values))
if missing:
fail(f"fallback dotenv is missing declared keys: {', '.join(missing)}")
return values
def validate_specs(config: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, dict[str, Any]]:
raw_specs = _object(config.get("secrets"), "secrets")
if not raw_specs:
fail("secrets must not be empty")
specs: dict[str, dict[str, Any]] = {}
for canonical, raw_spec in raw_specs.items():
if not isinstance(canonical, str) or not ENV_NAME_RE.fullmatch(canonical):
fail("every canonical secret name must be an uppercase environment name")
spec = _object(raw_spec, f"secrets.{canonical}")
_only_keys(
spec,
{"remote", "consumers", "max_bytes", "version", "literal"},
f"secrets.{canonical}",
)
has_remote = "remote" in spec
has_literal = "literal" in spec
if has_remote == has_literal:
fail(f"secrets.{canonical} must set exactly one of remote or literal")
if has_literal and spec["literal"] != "":
fail(f"secrets.{canonical}.literal may only be an empty string")
consumers = spec.get("consumers")
if not isinstance(consumers, list) or not consumers:
fail(f"secrets.{canonical}.consumers must be a non-empty array")
if len(consumers) != len(set(item for item in consumers if isinstance(item, str))):
fail(f"secrets.{canonical}.consumers contains duplicates or invalid values")
for consumer in consumers:
if not isinstance(consumer, str) or not SERVICE_NAME_RE.fullmatch(consumer):
fail(f"secrets.{canonical}.consumers contains an invalid service name")
specs[canonical] = spec
return specs
def dotenv_quote(value: bytes, name: str) -> str:
try:
text = value.decode("utf-8")
except UnicodeDecodeError:
fail(f"secret {name} is not valid UTF-8")
return json.dumps(text, ensure_ascii=False)
def materialize(runtime_dir: Path, specs: Mapping[str, Mapping[str, Any]], values: Mapping[str, bytes]) -> None:
try:
runtime_dir.mkdir(mode=0o700, parents=True, exist_ok=True)
if runtime_dir.is_symlink():
fail("runtime directory must not be a symlink")
os.chmod(runtime_dir, 0o700)
except OSError as exc:
fail(f"cannot prepare runtime directory: {exc.strerror or exc.__class__.__name__}")
consumers = sorted(
{consumer for spec in specs.values() for consumer in spec["consumers"]}
)
staged: list[tuple[Path, Path]] = []
try:
for consumer in consumers:
lines = [
f"{name}={dotenv_quote(values[name], name)}\n"
for name, spec in sorted(specs.items())
if consumer in spec["consumers"]
]
descriptor, temporary = tempfile.mkstemp(
prefix=f".{consumer}.", suffix=".tmp", dir=runtime_dir
)
temporary_path = Path(temporary)
try:
os.chmod(temporary_path, 0o600)
stream = os.fdopen(descriptor, "w", encoding="utf-8", newline="\n")
descriptor = -1
with stream:
stream.writelines(lines)
stream.flush()
os.fsync(stream.fileno())
except BaseException:
if descriptor >= 0:
os.close(descriptor)
raise
staged.append((temporary_path, runtime_dir / f"{consumer}.env"))
for temporary_path, destination in staged:
os.replace(temporary_path, destination)
value_paths: dict[str, Path] = {}
for name, value in sorted(values.items()):
descriptor, temporary = tempfile.mkstemp(
prefix=f".{name}.", suffix=".tmp", dir=runtime_dir
)
temporary_path = Path(temporary)
try:
# Compose implements local secrets as bind mounts. The protected
# 0700 parent prevents host users from traversing to this 0444
# file while allowing a non-root container UID to read its mount.
os.chmod(temporary_path, 0o444)
with os.fdopen(descriptor, "wb") as stream:
descriptor = -1
stream.write(value)
stream.flush()
os.fsync(stream.fileno())
except BaseException:
if descriptor >= 0:
os.close(descriptor)
temporary_path.unlink(missing_ok=True)
raise
destination = runtime_dir / name
os.replace(temporary_path, destination)
value_paths[name] = destination
manifest_lines = [
f"{name}={path.resolve()}\n" for name, path in sorted(value_paths.items())
]
descriptor, temporary = tempfile.mkstemp(
prefix=".manifest.", suffix=".tmp", dir=runtime_dir
)
manifest_path = Path(temporary)
try:
os.chmod(manifest_path, 0o600)
with os.fdopen(descriptor, "w", encoding="utf-8", newline="\n") as stream:
descriptor = -1
stream.writelines(manifest_lines)
stream.flush()
os.fsync(stream.fileno())
except BaseException:
if descriptor >= 0:
os.close(descriptor)
manifest_path.unlink(missing_ok=True)
raise
os.replace(manifest_path, runtime_dir / "manifest")
if hasattr(os, "O_DIRECTORY"):
directory_fd = os.open(runtime_dir, os.O_RDONLY | os.O_DIRECTORY)
try:
os.fsync(directory_fd)
finally:
os.close(directory_fd)
except OSError as exc:
fail(f"cannot atomically materialize service files: {exc.strerror or exc.__class__.__name__}")
finally:
for temporary_path, _ in staged:
try:
temporary_path.unlink(missing_ok=True)
except OSError:
pass
def run(
config_path: Path,
*,
runtime_override: Path | None = None,
environ: Mapping[str, str] | None = None,
client_factory: Callable[..., HTTPClient] = HTTPClient,
) -> list[str]:
os.umask(0o077)
environment = os.environ if environ is None else environ
config = load_json(config_path)
_only_keys(config, {"version", "mode", "runtime_dir", "http", "selectel", "file", "secrets"}, "configuration")
if config.get("version") != 1:
fail("configuration.version must be 1")
mode = config.get("mode")
if mode not in {"selectel", "file"}:
fail("configuration.mode must explicitly be selectel or file")
specs = validate_specs(config)
if runtime_override is None:
configured_runtime = config.get("runtime_dir")
if not isinstance(configured_runtime, str) or not configured_runtime:
fail("configuration.runtime_dir must be a non-empty string")
runtime_dir = Path(configured_runtime)
else:
runtime_dir = runtime_override
if not runtime_dir.is_absolute():
fail("runtime directory must be an absolute path")
if mode == "selectel":
if "file" in config:
fail("file settings are forbidden in selectel mode")
values = fetch_selectel(config, specs, environment, client_factory)
else:
if "selectel" in config or "http" in config:
fail("selectel and http settings are forbidden in file mode")
file_config = _object(config.get("file"), "file")
_only_keys(file_config, {"path", "max_bytes"}, "file")
source = Path(_required_string(file_config, "path", "file"))
if not source.is_absolute():
fail("file.path must be absolute")
max_bytes = _bounded_int(
file_config.get("max_bytes", MAX_CONFIG_BYTES),
"file.max_bytes",
1,
4 * MAX_CONFIG_BYTES,
)
expected = {name for name, spec in specs.items() if "literal" not in spec}
values = parse_dotenv(source, expected, max_bytes)
values.update(
{name: b"" for name, spec in specs.items() if "literal" in spec}
)
for canonical, value in values.items():
limit = _bounded_int(
specs[canonical].get("max_bytes", MAX_SECRET_BYTES),
f"secrets.{canonical}.max_bytes",
1,
MAX_SECRET_BYTES,
)
if len(value) > limit:
fail(f"secret {canonical} exceeds its configured limit")
materialize(runtime_dir, specs, values)
return sorted({consumer for spec in specs.values() for consumer in spec["consumers"]})
def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Materialize per-service secret dotenv files")
parser.add_argument("--config", required=True, type=Path)
parser.add_argument("--runtime-dir", type=Path)
arguments = parser.parse_args(argv)
try:
consumers = run(arguments.config, runtime_override=arguments.runtime_dir)
except LoaderError as exc:
print(f"secrets-loader: {exc}", file=sys.stderr)
return 1
print(f"secrets-loader: materialized {len(consumers)} service file(s)", file=sys.stderr)
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
raise SystemExit(main())
codebase/backend/infra/compose/application.yml
+220 -73
View File
@@ -1,28 +1,59 @@
x-no-sms-secrets: &no-sms-secrets
SMS_DATABASE_URL: ""
SMS_SERVICE_TOKEN: ""
KEYCLOAK_SMS_SERVICE_TOKEN: ""
IDGTL_SMS_API_KEY: ""
IDGTL_SMS_CALLBACK_USERNAME: ""
IDGTL_SMS_CALLBACK_PASSWORD: ""
KEYCLOAK_YANDEX_CAPTCHA_ENABLED: ""
KEYCLOAK_YANDEX_CAPTCHA_CLIENT_KEY: ""
KEYCLOAK_YANDEX_CAPTCHA_SERVER_KEY: ""
x-api-secret-environment: &api-secret-environment
HAN_SECRET_VARS: >-
DATABASE_URL REDIS_URL REDIS_REALTIME_URL MESSAGE_SAFETY_SERVICE_TOKEN
BITRIX_LOCAL_APP_INTERNAL_TOKEN BITRIX_API_INBOX_TOKEN
KEYCLOAK_SETTINGS_BRIDGE_TOKEN SELECTEL_S3_ACCESS_KEY SELECTEL_S3_SECRET_KEY
CURSOR_HMAC_SECRET
DATABASE_URL_FILE: /run/secrets/api_database_url
REDIS_URL_FILE: /run/secrets/api_redis_url
REDIS_REALTIME_URL_FILE: /run/secrets/api_redis_realtime_url
MESSAGE_SAFETY_SERVICE_TOKEN_FILE: /run/secrets/message_safety_service_token
BITRIX_LOCAL_APP_INTERNAL_TOKEN_FILE: /run/secrets/bitrix_local_app_internal_token
BITRIX_API_INBOX_TOKEN_FILE: /run/secrets/bitrix_api_inbox_token
KEYCLOAK_SETTINGS_BRIDGE_TOKEN_FILE: /run/secrets/keycloak_settings_bridge_token
SELECTEL_S3_ACCESS_KEY_FILE: /run/secrets/selectel_s3_access_key
SELECTEL_S3_SECRET_KEY_FILE: /run/secrets/selectel_s3_secret_key
CURSOR_HMAC_SECRET_FILE: /run/secrets/cursor_hmac_secret
x-api-secrets: &api-secrets
- api_database_url
- api_redis_url
- api_redis_realtime_url
- message_safety_service_token
- bitrix_local_app_internal_token
- bitrix_api_inbox_token
- keycloak_settings_bridge_token
- selectel_s3_access_key
- selectel_s3_secret_key
- cursor_hmac_secret
x-api-runtime: &api-runtime
build:
context: ../../api-backend
image: ${API_BACKEND_IMAGE:-han-chat-api-backend:local}
env_file:
- path: ../../.env
required: false
environment:
<<: *no-sms-secrets
NOTIFICATIONS_TOKEN_PRODUCER_TEST: ${NOTIFICATIONS_TOKEN_PRODUCER_TEST:?NOTIFICATIONS_TOKEN_PRODUCER_TEST is required}
<<: *api-secret-environment
APP_ENV: ${APP_ENV:-production-like}
LOG_LEVEL: ${LOG_LEVEL:-INFO}
RELEASE_VERSION: ${RELEASE_VERSION:-unknown}
KEYCLOAK_PUBLIC_URL: ${KEYCLOAK_PUBLIC_URL}
KEYCLOAK_INTERNAL_URL: ${KEYCLOAK_INTERNAL_URL:-http://keycloak:8080/auth}
KEYCLOAK_REALM: ${KEYCLOAK_REALM:-han-chat}
KEYCLOAK_AUDIENCE: ${KEYCLOAK_AUDIENCE:-han-chat-api}
MESSAGE_SAFETY_URL: ${MESSAGE_SAFETY_URL:-http://message-safety:8080}
MESSAGE_SAFETY_POST_TIMEOUT_SEC: ${MESSAGE_SAFETY_POST_TIMEOUT_SEC:-5}
MESSAGE_SAFETY_TASK_POLL_INTERVAL_SEC: ${MESSAGE_SAFETY_TASK_POLL_INTERVAL_SEC:-2}
MESSAGE_SAFETY_TASK_POLL_MAX_SEC: ${MESSAGE_SAFETY_TASK_POLL_MAX_SEC:-300}
BITRIX_LOCAL_APP_BASE_URL: ${BITRIX_LOCAL_APP_BASE_URL:-http://bitrix-local-app:8080}
BITRIX_LOCAL_APP_HTTP_TIMEOUT_SEC: ${BITRIX_LOCAL_APP_HTTP_TIMEOUT_SEC:-20}
SELECTEL_S3_ENDPOINT_URL: ${SELECTEL_S3_ENDPOINT_URL}
SELECTEL_S3_BUCKET_DOCUMENTS: ${SELECTEL_S3_BUCKET_DOCUMENTS}
SELECTEL_S3_BUCKET_ATTACHMENTS: ${SELECTEL_S3_BUCKET_ATTACHMENTS}
SELECTEL_S3_BUCKET_QUARANTINE: ${SELECTEL_S3_BUCKET_QUARANTINE}
TRUSTED_PROXY_CIDRS: ${TRUSTED_PROXY_CIDRS:-127.0.0.1/32}
OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT: ${OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT:-http://otel-collector:4317}
OTEL_SERVICE_NAME: ${OTEL_SERVICE_NAME_API:-api-backend}
secrets: *api-secrets
volumes:
- type: bind
source: ${PG_CA_HOST_PATH}
@@ -30,32 +61,48 @@ x-api-runtime: &api-runtime
read_only: true
networks: [backend, observability, egress]
security_opt: ["no-new-privileges:true"]
ulimits:
core: {soft: 0, hard: 0}
logging:
driver: json-file
options: {max-size: "50m", max-file: "5"}
x-sms-api-environment: &sms-api-environment
HAN_SECRET_VARS: >-
SMS_DATABASE_URL SMS_SERVICE_TOKEN IDGTL_SMS_CALLBACK_USERNAME
IDGTL_SMS_CALLBACK_PASSWORD
SMS_DATABASE_URL_FILE: /run/secrets/sms_database_url
SMS_SERVICE_TOKEN_FILE: /run/secrets/sms_service_token
IDGTL_SMS_CALLBACK_USERNAME_FILE: /run/secrets/idgtl_sms_callback_username
IDGTL_SMS_CALLBACK_PASSWORD_FILE: /run/secrets/idgtl_sms_callback_password
IDGTL_SMS_BASE_URL: ${IDGTL_SMS_BASE_URL:-https://direct.i-dgtl.ru}
IDGTL_SMS_CALLBACK_PUBLIC_URL: ${IDGTL_SMS_CALLBACK_PUBLIC_URL}
LOG_LEVEL: ${LOG_LEVEL:-INFO}
APP_ENV: ${APP_ENV:-production-like}
RELEASE_VERSION: ${RELEASE_VERSION:-unknown}
OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT: ${OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT:-http://otel-collector:4317}
OTEL_SERVICE_NAME: ${OTEL_SERVICE_NAME_SMS_API:-sms-service}
x-sms-api-secrets: &sms-api-secrets
- sms_database_url
- sms_service_token
- idgtl_sms_callback_username
- idgtl_sms_callback_password
x-sms-runtime: &sms-runtime
build:
context: ../../sms-service
image: ${SMS_SERVICE_IMAGE:-han-chat-sms-service:local}
environment:
SMS_DATABASE_URL: ${SMS_DATABASE_URL}
SMS_SERVICE_TOKEN: ${SMS_SERVICE_TOKEN}
IDGTL_SMS_BASE_URL: ${IDGTL_SMS_BASE_URL:-https://direct.i-dgtl.ru}
IDGTL_SMS_CALLBACK_PUBLIC_URL: ${IDGTL_SMS_CALLBACK_PUBLIC_URL}
IDGTL_SMS_CALLBACK_USERNAME: ${IDGTL_SMS_CALLBACK_USERNAME}
IDGTL_SMS_CALLBACK_PASSWORD: ${IDGTL_SMS_CALLBACK_PASSWORD}
LOG_LEVEL: ${LOG_LEVEL:-INFO}
APP_ENV: ${APP_ENV:-production-like}
RELEASE_VERSION: ${RELEASE_VERSION:-unknown}
OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT: ${OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT:-http://otel-collector:4317}
OTEL_SERVICE_NAME: ${OTEL_SERVICE_NAME_SMS_API:-sms-service}
environment: *sms-api-environment
secrets: *sms-api-secrets
volumes:
- type: bind
source: ${PG_CA_HOST_PATH}
target: /run/secrets/pg-ca.pem
read_only: true
security_opt: ["no-new-privileges:true"]
ulimits:
core: {soft: 0, hard: 0}
logging:
driver: json-file
options: {max-size: "50m", max-file: "5"}
@@ -80,21 +127,31 @@ services:
- /tmp:size=8m,mode=1777
cap_drop: ["ALL"]
security_opt: ["no-new-privileges:true"]
ulimits:
core: {soft: 0, hard: 0}
keycloak:
build:
context: ../../keycloak
image: ${KEYCLOAK_IMAGE:-han-chat-keycloak:local}
env_file:
- path: ../../.env
required: false
environment:
<<: *no-sms-secrets
HAN_SECRET_VARS: >-
KC_DB_PASSWORD KC_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_PASSWORD
KEYCLOAK_OTP_MOCK_CODE
KEYCLOAK_YANDEX_CAPTCHA_SERVER_KEY
KEYCLOAK_OTP_HMAC_KEY KEYCLOAK_SETTINGS_BRIDGE_TOKEN
KEYCLOAK_SMS_SERVICE_TOKEN
KC_DB_PASSWORD_FILE: /run/secrets/keycloak_db_password
KC_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_PASSWORD_FILE: /run/secrets/keycloak_admin_password
KEYCLOAK_OTP_MOCK_CODE_FILE: /run/secrets/keycloak_otp_mock_code
KEYCLOAK_YANDEX_CAPTCHA_SERVER_KEY_FILE: /run/secrets/keycloak_yandex_captcha_server_key
KEYCLOAK_OTP_HMAC_KEY_FILE: /run/secrets/keycloak_otp_hmac_key
KEYCLOAK_SETTINGS_BRIDGE_TOKEN_FILE: /run/secrets/keycloak_settings_bridge_token
KEYCLOAK_SMS_SERVICE_TOKEN_FILE: /run/secrets/keycloak_sms_service_token
KC_DB: postgres
KC_DB_URL: ${KEYCLOAK_DB_URL}
KC_DB_SCHEMA: ${KEYCLOAK_DB_SCHEMA:-keycloak}
KC_DB_USERNAME: ${KEYCLOAK_DB_USERNAME}
KC_DB_PASSWORD: ${KEYCLOAK_DB_PASSWORD}
KC_DB_SCHEMA: ${KEYCLOAK_DB_SCHEMA:-keycloak}
KC_PROXY_HEADERS: xforwarded
KC_HTTP_ENABLED: "true"
KC_HTTP_RELATIVE_PATH: /auth
@@ -102,18 +159,20 @@ services:
KC_METRICS_ENABLED: "true"
KC_HOSTNAME: ${KEYCLOAK_PUBLIC_URL}
KC_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_USERNAME: ${KEYCLOAK_ADMIN}
KC_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_PASSWORD: ${KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD}
KEYCLOAK_OTP_MOCK_ENABLED: ${KEYCLOAK_OTP_MOCK_ENABLED:-false}
KEYCLOAK_OTP_MOCK_CODE: ${KEYCLOAK_OTP_MOCK_CODE:-}
KEYCLOAK_YANDEX_CAPTCHA_ENABLED: ${KEYCLOAK_YANDEX_CAPTCHA_ENABLED:-false}
KEYCLOAK_YANDEX_CAPTCHA_CLIENT_KEY: ${KEYCLOAK_YANDEX_CAPTCHA_CLIENT_KEY:-}
KEYCLOAK_YANDEX_CAPTCHA_SERVER_KEY: ${KEYCLOAK_YANDEX_CAPTCHA_SERVER_KEY:-}
KEYCLOAK_OTP_HMAC_KEY: ${KEYCLOAK_OTP_HMAC_KEY:?KEYCLOAK_OTP_HMAC_KEY is required}
KEYCLOAK_OTP_SETTINGS_MAX_STALE_SEC: ${KEYCLOAK_OTP_SETTINGS_MAX_STALE_SEC:-300}
KEYCLOAK_SETTINGS_BRIDGE_URL: ${KEYCLOAK_SETTINGS_BRIDGE_URL:-http://api-backend:8000/internal/settings/v1/otp}
KEYCLOAK_SETTINGS_BRIDGE_TOKEN: ${KEYCLOAK_SETTINGS_BRIDGE_TOKEN:?KEYCLOAK_SETTINGS_BRIDGE_TOKEN is required}
KEYCLOAK_SMS_SERVICE_URL: ${KEYCLOAK_SMS_SERVICE_URL:-http://sms-service:8080}
KEYCLOAK_SMS_SERVICE_TOKEN: ${KEYCLOAK_SMS_SERVICE_TOKEN:?KEYCLOAK_SMS_SERVICE_TOKEN is required}
secrets:
- keycloak_db_password
- keycloak_admin_password
- keycloak_otp_mock_code
- keycloak_yandex_captcha_server_key
- keycloak_otp_hmac_key
- keycloak_settings_bridge_token
- keycloak_sms_service_token
command: ["start", "--optimized", "--import-realm"]
expose: ["8080", "9000"]
volumes:
@@ -130,6 +189,8 @@ services:
start_period: 60s
restart: unless-stopped
security_opt: ["no-new-privileges:true"]
ulimits:
core: {soft: 0, hard: 0}
logging:
driver: json-file
options: {max-size: "50m", max-file: "5"}
@@ -148,22 +209,21 @@ services:
sms-worker:
<<: *sms-runtime
entrypoint: []
command: ["han-sms-worker"]
environment:
SMS_DATABASE_URL: ${SMS_DATABASE_URL}
SMS_SERVICE_TOKEN: ${SMS_SERVICE_TOKEN}
IDGTL_SMS_BASE_URL: ${IDGTL_SMS_BASE_URL:-https://direct.i-dgtl.ru}
IDGTL_SMS_API_KEY: ${IDGTL_SMS_API_KEY:?IDGTL_SMS_API_KEY is required}
IDGTL_SMS_CALLBACK_PUBLIC_URL: ${IDGTL_SMS_CALLBACK_PUBLIC_URL}
IDGTL_SMS_CALLBACK_USERNAME: ${IDGTL_SMS_CALLBACK_USERNAME}
IDGTL_SMS_CALLBACK_PASSWORD: ${IDGTL_SMS_CALLBACK_PASSWORD}
LOG_LEVEL: ${LOG_LEVEL:-INFO}
APP_ENV: ${APP_ENV:-production-like}
RELEASE_VERSION: ${RELEASE_VERSION:-unknown}
OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT: ${OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT:-http://otel-collector:4317}
<<: *sms-api-environment
HAN_SECRET_VARS: >-
SMS_DATABASE_URL SMS_SERVICE_TOKEN IDGTL_SMS_API_KEY
IDGTL_SMS_CALLBACK_USERNAME IDGTL_SMS_CALLBACK_PASSWORD
IDGTL_SMS_API_KEY_FILE: /run/secrets/idgtl_sms_api_key
OTEL_SERVICE_NAME: ${OTEL_SERVICE_NAME_SMS_WORKER:-sms-worker}
SMS_METRICS_PORT: ${SMS_METRICS_PORT:-9464}
secrets:
- sms_database_url
- sms_service_token
- idgtl_sms_api_key
- idgtl_sms_callback_username
- idgtl_sms_callback_password
expose: ["9464"]
networks: [backend, observability, egress]
depends_on:
@@ -180,17 +240,17 @@ services:
build:
context: ../../message-safety
image: ${MESSAGE_SAFETY_IMAGE:-han-chat-message-safety:local}
env_file:
- path: ../../.env
required: false
environment:
<<: *no-sms-secrets
HAN_SECRET_VARS: MESSAGE_SAFETY_REDIS_URL MESSAGE_SAFETY_SERVICE_TOKEN
MESSAGE_SAFETY_REDIS_URL_FILE: /run/secrets/message_safety_redis_url
MESSAGE_SAFETY_SERVICE_TOKEN_FILE: /run/secrets/message_safety_service_token
APP_ENV: ${APP_ENV:-production-like}
MESSAGE_SAFETY_RULES_VERSION: ${MESSAGE_SAFETY_RULES_VERSION:-2026-01-01}
MESSAGE_SAFETY_TASK_TTL_SEC: ${MESSAGE_SAFETY_TASK_TTL_SEC:-900}
secrets:
- message_safety_redis_url
- message_safety_service_token
expose: ["8080"]
volumes:
- type: bind
source: ${PG_CA_HOST_PATH}
target: /run/secrets/pg-ca.pem
read_only: true
networks: [backend, observability, egress]
depends_on:
redis: {condition: service_healthy}
@@ -202,6 +262,8 @@ services:
start_period: 30s
restart: unless-stopped
security_opt: ["no-new-privileges:true"]
ulimits:
core: {soft: 0, hard: 0}
logging:
driver: json-file
options: {max-size: "50m", max-file: "5"}
@@ -223,7 +285,6 @@ services:
delivery-worker:
<<: *api-runtime
entrypoint: []
command: ["han-delivery-worker"]
depends_on:
api-backend: {condition: service_healthy}
@@ -238,7 +299,6 @@ services:
safety-recovery-worker:
<<: *api-runtime
entrypoint: []
command: ["han-safety-worker"]
depends_on:
api-backend: {condition: service_healthy}
@@ -253,7 +313,6 @@ services:
cleanup-worker:
<<: *api-runtime
entrypoint: []
command: ["han-cleanup-worker"]
depends_on:
api-backend: {condition: service_healthy}
@@ -267,7 +326,6 @@ services:
notification-expire-worker:
<<: *api-runtime
entrypoint: []
command: ["han-notification-expire-worker"]
depends_on:
api-backend: {condition: service_healthy}
@@ -281,7 +339,6 @@ services:
notification-draft-cleanup-worker:
<<: *api-runtime
entrypoint: []
command: ["han-notification-draft-cleanup-worker"]
depends_on:
api-backend: {condition: service_healthy}
@@ -298,11 +355,33 @@ services:
build:
context: ../../bitrix-local-app
image: ${BITRIX_LOCAL_APP_IMAGE:-han-chat-bitrix-local-app:local}
env_file:
- path: ../../.env
required: false
environment:
<<: *no-sms-secrets
HAN_SECRET_VARS: >-
BITRIX_DATABASE_URL BITRIX_CLIENT_SECRET
BITRIX_APPLICATION_TOKEN BITRIX_INTERNAL_API_TOKEN
BITRIX_API_FORWARD_TOKEN BITRIX_TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY
BITRIX_DATABASE_URL_FILE: /run/secrets/bitrix_database_url
BITRIX_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE: /run/secrets/bitrix_client_secret
BITRIX_APPLICATION_TOKEN_FILE: /run/secrets/bitrix_application_token
BITRIX_INTERNAL_API_TOKEN_FILE: /run/secrets/bitrix_internal_api_token
BITRIX_API_FORWARD_TOKEN_FILE: /run/secrets/bitrix_api_forward_token
BITRIX_TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY_FILE: /run/secrets/bitrix_token_encryption_key
APP_ENV: ${APP_ENV:-production-like}
BITRIX_CLIENT_ID: ${BITRIX_CLIENT_ID}
BITRIX_CONNECTOR_ID: ${BITRIX_CONNECTOR_ID:-han_mobile_app}
BITRIX_CONNECTOR_NAME: ${BITRIX_CONNECTOR_NAME:-HAN Mobile App}
BITRIX_OPEN_LINE_ID: ${BITRIX_OPEN_LINE_ID}
BITRIX_EXPECTED_DOMAIN: ${BITRIX_EXPECTED_DOMAIN}
BITRIX_PUBLIC_BASE_URL: ${BITRIX_PUBLIC_BASE_URL}
BITRIX_API_FORWARD_URL: ${BITRIX_API_FORWARD_URL:-http://api-backend:8000/internal/openlines/v1/inbox}
BITRIX_HTTP_TIMEOUT_SEC: ${BITRIX_HTTP_TIMEOUT_SEC:-10}
secrets:
- bitrix_database_url
- bitrix_client_secret
- bitrix_application_token
- bitrix_internal_api_token
- bitrix_api_forward_token
- bitrix_token_encryption_key
expose: ["8080"]
volumes:
- type: bind
@@ -320,6 +399,8 @@ services:
start_period: 30s
restart: unless-stopped
security_opt: ["no-new-privileges:true"]
ulimits:
core: {soft: 0, hard: 0}
logging:
driver: json-file
options: {max-size: "50m", max-file: "5"}
@@ -328,11 +409,15 @@ services:
build:
context: ../../bitrix-sync
image: ${BITRIX_SYNC_IMAGE:-han-chat-bitrix-sync:local}
env_file:
- path: ../../.env
required: false
environment:
<<: *no-sms-secrets
HAN_SECRET_VARS: BITRIX_SYNC_DATABASE_URL BITRIX_SYNC_SERVICE_TOKEN
BITRIX_SYNC_DATABASE_URL_FILE: /run/secrets/bitrix_sync_database_url
BITRIX_SYNC_SERVICE_TOKEN_FILE: /run/secrets/bitrix_sync_service_token
APP_ENV: ${APP_ENV:-production-like}
BITRIX_SYNC_ENABLED: ${BITRIX_SYNC_ENABLED:-false}
secrets:
- bitrix_sync_database_url
- bitrix_sync_service_token
expose: ["8080"]
volumes:
- type: bind
@@ -353,3 +438,65 @@ services:
logging:
driver: json-file
options: {max-size: "50m", max-file: "5"}
secrets:
api_database_url:
file: ${HAN_SECRETS_DIR:-/run/han-chat/secrets}/DATABASE_URL
api_redis_url:
file: ${HAN_SECRETS_DIR:-/run/han-chat/secrets}/REDIS_URL
api_redis_realtime_url:
file: ${HAN_SECRETS_DIR:-/run/han-chat/secrets}/REDIS_REALTIME_URL
message_safety_service_token:
file: ${HAN_SECRETS_DIR:-/run/han-chat/secrets}/MESSAGE_SAFETY_SERVICE_TOKEN
bitrix_local_app_internal_token:
file: ${HAN_SECRETS_DIR:-/run/han-chat/secrets}/BITRIX_LOCAL_APP_INTERNAL_TOKEN
bitrix_api_inbox_token:
file: ${HAN_SECRETS_DIR:-/run/han-chat/secrets}/BITRIX_API_INBOX_TOKEN
keycloak_settings_bridge_token:
file: ${HAN_SECRETS_DIR:-/run/han-chat/secrets}/KEYCLOAK_SETTINGS_BRIDGE_TOKEN
selectel_s3_access_key:
file: ${HAN_SECRETS_DIR:-/run/han-chat/secrets}/SELECTEL_S3_ACCESS_KEY
selectel_s3_secret_key:
file: ${HAN_SECRETS_DIR:-/run/han-chat/secrets}/SELECTEL_S3_SECRET_KEY
cursor_hmac_secret:
file: ${HAN_SECRETS_DIR:-/run/han-chat/secrets}/CURSOR_HMAC_SECRET
sms_database_url:
file: ${HAN_SECRETS_DIR:-/run/han-chat/secrets}/SMS_DATABASE_URL
sms_service_token:
file: ${HAN_SECRETS_DIR:-/run/han-chat/secrets}/SMS_SERVICE_TOKEN
idgtl_sms_api_key:
file: ${HAN_SECRETS_DIR:-/run/han-chat/secrets}/IDGTL_SMS_API_KEY
idgtl_sms_callback_username:
file: ${HAN_SECRETS_DIR:-/run/han-chat/secrets}/IDGTL_SMS_CALLBACK_USERNAME
idgtl_sms_callback_password:
file: ${HAN_SECRETS_DIR:-/run/han-chat/secrets}/IDGTL_SMS_CALLBACK_PASSWORD
message_safety_redis_url:
file: ${HAN_SECRETS_DIR:-/run/han-chat/secrets}/MESSAGE_SAFETY_REDIS_URL
bitrix_database_url:
file: ${HAN_SECRETS_DIR:-/run/han-chat/secrets}/BITRIX_DATABASE_URL
bitrix_client_secret:
file: ${HAN_SECRETS_DIR:-/run/han-chat/secrets}/BITRIX_CLIENT_SECRET
bitrix_application_token:
file: ${HAN_SECRETS_DIR:-/run/han-chat/secrets}/BITRIX_APPLICATION_TOKEN
bitrix_internal_api_token:
file: ${HAN_SECRETS_DIR:-/run/han-chat/secrets}/BITRIX_INTERNAL_API_TOKEN
bitrix_api_forward_token:
file: ${HAN_SECRETS_DIR:-/run/han-chat/secrets}/BITRIX_API_FORWARD_TOKEN
bitrix_token_encryption_key:
file: ${HAN_SECRETS_DIR:-/run/han-chat/secrets}/BITRIX_TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY
bitrix_sync_database_url:
file: ${HAN_SECRETS_DIR:-/run/han-chat/secrets}/BITRIX_SYNC_DATABASE_URL
bitrix_sync_service_token:
file: ${HAN_SECRETS_DIR:-/run/han-chat/secrets}/BITRIX_SYNC_SERVICE_TOKEN
keycloak_db_password:
file: ${HAN_SECRETS_DIR:-/run/han-chat/secrets}/KEYCLOAK_DB_PASSWORD
keycloak_admin_password:
file: ${HAN_SECRETS_DIR:-/run/han-chat/secrets}/KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD
keycloak_otp_mock_code:
file: ${HAN_SECRETS_DIR:-/run/han-chat/secrets}/KEYCLOAK_OTP_MOCK_CODE
keycloak_yandex_captcha_server_key:
file: ${HAN_SECRETS_DIR:-/run/han-chat/secrets}/KEYCLOAK_YANDEX_CAPTCHA_SERVER_KEY
keycloak_otp_hmac_key:
file: ${HAN_SECRETS_DIR:-/run/han-chat/secrets}/KEYCLOAK_OTP_HMAC_KEY
keycloak_sms_service_token:
file: ${HAN_SECRETS_DIR:-/run/han-chat/secrets}/KEYCLOAK_SMS_SERVICE_TOKEN
codebase/backend/keycloak/Dockerfile
+2 -1
View File
@@ -21,7 +21,8 @@ RUN /opt/keycloak/bin/kc.sh build
FROM quay.io/keycloak/keycloak:26.1.4
COPY --from=keycloak-build --chown=keycloak:keycloak /opt/keycloak/ /opt/keycloak/
COPY --chown=keycloak:keycloak realm/han-chat-realm.json /opt/keycloak/data/import/han-chat-realm.json
COPY --chown=keycloak:keycloak --chmod=0555 container-entrypoint.sh /opt/keycloak/bin/han-container-entrypoint
USER 1000
EXPOSE 8080 9000
ENTRYPOINT ["/opt/keycloak/bin/kc.sh"]
ENTRYPOINT ["/opt/keycloak/bin/han-container-entrypoint"]
CMD ["start", "--optimized", "--import-realm"]
codebase/backend/keycloak/container-entrypoint.sh
+23
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
#!/bin/sh
set -eu
for name in ${HAN_SECRET_VARS:-}; do
case "$name" in
""|[0-9]*|*[!A-Z0-9_]*)
echo "container secrets: invalid variable name" >&2
exit 64
;;
*) ;;
esac
eval "file=\${${name}_FILE:-}"
if [ -z "$file" ] || [ ! -r "$file" ]; then
echo "container secrets: missing file for $name" >&2
exit 66
fi
value=$(cat "$file")
export "$name=$value"
unset "${name}_FILE"
done
unset HAN_SECRET_VARS
exec /opt/keycloak/bin/kc.sh "$@"
codebase/backend/keycloak/docker-compose.yml
+38 -6
View File
@@ -6,8 +6,20 @@ services:
image: han-chat/keycloak:26.1.4-otp-1.0.0
command: ["start", "--optimized", "--import-realm"]
environment:
HAN_SECRET_VARS: >-
KC_DB_PASSWORD KC_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_PASSWORD KEYCLOAK_OTP_MOCK_CODE
KEYCLOAK_YANDEX_CAPTCHA_SERVER_KEY KEYCLOAK_OTP_HMAC_KEY
KEYCLOAK_SETTINGS_BRIDGE_TOKEN KEYCLOAK_SMS_SERVICE_TOKEN
KC_DB_PASSWORD_FILE: /run/secrets/keycloak_db_password
KC_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_PASSWORD_FILE: /run/secrets/keycloak_admin_password
KEYCLOAK_OTP_MOCK_CODE_FILE: /run/secrets/keycloak_otp_mock_code
KEYCLOAK_YANDEX_CAPTCHA_SERVER_KEY_FILE: /run/secrets/keycloak_yandex_captcha_server_key
KEYCLOAK_OTP_HMAC_KEY_FILE: /run/secrets/keycloak_otp_hmac_key
KEYCLOAK_SETTINGS_BRIDGE_TOKEN_FILE: /run/secrets/keycloak_settings_bridge_token
KEYCLOAK_SMS_SERVICE_TOKEN_FILE: /run/secrets/keycloak_sms_service_token
KC_DB: postgres
KC_DB_URL: ${KEYCLOAK_DB_URL:?KEYCLOAK_DB_URL is required}
KC_DB_USERNAME: ${KEYCLOAK_DB_USERNAME:?KEYCLOAK_DB_USERNAME is required}
KC_DB_URL_PROPERTIES: ${KC_DB_URL_PROPERTIES:-currentSchema=keycloak}
KC_HOSTNAME: ${KEYCLOAK_PUBLIC_URL:-https://tohin.ru/auth}
KC_HOSTNAME_STRICT: "true"
@@ -19,21 +31,23 @@ services:
KC_METRICS_ENABLED: "true"
KC_HTTP_MANAGEMENT_PORT: "9000"
KC_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_USERNAME: ${KC_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_USERNAME:?bootstrap admin username is required}
KC_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_PASSWORD: ${KC_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_PASSWORD:?bootstrap admin password is required}
KEYCLOAK_OTP_MOCK_ENABLED: ${KEYCLOAK_OTP_MOCK_ENABLED:-true}
KEYCLOAK_OTP_MOCK_CODE: ${KEYCLOAK_OTP_MOCK_CODE:-}
KEYCLOAK_YANDEX_CAPTCHA_ENABLED: ${KEYCLOAK_YANDEX_CAPTCHA_ENABLED:-false}
KEYCLOAK_YANDEX_CAPTCHA_CLIENT_KEY: ${KEYCLOAK_YANDEX_CAPTCHA_CLIENT_KEY:-}
KEYCLOAK_YANDEX_CAPTCHA_SERVER_KEY: ${KEYCLOAK_YANDEX_CAPTCHA_SERVER_KEY:-}
KEYCLOAK_OTP_HMAC_KEY: ${KEYCLOAK_OTP_HMAC_KEY:?OTP HMAC key is required}
KEYCLOAK_OTP_SETTINGS_MAX_STALE_SEC: ${KEYCLOAK_OTP_SETTINGS_MAX_STALE_SEC:-300}
KEYCLOAK_SETTINGS_BRIDGE_URL: ${KEYCLOAK_SETTINGS_BRIDGE_URL:-http://api-backend:8000/internal/settings/v1/otp}
KEYCLOAK_SETTINGS_BRIDGE_TOKEN: ${KEYCLOAK_SETTINGS_BRIDGE_TOKEN:?settings bridge token is required}
KEYCLOAK_SMS_SERVICE_URL: ${KEYCLOAK_SMS_SERVICE_URL:-http://sms-service:8080}
KEYCLOAK_SMS_SERVICE_TOKEN: ${KEYCLOAK_SMS_SERVICE_TOKEN:-}
KC_LOG_CONSOLE_OUTPUT: json
KC_LOG_LEVEL: ${KEYCLOAK_LOG_LEVEL:-INFO}
JAVA_OPTS_APPEND: ${KEYCLOAK_JAVA_OPTS:--XX:MaxRAMPercentage=70 -XX:InitialRAMPercentage=35}
secrets:
- keycloak_db_password
- keycloak_admin_password
- keycloak_otp_mock_code
- keycloak_yandex_captcha_server_key
- keycloak_otp_hmac_key
- keycloak_settings_bridge_token
- keycloak_sms_service_token
expose:
- "8080"
- "9000"
@@ -56,6 +70,8 @@ services:
- no-new-privileges:true
cap_drop:
- ALL
ulimits:
core: {soft: 0, hard: 0}
stop_grace_period: 30s
restart: unless-stopped
@@ -64,3 +80,19 @@ networks:
backend:
observability:
egress:
secrets:
keycloak_db_password:
file: ${HAN_SECRETS_DIR:-/run/han-chat/secrets}/KEYCLOAK_DB_PASSWORD
keycloak_admin_password:
file: ${HAN_SECRETS_DIR:-/run/han-chat/secrets}/KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD
keycloak_otp_mock_code:
file: ${HAN_SECRETS_DIR:-/run/han-chat/secrets}/KEYCLOAK_OTP_MOCK_CODE
keycloak_yandex_captcha_server_key:
file: ${HAN_SECRETS_DIR:-/run/han-chat/secrets}/KEYCLOAK_YANDEX_CAPTCHA_SERVER_KEY
keycloak_otp_hmac_key:
file: ${HAN_SECRETS_DIR:-/run/han-chat/secrets}/KEYCLOAK_OTP_HMAC_KEY
keycloak_settings_bridge_token:
file: ${HAN_SECRETS_DIR:-/run/han-chat/secrets}/KEYCLOAK_SETTINGS_BRIDGE_TOKEN
keycloak_sms_service_token:
file: ${HAN_SECRETS_DIR:-/run/han-chat/secrets}/KEYCLOAK_SMS_SERVICE_TOKEN
codebase/backend/message-safety/Dockerfile
+2
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,9 @@ WORKDIR /service
COPY app ./app
COPY pyproject.toml ./
RUN pip install --no-cache-dir .
COPY --chmod=0555 container-entrypoint.sh /usr/local/bin/han-container-entrypoint
USER app
EXPOSE 8080
HEALTHCHECK --interval=30s --timeout=3s CMD python -c "import urllib.request; urllib.request.urlopen('http://127.0.0.1:8080/health/live', timeout=2)"
ENTRYPOINT ["/usr/local/bin/han-container-entrypoint"]
CMD ["uvicorn", "app.main:app", "--host", "0.0.0.0", "--port", "8080"]
codebase/backend/message-safety/container-entrypoint.sh
+23
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
#!/bin/sh
set -eu
for name in ${HAN_SECRET_VARS:-}; do
case "$name" in
""|[0-9]*|*[!A-Z0-9_]*)
echo "container secrets: invalid variable name" >&2
exit 64
;;
*) ;;
esac
eval "file=\${${name}_FILE:-}"
if [ -z "$file" ] || [ ! -r "$file" ]; then
echo "container secrets: missing file for $name" >&2
exit 66
fi
value=$(cat "$file")
export "$name=$value"
unset "${name}_FILE"
done
unset HAN_SECRET_VARS
exec "$@"
codebase/backend/observability/docker-compose.yml
+8 -1
View File
@@ -18,12 +18,13 @@ services:
APP_ENV: ${APP_ENV:-production-like}
RELEASE_VERSION: ${RELEASE_VERSION:-unknown}
OTEL_REMOTE_ENDPOINT: ${OTEL_REMOTE_ENDPOINT}
OTEL_REMOTE_AUTH_HEADER: ${OTEL_REMOTE_AUTH_HEADER:-}
OTEL_REMOTE_TLS_INSECURE: ${OTEL_REMOTE_TLS_INSECURE:-false}
expose: ["4317", "4318", "13133", "8888"]
volumes:
- ./otel-collector.yaml:/etc/otelcol/config.yaml:ro
- otel-queue:/var/lib/otelcol/queue
secrets:
- otel_remote_auth_header
networks: [observability, egress]
depends_on:
otel-queue-init: {condition: service_completed_successfully}
@@ -38,6 +39,8 @@ services:
user: "10001:10001"
cap_drop: ["ALL"]
security_opt: ["no-new-privileges:true"]
ulimits:
core: {soft: 0, hard: 0}
mem_limit: 512m
cpus: 0.5
logging:
@@ -62,3 +65,7 @@ services:
user: "10001:10001"
cap_drop: ["ALL"]
security_opt: ["no-new-privileges:true"]
secrets:
otel_remote_auth_header:
file: ${HAN_SECRETS_DIR:-/run/han-chat/secrets}/OTEL_REMOTE_AUTH_HEADER
codebase/backend/observability/otel-collector.yaml
+1 -1
View File
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ exporters:
otlp/remote:
endpoint: "${env:OTEL_REMOTE_ENDPOINT}"
headers:
authorization: "${env:OTEL_REMOTE_AUTH_HEADER}"
authorization: ${file:/run/secrets/otel_remote_auth_header}
tls:
insecure: "${env:OTEL_REMOTE_TLS_INSECURE}"
sending_queue:
codebase/backend/redis/docker-compose.yml
+14 -4
View File
@@ -4,17 +4,18 @@ services:
context: .
image: han-chat-redis:${RELEASE_VERSION:-local}
environment:
REDIS_API_PASSWORD: ${REDIS_API_PASSWORD}
REDIS_SAFETY_PASSWORD: ${REDIS_SAFETY_PASSWORD}
REDIS_HEALTH_PASSWORD: ${REDIS_HEALTH_PASSWORD}
REDIS_MAXMEMORY: ${REDIS_MAXMEMORY:-384mb}
REDIS_EVICTION_POLICY: ${REDIS_EVICTION_POLICY:-volatile-lru}
secrets:
- redis_api_password
- redis_safety_password
- redis_health_password
expose: ["6379"]
volumes:
- redis-data:/data
networks: [backend]
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "redis-cli --no-auth-warning --user ops_health --pass \"$$REDIS_HEALTH_PASSWORD\" PING | grep -qx PONG"]
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "REDISCLI_AUTH=\"$$(cat /run/secrets/redis_health_password)\" redis-cli --user ops_health PING | grep -qx PONG"]
interval: 10s
timeout: 3s
retries: 10
@@ -28,7 +29,16 @@ services:
cap_drop: ["ALL"]
mem_limit: 512m
ulimits:
core: {soft: 0, hard: 0}
nofile: {soft: 65536, hard: 65536}
logging:
driver: json-file
options: {max-size: "50m", max-file: "5"}
secrets:
redis_api_password:
file: ${HAN_SECRETS_DIR:-/run/han-chat/secrets}/REDIS_API_PASSWORD
redis_safety_password:
file: ${HAN_SECRETS_DIR:-/run/han-chat/secrets}/REDIS_SAFETY_PASSWORD
redis_health_password:
file: ${HAN_SECRETS_DIR:-/run/han-chat/secrets}/REDIS_HEALTH_PASSWORD
codebase/backend/redis/scripts/entrypoint.sh
+14 -2
View File
@@ -1,17 +1,29 @@
#!/bin/sh
set -eu
for name in REDIS_API_PASSWORD REDIS_SAFETY_PASSWORD REDIS_HEALTH_PASSWORD; do
eval "value=\${$name:-}"
for item in \
REDIS_API_PASSWORD:redis_api_password \
REDIS_SAFETY_PASSWORD:redis_safety_password \
REDIS_HEALTH_PASSWORD:redis_health_password
do
name=${item%%:*}
file=/run/secrets/${item#*:}
if [ ! -r "$file" ]; then
echo "redis bootstrap: missing secret file for $name" >&2
exit 66
fi
value=$(cat "$file")
if [ "${#value}" -lt 16 ] || printf '%s' "$value" | grep -Eq '[[:space:]]'; then
echo "redis bootstrap: $name must be at least 16 characters without whitespace" >&2
exit 64
fi
export "$name=$value"
done
umask 077
envsubst '${REDIS_API_PASSWORD} ${REDIS_SAFETY_PASSWORD} ${REDIS_HEALTH_PASSWORD}' \
< /etc/han-redis/users.acl.template > /tmp/users.acl
unset REDIS_API_PASSWORD REDIS_SAFETY_PASSWORD REDIS_HEALTH_PASSWORD
exec redis-server /etc/han-redis/redis.conf \
--aclfile /tmp/users.acl \
codebase/backend/scripts/validate-env
+175 -95
View File
@@ -1,46 +1,56 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Fail-fast validation for the single HAN Chat deployment environment."""
"""Validate public deployment config separately from runtime secrets."""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import re
import stat
import sys
from pathlib import Path
from urllib.parse import urlparse
REQUIRED = {
"APP_ENV", "RELEASE_VERSION", "HAN_PG_HOST", "DATABASE_URL",
"BITRIX_DATABASE_URL", "BITRIX_SYNC_DATABASE_URL",
"MESSAGE_SAFETY_DATABASE_URL", "SMS_DATABASE_URL", "KEYCLOAK_DB_URL", "PUBLIC_HOST",
"PUBLIC_WEB_URL", "PUBLIC_API_URL", "PUBLIC_AUTH_URL",
"KEYCLOAK_PUBLIC_URL", "KEYCLOAK_INTERNAL_URL", "REDIS_URL",
"REDIS_REALTIME_URL", "MESSAGE_SAFETY_REDIS_URL",
REQUIRED_CONFIG = {
"SECRETS_SOURCE", "APP_ENV", "RELEASE_VERSION", "HAN_PG_HOST", "HAN_PG_PORT",
"HAN_PG_DATABASE", "PG_CA_HOST_PATH", "KEYCLOAK_DB_URL", "KEYCLOAK_DB_USERNAME",
"PUBLIC_HOST", "PUBLIC_WEB_URL",
"PUBLIC_API_URL", "PUBLIC_AUTH_URL", "KEYCLOAK_PUBLIC_URL",
"KEYCLOAK_INTERNAL_URL", "KEYCLOAK_REALM", "KEYCLOAK_SMS_SERVICE_URL",
"IDGTL_SMS_BASE_URL", "IDGTL_SMS_CALLBACK_PUBLIC_URL",
}
REQUIRED_RUNTIME = {
"DATABASE_URL", "BITRIX_DATABASE_URL", "BITRIX_SYNC_DATABASE_URL",
"SMS_DATABASE_URL", "KEYCLOAK_DB_PASSWORD", "REDIS_URL",
"REDIS_REALTIME_URL", "MESSAGE_SAFETY_REDIS_URL", "REDIS_API_PASSWORD",
"REDIS_SAFETY_PASSWORD", "REDIS_HEALTH_PASSWORD",
"MESSAGE_SAFETY_SERVICE_TOKEN", "BITRIX_LOCAL_APP_INTERNAL_TOKEN",
"BITRIX_INTERNAL_API_TOKEN", "BITRIX_API_FORWARD_TOKEN",
"BITRIX_API_INBOX_TOKEN", "BITRIX_SYNC_SERVICE_TOKEN",
"KEYCLOAK_SETTINGS_BRIDGE_TOKEN", "KEYCLOAK_OTP_HMAC_KEY",
"KEYCLOAK_SMS_SERVICE_URL", "KEYCLOAK_SMS_SERVICE_TOKEN", "SMS_SERVICE_TOKEN",
"IDGTL_SMS_BASE_URL", "IDGTL_SMS_API_KEY", "IDGTL_SMS_CALLBACK_PUBLIC_URL",
"IDGTL_SMS_CALLBACK_USERNAME", "IDGTL_SMS_CALLBACK_PASSWORD",
"KEYCLOAK_ADMIN", "KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD", "CURSOR_HMAC_SECRET",
"BITRIX_TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY",
"SELECTEL_S3_ENDPOINT_URL",
"KEYCLOAK_SMS_SERVICE_TOKEN", "SMS_SERVICE_TOKEN",
"IDGTL_SMS_API_KEY", "IDGTL_SMS_CALLBACK_USERNAME",
"IDGTL_SMS_CALLBACK_PASSWORD", "KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD",
"CURSOR_HMAC_SECRET", "BITRIX_TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY",
"SELECTEL_S3_ACCESS_KEY", "SELECTEL_S3_SECRET_KEY",
"SELECTEL_S3_QUARANTINE_READ_ACCESS_KEY",
"SELECTEL_S3_QUARANTINE_READ_SECRET_KEY", "REDIS_API_PASSWORD",
"REDIS_SAFETY_PASSWORD", "REDIS_HEALTH_PASSWORD",
}
SECRET_KEYS = {
key for key in REQUIRED
if any(word in key for word in ("TOKEN", "PASSWORD", "SECRET_KEY", "ACCESS_KEY"))
} | {
OPTIONAL_SECRET_KEYS = {
"BITRIX_CLIENT_SECRET", "BITRIX_APPLICATION_TOKEN",
"IDGTL_SMS_CALLBACK_USERNAME", "IDGTL_SMS_CALLBACK_PASSWORD",
"BITRIX_SYNC_CRM_WEBHOOK_URL", "BITRIX_SYNC_WEBHOOK_TOKEN",
"KEYCLOAK_YANDEX_CAPTCHA_SERVER_KEY",
"NOTIFICATIONS_TOKEN_PRODUCER_TEST",
"OTEL_REMOTE_AUTH_HEADER", "KEYCLOAK_OTP_MOCK_CODE",
}
FORBIDDEN_CONFIG_KEYS = REQUIRED_RUNTIME | OPTIONAL_SECRET_KEYS | {
"BITRIX_SYNC_APP_DATABASE_URL", "PG_BACKUP_DSN",
}
DSN_KEYS = {
"DATABASE_URL", "BITRIX_DATABASE_URL", "BITRIX_SYNC_APP_DATABASE_URL",
"BITRIX_SYNC_DATABASE_URL", "MESSAGE_SAFETY_DATABASE_URL",
"SMS_DATABASE_URL", "PG_BACKUP_DSN",
}
PLACEHOLDER = re.compile(r"(change-me|example\.(com|ru|invalid)|<[^>]+>)", re.I)
def load(path: Path) -> tuple[dict[str, str], list[str]]:
def load_env(path: Path) -> tuple[dict[str, str], list[str]]:
values: dict[str, str] = {}
errors: list[str] = []
for number, raw in enumerate(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").splitlines(), 1):
@@ -58,33 +68,107 @@ def load(path: Path) -> tuple[dict[str, str], list[str]]:
return values, errors
def main() -> int:
path = Path(sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) > 1 else ".env")
if not path.is_file():
print(f"ERROR: файл не найден: {path}", file=sys.stderr)
return 2
env, errors = load(path)
for key in sorted(REQUIRED):
if not env.get(key):
errors.append(f"{key}: обязательное значение отсутствует")
for key in sorted(SECRET_KEYS):
value = env.get(key, "")
if value and (len(value) < 16 or PLACEHOLDER.search(value)):
errors.append(f"{key}: секрет должен быть непустым, уникальным и длиной >=16")
for key in ("SMS_SERVICE_TOKEN", "KEYCLOAK_SMS_SERVICE_TOKEN"):
if env.get(key) and len(env[key]) < 32:
errors.append(f"{key}: service token должен иметь длину >=32")
captcha_enabled = env.get("KEYCLOAK_YANDEX_CAPTCHA_ENABLED", "false").lower()
if captcha_enabled not in {"true", "false"}:
errors.append("KEYCLOAK_YANDEX_CAPTCHA_ENABLED: ожидается true или false")
if captcha_enabled == "true":
for key in (
"KEYCLOAK_YANDEX_CAPTCHA_CLIENT_KEY",
"KEYCLOAK_YANDEX_CAPTCHA_SERVER_KEY",
):
if not env.get(key):
errors.append(f"{key}: обязательное значение при включённой CAPTCHA отсутствует")
def load_manifest(path: Path) -> tuple[dict[str, str], list[str]]:
files, errors = load_env(path)
values: dict[str, str] = {}
for key, raw_path in files.items():
secret_path = Path(raw_path)
if not secret_path.is_absolute():
errors.append(f"{key}: manifest должен содержать абсолютный путь")
continue
try:
metadata = secret_path.lstat()
mode = stat.S_IMODE(metadata.st_mode)
parent_mode = stat.S_IMODE(secret_path.parent.stat().st_mode)
if stat.S_ISLNK(metadata.st_mode) or not stat.S_ISREG(metadata.st_mode):
errors.append(f"{key}: secret file должен быть regular file, не symlink")
continue
if os.name != "nt" and (mode & 0o022 or parent_mode & 0o077):
errors.append(
f"{key}: secret file или runtime directory имеют небезопасные права"
)
continue
values[key] = secret_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").rstrip("\r\n")
except OSError:
errors.append(f"{key}: secret file недоступен")
return values, errors
def runtime_from_environment() -> dict[str, str]:
keys = REQUIRED_RUNTIME | OPTIONAL_SECRET_KEYS
return {key: os.environ[key] for key in keys if key in os.environ}
def validate_config(config: dict[str, str], errors: list[str]) -> None:
for key in sorted(REQUIRED_CONFIG):
if not config.get(key):
errors.append(f"{key}: обязательный config отсутствует")
if config.get("SECRETS_SOURCE") not in {"selectel", "file"}:
errors.append("SECRETS_SOURCE: ожидается selectel или file")
for key in sorted(FORBIDDEN_CONFIG_KEYS & config.keys()):
errors.append(f"{key}: секрет или credential-bearing DSN запрещён в обычном .env")
for key, value in config.items():
if key.endswith("_FILE") and value:
errors.append(f"{key}: secret file path задаётся launcher, не обычным .env")
if key.endswith("_URL"):
parsed = urlparse(value.replace("jdbc:", "", 1))
if parsed.username or parsed.password:
errors.append(f"{key}: URL с credentials запрещён в обычном .env")
def validate_runtime(config: dict[str, str], runtime: dict[str, str], errors: list[str]) -> None:
required = set(REQUIRED_RUNTIME)
if config.get("KEYCLOAK_OTP_MOCK_ENABLED", "").lower() == "true":
required.add("KEYCLOAK_OTP_MOCK_CODE")
if config.get("KEYCLOAK_YANDEX_CAPTCHA_ENABLED", "false").lower() == "true":
required.add("KEYCLOAK_YANDEX_CAPTCHA_SERVER_KEY")
if not config.get("KEYCLOAK_YANDEX_CAPTCHA_CLIENT_KEY"):
errors.append(
"KEYCLOAK_YANDEX_CAPTCHA_CLIENT_KEY: обязательный public config отсутствует"
)
for key in sorted(required):
value = runtime.get(key, "")
if not value:
errors.append(f"{key}: обязательный runtime secret отсутствует")
elif key == "KEYCLOAK_OTP_MOCK_CODE":
if not re.fullmatch(r"\d{6,10}", value) or value == "1234":
errors.append(
f"{key}: требуется нестандартный цифровой код длиной 6–10 цифр"
)
elif key not in DSN_KEYS and (len(value) < 16 or PLACEHOLDER.search(value)):
errors.append(f"{key}: runtime secret слишком короткий или является placeholder")
for key in DSN_KEYS & runtime.keys():
value = runtime[key]
if "sslmode=verify-full" not in value or "sslrootcert=" not in value:
errors.append(f"{key}: требуется sslmode=verify-full и sslrootcert")
if re.search(r"(?:[?&](?:options|currentSchema)=)", value, re.I):
errors.append(f"{key}: options/currentSchema запрещены через PgBouncer")
redis_contract = (
("REDIS_URL", "api_backend", "REDIS_API_PASSWORD", "/0"),
("REDIS_REALTIME_URL", "api_backend", "REDIS_API_PASSWORD", "/1"),
("MESSAGE_SAFETY_REDIS_URL", "message_safety", "REDIS_SAFETY_PASSWORD", "/2"),
)
for key, username, password_key, database in redis_contract:
parsed = urlparse(runtime.get(key, ""))
if (
parsed.scheme != "redis" or parsed.hostname != "redis"
or parsed.username != username or parsed.password != runtime.get(password_key)
or parsed.path != database
):
errors.append(f"{key}: ACL user/password/host/DB не согласованы с {password_key}")
for left, right in (
("BITRIX_LOCAL_APP_INTERNAL_TOKEN", "BITRIX_INTERNAL_API_TOKEN"),
("BITRIX_API_FORWARD_TOKEN", "BITRIX_API_INBOX_TOKEN"),
("KEYCLOAK_SMS_SERVICE_TOKEN", "SMS_SERVICE_TOKEN"),
):
if runtime.get(left) != runtime.get(right):
errors.append(f"{left} должен совпадать с {right}")
def validate_shared(env: dict[str, str], errors: list[str]) -> None:
production = env.get("APP_ENV") in {"production-like", "production"}
if production and env.get("FRONTEND_DEV_PROXY_ENABLED", "").lower() != "false":
errors.append("FRONTEND_DEV_PROXY_ENABLED: production-like/production требует false")
@@ -105,41 +189,6 @@ def main() -> int:
errors.append(f"{key}: ожидается http URL с Docker DNS service name")
if not env.get("KEYCLOAK_INTERNAL_URL", "").rstrip("/").endswith("/auth"):
errors.append("KEYCLOAK_INTERNAL_URL: внутренний URL должен заканчиваться на /auth")
redis_contract = (
("REDIS_URL", "api_backend", "REDIS_API_PASSWORD", "/0"),
("REDIS_REALTIME_URL", "api_backend", "REDIS_API_PASSWORD", "/1"),
("MESSAGE_SAFETY_REDIS_URL", "message_safety", "REDIS_SAFETY_PASSWORD", "/2"),
)
for key, username, password_key, database in redis_contract:
parsed = urlparse(env.get(key, ""))
if (
parsed.scheme != "redis"
or parsed.hostname != "redis"
or parsed.username != username
or parsed.password != env.get(password_key)
or parsed.path != database
):
errors.append(f"{key}: ACL user/password/host/DB не согласованы с {password_key}")
for key in (
"DATABASE_URL", "BITRIX_DATABASE_URL", "BITRIX_SYNC_DATABASE_URL",
"MESSAGE_SAFETY_DATABASE_URL", "SMS_DATABASE_URL", "KEYCLOAK_DB_URL",
):
value = env.get(key, "")
if "sslmode=verify-full" not in value or "sslrootcert=" not in value:
errors.append(f"{key}: требуется sslmode=verify-full и sslrootcert")
if re.search(r"(?:[?&](?:options|currentSchema)=)", value, re.I):
errors.append(
f"{key}: options/currentSchema запрещены через PgBouncer; "
"используйте database-level search_path роли"
)
pairs = (
("BITRIX_LOCAL_APP_INTERNAL_TOKEN", "BITRIX_INTERNAL_API_TOKEN"),
("BITRIX_API_FORWARD_TOKEN", "BITRIX_API_INBOX_TOKEN"),
("KEYCLOAK_SMS_SERVICE_TOKEN", "SMS_SERVICE_TOKEN"),
)
for left, right in pairs:
if env.get(left) != env.get(right):
errors.append(f"{left} должен совпадать с {right}")
try:
poll = int(env.get("MESSAGE_SAFETY_TASK_POLL_MAX_SEC", "0"))
nginx = int(env.get("NGINX_MESSAGE_READ_TIMEOUT_SEC", "0"))
@@ -153,24 +202,55 @@ def main() -> int:
if production and env.get("KEYCLOAK_OTP_MOCK_ENABLED", "").lower() == "true":
if env.get("KEYCLOAK_OTP_MOCK_RISK_ACCEPTED", "").lower() != "true":
errors.append("KEYCLOAK_OTP_MOCK_RISK_ACCEPTED=true обязателен для mock OTP")
real_sms = env.get("KEYCLOAK_OTP_MOCK_ENABLED", "").lower() == "false"
if production and real_sms and (
env.get("IDGTL_SMS_BASE_URL", "").rstrip("/") != "https://direct.i-dgtl.ru"
):
errors.append("IDGTL_SMS_BASE_URL: production contract требует https://direct.i-dgtl.ru")
expected_callback = f"https://{env.get('PUBLIC_HOST', '')}/callbacks/idgtl/sms"
if production and env.get("IDGTL_SMS_CALLBACK_PUBLIC_URL") != expected_callback:
errors.append(
"IDGTL_SMS_CALLBACK_PUBLIC_URL должен совпадать с публичным host и callback path"
)
callback = f"https://{env.get('PUBLIC_HOST', '')}/callbacks/idgtl/sms"
if production and env.get("IDGTL_SMS_CALLBACK_PUBLIC_URL") != callback:
errors.append("IDGTL_SMS_CALLBACK_PUBLIC_URL должен совпадать с PUBLIC_HOST")
if env.get("HAN_PG_HOST") in {"localhost", "127.0.0.1", "postgres", "db"}:
errors.append("HAN_PG_HOST: PostgreSQL должен быть внешним managed endpoint")
keycloak_dsn = env.get("KEYCLOAK_DB_URL", "")
if "sslmode=verify-full" not in keycloak_dsn or "sslrootcert=" not in keycloak_dsn:
errors.append("KEYCLOAK_DB_URL: требуется sslmode=verify-full и sslrootcert")
def main() -> int:
args = sys.argv[1:]
config_path = Path(args.pop(0) if args and not args[0].startswith("--") else ".env")
manifest: Path | None = None
use_runtime_env = False
while args:
option = args.pop(0)
if option == "--runtime-manifest" and args:
manifest = Path(args.pop(0))
elif option == "--runtime-env":
use_runtime_env = True
else:
print(f"ERROR: неизвестный параметр {option}", file=sys.stderr)
return 2
if not config_path.is_file():
print(f"ERROR: config файл не найден: {config_path}", file=sys.stderr)
return 2
config, errors = load_env(config_path)
validate_config(config, errors)
runtime: dict[str, str] = {}
if manifest:
if not manifest.is_file():
errors.append("runtime manifest недоступен")
else:
runtime, manifest_errors = load_manifest(manifest)
errors.extend(manifest_errors)
elif use_runtime_env:
runtime = runtime_from_environment()
if manifest or use_runtime_env:
validate_runtime(config, runtime, errors)
validate_shared({**config, **runtime}, errors)
if errors:
for error in errors:
print(f"ERROR: {error}", file=sys.stderr)
return 1
print(f"OK: {path} прошёл проверку ({len(env)} переменных)")
scope = "config + runtime secrets" if manifest or use_runtime_env else "non-secret config"
print(f"OK: {config_path} прошёл проверку ({scope})")
return 0
codebase/backend/sms-service/Dockerfile
+2
View File
@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@ COPY --from=builder /build/dist/*.whl /tmp/
RUN pip install --no-cache-dir /tmp/*.whl && rm -f /tmp/*.whl
COPY alembic.ini ./
COPY migrations ./migrations
COPY --chmod=0555 container-entrypoint.sh /usr/local/bin/han-container-entrypoint
USER 10001:10001
EXPOSE 8080
ENTRYPOINT ["/usr/local/bin/han-container-entrypoint"]
CMD ["uvicorn", "app.main:app", "--host", "0.0.0.0", "--port", "8080", "--no-proxy-headers"]
codebase/backend/sms-service/app/logging_security.py
+47
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
from __future__ import annotations
import re
from collections.abc import Mapping
from typing import Any
REDACTED = "[REDACTED]"
_SENSITIVE_KEY = re.compile(
r"(authorization|cookie|password|passwd|secret|token|api[_-]?key|"
r"database[_-]?url|redis[_-]?url|dsn|callback[_-]?url)",
re.IGNORECASE,
)
_URI_USERINFO = re.compile(r"(?P<scheme>[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*://)[^/@\s]+@", re.IGNORECASE)
_QUERY_SECRET = re.compile(
r"(?P<prefix>[?&](?:token|access_token|api_key|key|secret|password)=)[^&#\s]+",
re.IGNORECASE,
)
_AUTH_VALUE = re.compile(r"\b(Bearer|Basic)\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]+", re.IGNORECASE)
def sanitize_text(value: str) -> str:
value = _URI_USERINFO.sub(r"\g<scheme>[REDACTED]@", value)
value = _QUERY_SECRET.sub(r"\g<prefix>[REDACTED]", value)
return _AUTH_VALUE.sub(r"\1 [REDACTED]", value)
def sanitize_value(value: Any) -> Any:
if isinstance(value, str):
return sanitize_text(value)
if isinstance(value, Mapping):
return {
str(key): REDACTED if _SENSITIVE_KEY.search(str(key)) else sanitize_value(item)
for key, item in value.items()
}
if isinstance(value, list):
return [sanitize_value(item) for item in value]
if isinstance(value, tuple):
return tuple(sanitize_value(item) for item in value)
return value
def redact_event(
_logger: Any,
_method_name: str,
event_dict: dict[str, Any],
) -> dict[str, Any]:
return sanitize_value(event_dict)
codebase/backend/sms-service/app/main.py
+7 -1
View File
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ from starlette.exceptions import HTTPException as StarletteHTTPException
from app.db import Database, SmsTemplate
from app.domain import DomainError
from app.logging_security import redact_event
from app.metrics import CALLBACK_LAG, CALLBACK_TOTAL
from app.schemas import CallbackItem, ErrorEnvelope, MessageResponse, SendRequest, SendResponse
from app.service import (
@@ -42,6 +43,7 @@ def configure_logging(level: str) -> None:
processors=[
structlog.contextvars.merge_contextvars,
add_trace_context,
redact_event,
structlog.processors.TimeStamper(fmt="iso", utc=True, key="timestamp"),
structlog.stdlib.add_log_level,
structlog.processors.JSONRenderer(),
@@ -147,7 +149,11 @@ async def http_error(request: Request, exc: StarletteHTTPException) -> JSONRespo
@app.exception_handler(Exception)
async def unhandled_error(request: Request, exc: Exception) -> JSONResponse:
log.exception("request.failed", error_code="internal_error")
log.error(
"request.failed",
error_code="internal_error",
error_type=type(exc).__name__,
)
return error_response(request, "internal_error", "Internal server error", 500)
codebase/backend/sms-service/app/worker.py
+7 -2
View File
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ from prometheus_client import start_http_server
from sqlalchemy import and_, func, or_, select, update
from app.db import Database, SendStatus, SmsOutboundMessage
from app.logging_security import redact_event
from app.metrics import (
JOURNAL_ROWS,
PENDING_AGE,
@@ -37,6 +38,7 @@ def configure_logging(level: str) -> None:
processors=[
structlog.contextvars.merge_contextvars,
add_trace_context,
redact_event,
structlog.processors.TimeStamper(fmt="iso", utc=True, key="timestamp"),
structlog.stdlib.add_log_level,
structlog.processors.JSONRenderer(),
@@ -217,9 +219,12 @@ async def worker_loop(stop: asyncio.Event) -> None:
await save_result(db, message.id, result, message.attempt_count)
except TimeoutError:
continue
except Exception:
except Exception as exc:
SETTINGS_VALID.set(0)
log.exception("worker.iteration_failed")
log.error(
"worker.iteration_failed",
error_type=type(exc).__name__,
)
try:
await asyncio.wait_for(stop.wait(), timeout=5)
except TimeoutError:
codebase/backend/sms-service/container-entrypoint.sh
+23
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
#!/bin/sh
set -eu
for name in ${HAN_SECRET_VARS:-}; do
case "$name" in
""|[0-9]*|*[!A-Z0-9_]*)
echo "container secrets: invalid variable name" >&2
exit 64
;;
*) ;;
esac
eval "file=\${${name}_FILE:-}"
if [ -z "$file" ] || [ ! -r "$file" ]; then
echo "container secrets: missing file for $name" >&2
exit 66
fi
value=$(cat "$file")
export "$name=$value"
unset "${name}_FILE"
done
unset HAN_SECRET_VARS
exec "$@"
codebase/backend/sms-service/migrations/env.py
+2 -2
View File
@@ -1,17 +1,17 @@
from __future__ import annotations
import asyncio
import os
from logging.config import fileConfig
from alembic import context
from app.db import Base, create_postgres_engine
from app.settings import get_settings
config = context.config
if config.config_file_name:
fileConfig(config.config_file_name)
database_url = get_settings().database_url
database_url = os.environ["SMS_DATABASE_URL"]
if database_url.startswith("postgresql://"):
database_url = database_url.replace("postgresql://", "postgresql+asyncpg://", 1)
config.set_main_option("sqlalchemy.url", database_url.replace("%", "%%"))
codebase/backend/sms-service/tests/unit/test_logging_security.py
+31
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
from app.logging_security import REDACTED, redact_event, sanitize_text
def test_redacts_sensitive_fields_recursively() -> None:
event = {
"api_key": "provider-key",
"nested": {
"callback_url": "https://user:password@example.test/callback",
"status": "accepted",
},
}
redacted = redact_event(None, "info", event)
assert redacted["api_key"] == REDACTED
assert redacted["nested"]["callback_url"] == REDACTED
assert redacted["nested"]["status"] == "accepted"
def test_redacts_credentials_embedded_in_text() -> None:
value = (
"POST https://callback-user:callback-password@example.test/cb"
"?api_key=query-secret Authorization=Basic header-secret"
)
redacted = sanitize_text(value)
assert "callback-password" not in redacted
assert "query-secret" not in redacted
assert "header-secret" not in redacted
assert redacted.count(REDACTED) == 3
codebase/backend/tests/test_config.py
+74 -43
View File
@@ -44,11 +44,13 @@ class InfrastructureConfigTests(unittest.TestCase):
application = (ROOT / "infra/compose/application.yml").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
self.assertIn("networks: [backend, observability, egress]", application)
self.assertIn("networks: [public, backend, observability, egress]", application)
self.assertIn('KEYCLOAK_YANDEX_CAPTCHA_SERVER_KEY: ""', application)
self.assertIn(
"KEYCLOAK_YANDEX_CAPTCHA_SERVER_KEY_FILE: "
"/run/secrets/keycloak_yandex_captcha_server_key",
application,
)
self.assertEqual(
application.count(
"IDGTL_SMS_API_KEY: ${IDGTL_SMS_API_KEY:?IDGTL_SMS_API_KEY is required}"
),
application.count("IDGTL_SMS_API_KEY_FILE: /run/secrets/idgtl_sms_api_key"),
1,
)
@@ -56,7 +58,7 @@ class InfrastructureConfigTests(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertEqual(jobs.count("networks: [backend, egress]"), 5)
observability = (ROOT / "observability/docker-compose.yml").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
self.assertIn("networks: [observability, backend, egress]", observability)
self.assertIn("networks: [observability, egress]", observability)
redis = (ROOT / "redis/docker-compose.yml").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
self.assertNotIn("egress", redis)
@@ -64,6 +66,8 @@ class InfrastructureConfigTests(unittest.TestCase):
def test_only_nginx_fragment_publishes_ports(self) -> None:
forbidden = (
ROOT / "infra/compose/application.yml",
ROOT / "api-backend/docker-compose.yml",
ROOT / "keycloak/docker-compose.yml",
ROOT / "redis/docker-compose.yml",
ROOT / "observability/docker-compose.yml",
ROOT / "deployment/docker-compose.jobs.yml",
@@ -177,6 +181,10 @@ class InfrastructureConfigTests(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertIn("storage: file_storage", config)
self.assertIn("retry_on_failure:", config)
self.assertIn('insecure: "${env:OTEL_REMOTE_TLS_INSECURE}"', config)
self.assertIn(
"authorization: ${file:/run/secrets/otel_remote_auth_header}", config
)
self.assertNotIn("OTEL_REMOTE_AUTH_HEADER", config)
self.assertIn("tail_sampling:", config)
self.assertNotIn("probabilistic_sampler:", config)
self.assertIn('targets: ["sms-service:8080"]', config)
@@ -231,7 +239,7 @@ class InfrastructureConfigTests(unittest.TestCase):
def test_smoke_script_does_not_source_env_as_shell(self) -> None:
smoke = (ROOT / "deployment/scripts/smoke.sh").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
self.assertNotIn('. "./$ENV_FILE"', smoke)
self.assertNotIn('. "./$CONFIG_FILE"', smoke)
for variable in ("PUBLIC_HOST", "PUBLIC_WEB_URL", "KEYCLOAK_REALM"):
self.assertIn(f"{variable}=$(env_value {variable})", smoke)
@@ -298,18 +306,64 @@ class InfrastructureConfigTests(unittest.TestCase):
for variable in (
"KC_DB_SCHEMA",
"KEYCLOAK_OTP_MOCK_ENABLED",
"KEYCLOAK_OTP_MOCK_CODE",
"KEYCLOAK_YANDEX_CAPTCHA_ENABLED",
"KEYCLOAK_YANDEX_CAPTCHA_CLIENT_KEY",
"KEYCLOAK_YANDEX_CAPTCHA_SERVER_KEY",
"KEYCLOAK_OTP_HMAC_KEY",
"KEYCLOAK_OTP_SETTINGS_MAX_STALE_SEC",
"KEYCLOAK_SETTINGS_BRIDGE_URL",
"KEYCLOAK_SETTINGS_BRIDGE_TOKEN",
"KEYCLOAK_SMS_SERVICE_URL",
"KEYCLOAK_SMS_SERVICE_TOKEN",
):
self.assertIn(f" {variable}:", application)
for variable in (
"KEYCLOAK_OTP_MOCK_CODE",
"KEYCLOAK_YANDEX_CAPTCHA_SERVER_KEY",
"KEYCLOAK_OTP_HMAC_KEY",
"KEYCLOAK_SETTINGS_BRIDGE_TOKEN",
"KEYCLOAK_SMS_SERVICE_TOKEN",
):
self.assertIn(f" {variable}_FILE:", application)
self.assertIn(
" KEYCLOAK_YANDEX_CAPTCHA_CLIENT_KEY: "
"${KEYCLOAK_YANDEX_CAPTCHA_CLIENT_KEY:-}",
application,
)
def test_compose_secrets_do_not_enter_config_environment(self) -> None:
compose_paths = (
ROOT / "infra/compose/application.yml",
ROOT / "redis/docker-compose.yml",
ROOT / "observability/docker-compose.yml",
ROOT / "deployment/docker-compose.jobs.yml",
)
combined = "\n".join(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8") for path in compose_paths)
self.assertNotIn("env_file:", combined)
for path in compose_paths:
self.assertIn(
"core: {soft: 0, hard: 0}",
path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"),
path,
)
for variable in (
"DATABASE_URL",
"REDIS_URL",
"SMS_SERVICE_TOKEN",
"KEYCLOAK_DB_PASSWORD",
"OTEL_REMOTE_AUTH_HEADER",
):
self.assertNotIn(f"${{{variable}", combined)
self.assertIn(
"${HAN_SECRETS_DIR:-/run/han-chat/secrets}/DATABASE_URL", combined
)
self.assertNotIn("entrypoint: []", combined)
for service in (
"api-backend",
"sms-service",
"message-safety",
"bitrix-local-app",
"bitrix-sync",
"keycloak",
):
dockerfile = (ROOT / service / "Dockerfile").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
self.assertIn("han-container-entrypoint", dockerfile, service)
def test_env_validator_accepts_materialized_example(self) -> None:
example = (ROOT / ".env.example").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
@@ -317,15 +371,10 @@ class InfrastructureConfigTests(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertNotIn("currentSchema=", example)
self.assertIn("KEYCLOAK_DB_SCHEMA=keycloak", example)
self.assertIn("HAN_PG_PORT=5433", example)
for required in (
"CURSOR_HMAC_SECRET=",
"BITRIX_TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY=",
"KEYCLOAK_INTERNAL_URL=http://keycloak:8080/auth",
"KEYCLOAK_SMS_SERVICE_URL=http://sms-service:8080",
"IDGTL_SMS_CALLBACK_PUBLIC_URL=https://chat.example.ru/callbacks/idgtl/sms",
):
self.assertIn(required, example)
materialized = example.replace("change-me", "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef")
self.assertIn("SECRETS_SOURCE=file", example)
self.assertNotIn("CURSOR_HMAC_SECRET=", example)
self.assertNotIn("BITRIX_TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY=", example)
materialized = example
materialized = materialized.replace(
"KEYCLOAK_OTP_MOCK_RISK_ACCEPTED=false",
"KEYCLOAK_OTP_MOCK_RISK_ACCEPTED=true",
@@ -341,11 +390,9 @@ class InfrastructureConfigTests(unittest.TestCase):
)
self.assertEqual(result.returncode, 0, result.stderr)
def test_env_validator_requires_captcha_keys_only_when_enabled(self) -> None:
def test_env_validator_keeps_captcha_server_key_out_of_config(self) -> None:
example = (ROOT / ".env.example").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
materialized = example.replace(
"change-me", "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"
).replace(
"KEYCLOAK_OTP_MOCK_RISK_ACCEPTED=false",
"KEYCLOAK_OTP_MOCK_RISK_ACCEPTED=true",
)
@@ -353,33 +400,17 @@ class InfrastructureConfigTests(unittest.TestCase):
"KEYCLOAK_YANDEX_CAPTCHA_ENABLED=false",
"KEYCLOAK_YANDEX_CAPTCHA_ENABLED=true",
)
enabled_with_keys = enabled_without_keys.replace(
"KEYCLOAK_YANDEX_CAPTCHA_CLIENT_KEY=",
"KEYCLOAK_YANDEX_CAPTCHA_CLIENT_KEY=client-key",
).replace(
"KEYCLOAK_YANDEX_CAPTCHA_SERVER_KEY=",
"KEYCLOAK_YANDEX_CAPTCHA_SERVER_KEY=server-key-0123456789",
)
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as directory:
env_file = Path(directory) / ".env"
env_file.write_text(enabled_without_keys, encoding="utf-8")
missing = subprocess.run(
result = subprocess.run(
[sys.executable, str(ROOT / "scripts/validate-env"), str(env_file)],
text=True,
capture_output=True,
check=False,
)
env_file.write_text(enabled_with_keys, encoding="utf-8")
configured = subprocess.run(
[sys.executable, str(ROOT / "scripts/validate-env"), str(env_file)],
text=True,
capture_output=True,
check=False,
)
self.assertNotEqual(missing.returncode, 0)
self.assertIn("KEYCLOAK_YANDEX_CAPTCHA_CLIENT_KEY", missing.stderr)
self.assertIn("KEYCLOAK_YANDEX_CAPTCHA_SERVER_KEY", missing.stderr)
self.assertEqual(configured.returncode, 0, configured.stderr)
self.assertEqual(result.returncode, 0, result.stderr)
self.assertNotIn("KEYCLOAK_YANDEX_CAPTCHA_SERVER_KEY=", example)
if __name__ == "__main__":
codebase/backend/tests/test_secret_hygiene.py
+126
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import runpy
import subprocess
import sys
import tempfile
import unittest
from pathlib import Path
ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
VALIDATOR = ROOT / "scripts/validate-env"
def runtime_values() -> dict[str, str]:
symbols = runpy.run_path(str(VALIDATOR))
values = {key: "a" * 32 for key in symbols["REQUIRED_RUNTIME"]}
pg_tail = "?sslmode=verify-full&sslrootcert=/run/secrets/pg-ca.pem"
values.update(
{
"DATABASE_URL": f"postgresql+asyncpg://han_app:password@pg:5433/han_chat{pg_tail}",
"BITRIX_DATABASE_URL": f"postgresql://bitrix:password@pg:5433/han_chat{pg_tail}",
"BITRIX_SYNC_DATABASE_URL": f"postgresql://sync:password@pg:5433/han_chat{pg_tail}",
"MESSAGE_SAFETY_DATABASE_URL": f"postgresql://safety:password@pg:5433/han_chat{pg_tail}",
"SMS_DATABASE_URL": f"postgresql+asyncpg://sms:password@pg:5433/han_chat{pg_tail}",
"KEYCLOAK_DB_URL": f"jdbc:postgresql://pg:5433/han_chat{pg_tail}",
"REDIS_API_PASSWORD": "r" * 32,
"REDIS_SAFETY_PASSWORD": "s" * 32,
"REDIS_HEALTH_PASSWORD": "h" * 32,
"REDIS_URL": f"redis://api_backend:{'r' * 32}@redis:6379/0",
"REDIS_REALTIME_URL": f"redis://api_backend:{'r' * 32}@redis:6379/1",
"MESSAGE_SAFETY_REDIS_URL": f"redis://message_safety:{'s' * 32}@redis:6379/2",
"BITRIX_LOCAL_APP_INTERNAL_TOKEN": "b" * 32,
"BITRIX_INTERNAL_API_TOKEN": "b" * 32,
"BITRIX_API_FORWARD_TOKEN": "f" * 32,
"BITRIX_API_INBOX_TOKEN": "f" * 32,
"KEYCLOAK_SMS_SERVICE_TOKEN": "k" * 32,
"SMS_SERVICE_TOKEN": "k" * 32,
"KEYCLOAK_OTP_MOCK_CODE": "846271",
}
)
return values
class SecretHygieneTests(unittest.TestCase):
def run_validator(
self, config: Path, *args: str, environment: dict[str, str] | None = None
) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess[str]:
return subprocess.run(
[sys.executable, str(VALIDATOR), str(config), *args],
text=True,
capture_output=True,
check=False,
env=environment,
)
def test_example_is_non_secret_config(self) -> None:
example = (ROOT / ".env.example").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
symbols = runpy.run_path(str(VALIDATOR))
for key in symbols["FORBIDDEN_CONFIG_KEYS"]:
self.assertNotRegex(example, rf"(?m)^{key}=")
self.assertIn("SECRETS_SOURCE=file", example)
def test_config_rejects_secret_key_and_credential_url(self) -> None:
example = (ROOT / ".env.example").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as directory:
config = Path(directory) / ".env"
config.write_text(
example
+ "\nSMS_SERVICE_TOKEN=not-for-config\n"
+ "EXTERNAL_URL=https://user:password@example.net/path\n",
encoding="utf-8",
)
result = self.run_validator(config)
self.assertNotEqual(result.returncode, 0)
self.assertIn("SMS_SERVICE_TOKEN", result.stderr)
self.assertIn("URL с credentials", result.stderr)
self.assertNotIn("not-for-config", result.stderr)
def test_runtime_environment_is_validated_without_value_disclosure(self) -> None:
values = runtime_values()
secret_canary = "canary-never-print-" + "x" * 20
values["CURSOR_HMAC_SECRET"] = secret_canary
environment = {**os.environ, **values}
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as directory:
config = Path(directory) / ".env"
config.write_text(
(ROOT / ".env.example").read_text(encoding="utf-8").replace(
"KEYCLOAK_OTP_MOCK_RISK_ACCEPTED=false",
"KEYCLOAK_OTP_MOCK_RISK_ACCEPTED=true",
),
encoding="utf-8",
)
result = self.run_validator(config, "--runtime-env", environment=environment)
self.assertEqual(result.returncode, 0, result.stderr)
self.assertNotIn(secret_canary, result.stdout + result.stderr)
def test_runtime_manifest_reads_protected_files_without_value_disclosure(self) -> None:
values = runtime_values()
secret_canary = "manifest-canary-" + "z" * 20
values["CURSOR_HMAC_SECRET"] = secret_canary
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as directory:
root = Path(directory)
config = root / ".env"
config.write_text(
(ROOT / ".env.example").read_text(encoding="utf-8").replace(
"KEYCLOAK_OTP_MOCK_RISK_ACCEPTED=false",
"KEYCLOAK_OTP_MOCK_RISK_ACCEPTED=true",
),
encoding="utf-8",
)
entries = []
for index, (key, value) in enumerate(sorted(values.items())):
path = root / f"secret-{index}"
path.write_text(value + "\n", encoding="utf-8")
path.chmod(0o600)
entries.append(f"{key}={path.resolve()}")
manifest = root / "manifest"
manifest.write_text("\n".join(entries) + "\n", encoding="utf-8")
result = self.run_validator(config, "--runtime-manifest", str(manifest))
self.assertEqual(result.returncode, 0, result.stderr)
self.assertNotIn(secret_canary, result.stdout + result.stderr)
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
codebase/backend/tests/test_secrets_loader.py
+471
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,471 @@
from __future__ import annotations
import base64
import importlib.util
import io
import json
import os
import stat
import subprocess
import sys
import tempfile
import unittest
import urllib.error
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Any
ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
LOADER_PATH = ROOT / "deployment" / "secrets" / "secrets_loader.py"
LAUNCHER_PATH = ROOT / "deployment" / "secrets" / "han-secrets"
SPEC = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("han_secrets_loader", LOADER_PATH)
assert SPEC and SPEC.loader
loader = importlib.util.module_from_spec(SPEC)
sys.modules[SPEC.name] = loader
SPEC.loader.exec_module(loader)
class FakeResponse:
def __init__(
self, status: int, body: bytes, headers: dict[str, str] | None = None
) -> None:
self.status = status
self._body = body
self.headers = headers or {}
def __enter__(self) -> "FakeResponse":
return self
def __exit__(self, *args: Any) -> None:
return None
def read(self, amount: int) -> bytes:
return self._body[:amount]
class FakeOpener:
def __init__(self, outcomes: list[Any]) -> None:
self.outcomes = outcomes
self.requests: list[Any] = []
def open(self, request: Any, timeout: float) -> FakeResponse:
self.requests.append((request, timeout))
outcome = self.outcomes.pop(0)
if isinstance(outcome, BaseException):
raise outcome
return outcome
def identity_response(*, project_scoped: bool = True) -> FakeResponse:
token: dict[str, Any] = {
"catalog": [
{
"type": "secrets-manager",
"endpoints": [
{
"region": "ru-test",
"interface": "public",
"url": "https://secrets.example",
}
],
}
]
}
if project_scoped:
token["project"] = {"id": "project-id"}
return FakeResponse(
201,
json.dumps({"token": token}).encode(),
{"X-Subject-Token": "iam-token-do-not-log"},
)
def secret_response(value: bytes) -> FakeResponse:
return FakeResponse(
200, json.dumps({"value": base64.b64encode(value).decode()}).encode()
)
def selectel_config(runtime_dir: Path) -> dict[str, Any]:
return {
"version": 1,
"mode": "selectel",
"runtime_dir": str(runtime_dir),
"http": {"timeout_seconds": 2, "retries": 1, "max_response_bytes": 4096},
"selectel": {
"account_id": "123456",
"username": "reader",
"project_name": "production",
"region": "ru-test",
"password_file": "selectel-password",
},
"secrets": {
"DATABASE_URL": {
"remote": "han/database-url",
"consumers": ["api", "migration"],
"max_bytes": 512,
},
"SHARED_TOKEN": {
"remote": "han/shared-token",
"consumers": ["api"],
"max_bytes": 128,
},
},
}
def write_json(path: Path, value: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
path.write_text(json.dumps(value), encoding="utf-8")
def make_private(path: Path) -> None:
os.chmod(path, 0o600)
class SecretsLoaderTests(unittest.TestCase):
def test_decodes_current_secret_from_nested_selectel_version(self) -> None:
encoded = base64.b64encode(b"current-secret").decode()
value = loader.decode_secret(
{"name": "DATABASE_URL", "version": {"version_id": 1, "value": encoded}},
"DATABASE_URL",
1024,
)
self.assertEqual(value, b"current-secret")
def test_empty_literal_never_requires_provider_or_fallback_value(self) -> None:
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as directory:
root = Path(directory)
fallback = root / "fallback.env"
fallback.write_text("REQUIRED_TOKEN=required-value\n", encoding="utf-8")
make_private(fallback)
config = {
"version": 1,
"mode": "file",
"runtime_dir": str(root / "run"),
"file": {"path": str(fallback)},
"secrets": {
"REQUIRED_TOKEN": {
"remote": "provider-token",
"consumers": ["service"],
},
"OPTIONAL_HEADER": {
"literal": "",
"consumers": ["service"],
},
},
}
config_path = root / "file.json"
write_json(config_path, config)
loader.run(config_path, environ={})
self.assertEqual((root / "run" / "OPTIONAL_HEADER").read_bytes(), b"")
self.assertIn(
'OPTIONAL_HEADER=""',
(root / "run" / "service.env").read_text(encoding="utf-8"),
)
def test_launcher_uses_public_source_switch_without_exporting_values(self) -> None:
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as directory:
root = Path(directory)
runtime = root / "runtime"
fallback = root / "fallback.env"
fallback.write_text("TEST_SECRET=canary-secret-value\n", encoding="utf-8")
make_private(fallback)
public = root / ".env"
public.write_text(
"SECRETS_SOURCE=file\nAPP_ENV=production\n", encoding="utf-8"
)
loader_config = root / "production.file.json"
write_json(
loader_config,
{
"version": 1,
"mode": "file",
"runtime_dir": str(runtime),
"file": {"path": str(fallback)},
"secrets": {
"TEST_SECRET": {
"remote": "unused-in-file-mode",
"consumers": ["test-service"],
}
},
},
)
probe = (
"import json,os,pathlib;"
"p=os.environ['TEST_SECRET_FILE'];"
"print(json.dumps({'raw':os.environ.get('TEST_SECRET'),"
"'value':pathlib.Path(p).read_text()}))"
)
result = subprocess.run(
[
sys.executable,
str(LAUNCHER_PATH),
"run",
"--config",
str(public),
"--loader-config",
str(loader_config),
"--",
sys.executable,
"-c",
probe,
],
text=True,
capture_output=True,
check=False,
)
self.assertEqual(result.returncode, 0, result.stderr)
payload = json.loads(result.stdout)
self.assertIsNone(payload["raw"])
self.assertEqual(payload["value"], "canary-secret-value")
self.assertEqual(
(runtime / "manifest").read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip(),
f"TEST_SECRET={(runtime / 'TEST_SECRET').resolve()}",
)
def test_selectel_flow_uses_project_scope_catalog_and_per_service_files(self) -> None:
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as directory:
root = Path(directory)
credentials = root / "credentials"
credentials.mkdir()
(credentials / "selectel-password").write_text(
"service-user-password\n", encoding="utf-8"
)
make_private(credentials / "selectel-password")
runtime = root / "run"
config_path = root / "config.json"
write_json(config_path, selectel_config(runtime))
opener = FakeOpener(
[
identity_response(),
secret_response(b"postgresql://user:password@db/app"),
secret_response(b'token with spaces and "quotes"'),
]
)
def factory(**kwargs: Any) -> Any:
return loader.HTTPClient(
**kwargs, opener=opener, sleeper=lambda _: None, jitter=lambda: 0
)
consumers = loader.run(
config_path,
environ={"CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY": str(credentials)},
client_factory=factory,
)
self.assertEqual(consumers, ["api", "migration"])
auth_request = opener.requests[0][0]
auth_payload = json.loads(auth_request.data)
self.assertEqual(
auth_payload["auth"]["scope"]["project"]["name"], "production"
)
self.assertEqual(
auth_payload["auth"]["identity"]["password"]["user"]["domain"]["name"],
"123456",
)
self.assertEqual(
opener.requests[1][0].get_header("X-auth-token"),
"iam-token-do-not-log",
)
self.assertEqual(
opener.requests[1][0].full_url,
"https://secrets.example/v1/han%2Fdatabase-url",
)
api_text = (runtime / "api.env").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
migration_text = (runtime / "migration.env").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
self.assertIn('DATABASE_URL="postgresql://user:password@db/app"', api_text)
self.assertIn(
'SHARED_TOKEN="token with spaces and \\"quotes\\""', api_text
)
self.assertNotIn("SHARED_TOKEN", migration_text)
if os.name != "nt":
self.assertEqual(stat.S_IMODE((runtime / "api.env").stat().st_mode), 0o600)
self.assertEqual(stat.S_IMODE(runtime.stat().st_mode), 0o700)
def test_retry_uses_jitter_and_then_succeeds(self) -> None:
opener = FakeOpener(
[urllib.error.URLError("temporary"), FakeResponse(200, b"{}")]
)
sleeps: list[float] = []
client = loader.HTTPClient(
timeout=1,
retries=1,
max_response_bytes=1024,
opener=opener,
sleeper=sleeps.append,
jitter=lambda: 0.25,
)
result = client.request(
"GET", "https://provider.example/v1/key", expected=frozenset({200})
)
self.assertEqual(result.status, 200)
self.assertEqual(sleeps, [0.1875])
def test_paired_canonical_names_fetch_provider_version_once(self) -> None:
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as directory:
root = Path(directory)
credentials = root / "credentials"
credentials.mkdir()
credential = credentials / "selectel-password"
credential.write_text("password", encoding="utf-8")
make_private(credential)
config = selectel_config(root / "run")
config["secrets"]["SHARED_TOKEN"]["remote"] = "han/database-url"
config_path = root / "config.json"
write_json(config_path, config)
opener = FakeOpener([identity_response(), secret_response(b"same-value")])
def factory(**kwargs: Any) -> Any:
return loader.HTTPClient(**kwargs, opener=opener)
loader.run(
config_path,
environ={"CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY": str(credentials)},
client_factory=factory,
)
self.assertEqual(len(opener.requests), 2)
output = (root / "run" / "api.env").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
self.assertIn('DATABASE_URL="same-value"', output)
self.assertIn('SHARED_TOKEN="same-value"', output)
def test_http_error_is_redacted_and_body_is_not_read(self) -> None:
leaked = b"postgresql://admin:secret@db/app iam-token response-body"
class ExplodingBody(io.BytesIO):
def read(self, *args: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> bytes:
raise AssertionError("HTTP error body must not be read")
error = urllib.error.HTTPError(
"https://provider.example/v1/key",
403,
"body contains a secret",
{},
ExplodingBody(leaked),
)
client = loader.HTTPClient(
timeout=1,
retries=0,
max_response_bytes=1024,
opener=FakeOpener([error]),
)
with self.assertRaises(loader.LoaderError) as caught:
client.request(
"GET",
"https://provider.example/v1/key",
headers={"X-Auth-Token": "iam-token"},
expected=frozenset({200}),
)
message = str(caught.exception)
self.assertEqual(message, "provider request failed with HTTP 403")
for forbidden in ("secret", "iam-token", "response-body", "postgresql://"):
self.assertNotIn(forbidden, message)
def test_unscoped_token_fails_without_replacing_existing_output(self) -> None:
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as directory:
root = Path(directory)
credentials = root / "credentials"
credentials.mkdir()
(credentials / "selectel-password").write_text("password", encoding="utf-8")
make_private(credentials / "selectel-password")
runtime = root / "run"
runtime.mkdir()
existing = runtime / "api.env"
existing.write_text('DATABASE_URL="old-value"\n', encoding="utf-8")
config_path = root / "config.json"
write_json(config_path, selectel_config(runtime))
opener = FakeOpener([identity_response(project_scoped=False)])
def factory(**kwargs: Any) -> Any:
return loader.HTTPClient(**kwargs, opener=opener)
with self.assertRaisesRegex(loader.LoaderError, "not project-scoped"):
loader.run(
config_path,
environ={"CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY": str(credentials)},
client_factory=factory,
)
self.assertEqual(
existing.read_text(encoding="utf-8"),
'DATABASE_URL="old-value"\n',
)
def test_invalid_base64_and_size_limit_fail_closed(self) -> None:
with self.assertRaisesRegex(loader.LoaderError, "invalid base64"):
loader.decode_secret({"value": "not-base64!"}, "TOKEN", 128)
with self.assertRaisesRegex(loader.LoaderError, "configured limit"):
loader.decode_secret(
{"value": base64.b64encode(b"too-long").decode()}, "TOKEN", 3
)
with self.assertRaisesRegex(loader.LoaderError, "dotenv"):
loader.decode_secret(
{"value": base64.b64encode(b"line1\nline2").decode()}, "TOKEN", 128
)
def test_file_mode_is_explicit_strict_and_narrow(self) -> None:
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as directory:
root = Path(directory)
source = root / "fallback.env"
source.write_text(
"# exact recovery set\n"
'DATABASE_URL="postgresql://user:pass@db/app"\n'
"SHARED_TOKEN='literal value'\n",
encoding="utf-8",
)
make_private(source)
runtime = root / "run"
config = selectel_config(runtime)
config["mode"] = "file"
config.pop("selectel")
config.pop("http")
config["file"] = {"path": str(source)}
config_path = root / "config.json"
write_json(config_path, config)
loader.run(config_path, environ={})
output = (runtime / "api.env").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
self.assertIn("literal value", output)
self.assertNotIn("selectel", output)
source.write_text(
"DATABASE_URL=ok\nSHARED_TOKEN=ok\nUNDECLARED=leak\n",
encoding="utf-8",
)
with self.assertRaisesRegex(loader.LoaderError, "undeclared key"):
loader.run(config_path, environ={})
def test_selectel_failure_never_falls_back_to_file_section(self) -> None:
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as directory:
root = Path(directory)
config = selectel_config(root / "run")
config["file"] = {"path": str(root / "fallback.env")}
config_path = root / "config.json"
write_json(config_path, config)
with self.assertRaisesRegex(loader.LoaderError, "forbidden"):
loader.run(config_path, environ={})
def test_relative_credential_requires_systemd_directory(self) -> None:
selectel = {"password_file": "credential"}
with self.assertRaisesRegex(loader.LoaderError, "CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY"):
loader.credential_value(selectel, {})
def test_response_content_length_limit_is_enforced(self) -> None:
client = loader.HTTPClient(
timeout=1,
retries=0,
max_response_bytes=10,
opener=FakeOpener(
[FakeResponse(200, b"{}", {"Content-Length": "100"})]
),
)
with self.assertRaisesRegex(loader.LoaderError, "exceeds"):
client.request(
"GET", "https://provider.example/v1/key", expected=frozenset({200})
)
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
modules/module-10-deployment-runbook.md
+24 -11
View File
@@ -344,7 +344,7 @@ git status --short
- [ ] SBOM/vulnerability scan без unresolved critical/high.
- [ ] Root Compose — единственный production entrypoint.
## 9. Stage 6 — `.env` и secrets
## 9. Stage 6 — несекретный `.env` и runtime secrets
### 9.1. Создание
@@ -355,19 +355,24 @@ cp .env.example .env
chmod 600 .env
```
Генерировать минимум 256-bit:
`.env` содержит только несекретный config и `SECRETS_SOURCE=file|selectel`.
Пароли, токены, access keys, credential-bearing DSN и `*_FILE` пути в нём
запрещены. Секреты выдаёт единый интерфейс:
```bash
openssl rand -hex 32
deployment/secrets/han-secrets run --config .env -- <command>
```
Не выполнять `export SECRET=...` в shared shell history. Использовать editor с restricted permissions или secret manager/secret files.
Launcher устанавливает `HAN_SECRETS_ACTIVE=1`, не выводит значения и может
передать paths-only manifest через `HAN_RUNTIME_SECRET_MANIFEST`. Файлы manifest
должны быть абсолютными, недоступными group/other. Генерацию выполняет secret
manager; не выполнять `export SECRET=...` и не вставлять значения в history.
### 9.2. Обязательные группы
- `APP_ENV`, release/version, log level;
- private PG host/port/database, TLS CA и runtime DSN;
- Redis ACL credentials/URLs DB0/1/2;
- private PG host/port/database и TLS CA в config; runtime DSN в secret backend;
- Redis ACL credentials/URLs DB0/1/2 только в secret backend;
- public web/API/auth URLs;
- Keycloak realm/audience/hostname/bootstrap/provider technical secrets;
- SMS DB URL, парные Keycloak↔SMS tokens, Direct `TOKEN_1`, callback URL и отдельные callback credentials;
@@ -390,9 +395,10 @@ Service token и webhook token — разные secrets.
### 9.3. Validation
Добавить/запустить `scripts/validate-env`:
Запустить `scripts/validate-env` в двух независимых режимах:
- mandatory not empty;
- config: mandatory not empty, `SECRETS_SOURCE`, запрет secret keys/DSN credentials;
- runtime: manifest/files или child environment без печати значений;
- нет `change-me`, example IP/domain, default OTP;
- URLs have correct schemes;
- public URLs HTTPS, internal URLs service DNS;
@@ -409,14 +415,18 @@ Service token и webhook token — разные secrets.
```bash
cd <BACKEND_ROOT>
./scripts/validate-env .env
docker compose config --quiet
sudo systemctl restart han-secrets@production.service
sudo ./scripts/validate-env .env \
--runtime-manifest /run/han-chat/secrets/manifest
sudo deployment/secrets/han-compose config --quiet
```
`docker compose config` может раскрыть resolved secrets; не сохранять/публиковать его stdout.
### Gate 6
- [ ] `.env` mode 0600, отсутствует в git.
- [ ] `.env` отсутствует в git и содержит только несекретный config.
- [ ] Secret launcher и permissions manifest/files проверены.
- [ ] Все placeholder/default secrets отклонены.
- [ ] Paired tokens совпадают.
- [ ] DSN private/TLS; URLs/issuer согласованы.
@@ -1000,10 +1010,13 @@ DB backup включает realm/users/signing keys/provider data. Secret-free r
4. остановить новые claims/send при возможности;
5. переключить image tags на previous digests;
6. не выполнять Alembic downgrade;
7. `docker compose up -d`;
7. `SCHEMA_BACKWARD_COMPATIBLE_CONFIRMED=true deployment/scripts/rollback.sh <PREVIOUS_IMMUTABLE_RELEASE>`;
8. health/smoke/idempotency;
9. проверить outbox/inbox/SMS pending/uncertain/recovery.
Используется текущий runtime secret set и текущий несекретный config. Snapshot
старого `.env` не создаётся и не применяется.
### После backward-incompatible migration
Обычный rollback запрещён. Выбор:
ops-monitoring/diagnose-han-chat.sh
+14 -4
View File
@@ -2,13 +2,23 @@
# diagnose-han-chat.sh — запускать из /opt/han-chat/backend
set -euo pipefail
cd /opt/han-chat/backend
CONFIG_FILE="${CONFIG_FILE:-.env}"
SECRETS_LAUNCHER="${SECRETS_LAUNCHER:-deployment/secrets/han-secrets}"
if [[ "${HAN_SECRETS_ACTIVE:-0}" != 1 ]]; then
[[ -x "$SECRETS_LAUNCHER" ]] || {
echo "Secret launcher is required: $SECRETS_LAUNCHER" >&2
exit 66
}
exec "$SECRETS_LAUNCHER" run --config "$CONFIG_FILE" -- "$0" "$@"
fi
compose() { docker compose --env-file "$CONFIG_FILE" "$@"; }
echo "=== 1. Статус сервисов ==="
docker compose --env-file .env ps api-backend keycloak redis message-safety
compose ps api-backend keycloak redis message-safety
echo
echo "=== 2. Healthcheck api-backend (что именно падает) ==="
docker compose --env-file .env exec -T api-backend \
compose exec -T api-backend \
python -c "
import json, urllib.request
try:
@@ -22,13 +32,13 @@ except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
echo
echo "=== 3. Keycloak health (management port 9000) ==="
docker compose --env-file .env exec -T keycloak bash -c \
compose exec -T keycloak bash -c \
"exec 3<>/dev/tcp/127.0.0.1/9000 && printf 'GET /auth/health/ready HTTP/1.0\r\n\r\n' >&3 && cat <&3" \
2>/dev/null | head -20 || echo "Keycloak health FAILED"
echo
echo "=== 4. api-backend -> Keycloak (JWKS) ==="
docker compose --env-file .env exec -T api-backend \
compose exec -T api-backend \
python -c "
import os, urllib.request, json
base = os.environ.get('KEYCLOAK_INTERNAL_URL','http://keycloak:8080/auth').rstrip('/')
ops-monitoring/send_sms.md
+30 -59
View File
@@ -5,41 +5,25 @@
cd /opt/han-chat/backend
umask 077
read -r -p "Тестовый номер в E.164 (+79...): " TEST_PHONE
CHALLENGE_ID=$(python3 -c 'import uuid; print(uuid.uuid4())')
OTP_CODE=$(python3 -c 'import secrets; print(f"{secrets.randbelow(1000000):06d}")')
SMS_TOKEN=$(python3 - <<'PY'
from pathlib import Path
for line in Path(".env").read_text().splitlines():
if line.startswith("SMS_SERVICE_TOKEN="):
print(line.split("=", 1)[1].strip().strip("\"'"))
break
else:
raise SystemExit("SMS_SERVICE_TOKEN отсутствует")
PY
)
export TEST_PHONE CHALLENGE_ID OTP_CODE SMS_TOKEN
REQUEST_FILE=$(mktemp)
python3 - "$REQUEST_FILE" <<'PY'
read -r -p "Тестовый номер в E.164 (+79...): " TEST_PHONE
python3 - "$REQUEST_FILE" "$TEST_PHONE" <<'PY'
import json
import os
import secrets
import sys
import uuid
challenge_id = str(uuid.uuid4())
payload = {
"idempotency_key": f"ops:smoke:{os.environ['CHALLENGE_ID']}",
"idempotency_key": f"ops:smoke:{challenge_id}",
"template_code": "auth_otp",
"locale": "ru",
"phone_e164": os.environ["TEST_PHONE"],
"phone_e164": sys.argv[2],
"substitutions": {
"code": os.environ["OTP_CODE"],
"code": f"{secrets.randbelow(1000000):06d}",
"ttl_min": "1",
},
"customer_ref": os.environ["CHALLENGE_ID"],
"customer_ref": challenge_id,
"message_ttl_sec": 60,
}
@@ -51,16 +35,20 @@ PY
## Создайте функцию отправки:
send_sms_smoke() {
deployment/secrets/han-secrets run --config .env -- \
docker compose --env-file .env --profile ops run --rm --no-deps \
--user 0:0 \
--entrypoint sh \
-e SMS_TOKEN \
-v /run/han-chat/secrets/SMS_SERVICE_TOKEN:/run/secrets/sms_service_token:ro \
-v "$REQUEST_FILE:/tmp/sms-request.json:ro" \
toolbox -ec '
umask 077
printf "Authorization: Bearer %s\n" \
"$(cat /run/secrets/sms_service_token)" > /tmp/auth-header
curl -sS \
-w "\nHTTP %{http_code}\n" \
-X POST \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $SMS_TOKEN" \
-H @/tmp/auth-header \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "X-Request-ID: ops-sms-smoke" \
--data-binary @/tmp/sms-request.json \
@@ -90,7 +78,7 @@ LIMIT 5;
## После проверки удалите секретные данные:
shred -u "$REQUEST_FILE" 2>/dev/null || rm -f "$REQUEST_FILE"
unset SMS_TOKEN OTP_CODE TEST_PHONE CHALLENGE_ID REQUEST_FILE
unset TEST_PHONE REQUEST_FILE
# Тесты
@@ -138,33 +126,12 @@ HTTP 403
### 3. Проверить Basic auth внутри Docker-сети
Получите credentials из `.env`:
```bash
CB_USER=$(python3 - <<'PY'
from pathlib import Path
for line in Path(".env").read_text().splitlines():
if line.startswith("IDGTL_SMS_CALLBACK_USERNAME="):
print(line.split("=", 1)[1].strip().strip("\"'"))
break
PY
)
CB_PASS=$(python3 - <<'PY'
from pathlib import Path
for line in Path(".env").read_text().splitlines():
if line.startswith("IDGTL_SMS_CALLBACK_PASSWORD="):
print(line.split("=", 1)[1].strip().strip("\"'"))
break
PY
)
export CB_USER CB_PASS
```
Credentials получает только дочерний процесс через secret launcher.
Неверные credentials:
```bash
deployment/secrets/han-secrets run --config .env -- \
docker compose --env-file .env --profile ops run --rm --no-deps \
--entrypoint sh toolbox -ec '
curl -sS -o /dev/null -w "HTTP %{http_code}\n" \
@@ -180,10 +147,20 @@ docker compose --env-file .env --profile ops run --rm --no-deps \
Правильные credentials:
```bash
deployment/secrets/han-secrets run --config .env -- \
docker compose --env-file .env --profile ops run --rm --no-deps \
--entrypoint sh -e CB_USER -e CB_PASS toolbox -ec '
--entrypoint sh \
-v /run/han-chat/secrets/IDGTL_SMS_CALLBACK_USERNAME:/run/secrets/callback_user:ro \
-v /run/han-chat/secrets/IDGTL_SMS_CALLBACK_PASSWORD:/run/secrets/callback_password:ro \
toolbox -ec '
umask 077
{
printf "user = \"%s:%s\"\n" \
"$(cat /run/secrets/callback_user)" \
"$(cat /run/secrets/callback_password)"
} > /tmp/curl-auth.conf
curl -sS -o /dev/null -w "HTTP %{http_code}\n" \
-u "$CB_USER:$CB_PASS" \
--config /tmp/curl-auth.conf \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
--data "[]" \
http://sms-service:8080/callbacks/idgtl/sms
@@ -192,12 +169,6 @@ docker compose --env-file .env --profile ops run --rm --no-deps \
Ожидается `HTTP 422`: авторизация прошла, но пустой callback-массив невалиден.
После проверки:
```bash
unset CB_USER CB_PASS
```
### 4. Проверить реальный callback Direct
После тестовой SMS:
releases/#0 deploy-steps.md
+99 -537
View File
@@ -1,555 +1,117 @@
# usefull commands
- Убрать переносы строк: sed -i 's/\r$//' name-file.sh
- find . -type f \( -name '*.sh' -o -name 'validate-env' \) -exec dos2unix {} +
- docker compose stop # мягко останавливает контейнеры (не удаляет)
- sudo shutdown -h now # выглючить ВМ
- Генерация паролей
- (со спец.символами) openssl rand -base64 32
- (без спец.символов) openssl rand -hex 16
- openssl rand -base64 16 | xclip -selection clipboard # Linux
# Release #0: безопасный порядок развертывания
Посмотреть состояние контейнеров
docker compose ps --format "table {{.Service}}\t{{.Status}}\t{{.Ports}}"
Этот файл больше не является журналом реальных адресов, SSH-ключей и локальных
путей. Фактические значения инфраструктуры хранятся в защищённой CMDB/ops wiki,
а не в Git.
Туннель до БД: ssh -i C:\Users\MI\.ssh\hansel -L 5433:192.168.0.211:5432 root@135.106.164.58 -N
## 1. Подготовка ВМ
#Обновление проекта
mkdir -p ~/.ssh
cp /mnt/c/Users/MI/.ssh/hansel ~/.ssh/hansel
chmod 600 ~/.ssh/hansel
Разрешите извне только 80/443 и SSH из административной сети. PostgreSQL
доступен ВМ только через приватную сеть.
1. Скопировать и автоматически почистить артефакты
Когда вы убедитесь, что вывод предыдущей команды вас устраивает, просто уберите флаг -n:
rsync -rltD --no-perms --no-owner --no-group -ivc --delete \
```sh
scp -i <DEPLOY_SSH_KEY> deployment/scripts/setup-vm.sh \
<CLOUD_USER>@<VM_IP>:/tmp/setup-vm.sh
ssh -i <DEPLOY_SSH_KEY> <CLOUD_USER>@<VM_IP>
sudo chmod 0755 /tmp/setup-vm.sh
sudo /tmp/setup-vm.sh
```
После создания пользователя `deploy` проверьте отдельную SSH-сессию до
отключения root login. Не копируйте приватный ключ на ВМ.
## 2. Доставка приложения
Предпочтительно использовать Git либо архив без runtime-данных:
```sh
tar -C HAN_chat_specification/codebase/backend \
--exclude='.env' \
--exclude='*.crt' \
--exclude='*.pem' \
--exclude='*.key' \
--exclude='secrets/' \
--exclude='node_modules/' \
--exclude='dist/' \
--exclude='.expo/' \
--exclude='playwright-report/' \
--exclude='test-results/' \
--exclude='*.log' \
-e "ssh -i ~/.ssh/hansel" \
/mnt/c/Users/MI/Documents/Assistent/HAN_chat_specification/codebase/backend/ \
root@135.106.164.58:/opt/han-chat/backend/
--exclude='secrets' \
--exclude='backups' \
-czf han-chat-backend.tar.gz .
scp -i <DEPLOY_SSH_KEY> han-chat-backend.tar.gz deploy@<VM_IP>:/tmp/
```
-r — рекурсивно.
-l — сохранять символические ссылки.
-t — сохранять время модификации (важно для будущих проверок).
-D — сохранять устройства (на всякий случай, как в -a).
--no-perms --no-owner --no-group — главное исправление: не пытаться копировать права, владельца и группу с Windows на Linux. Это избавит от ложных срабатываний.
-i — покажет только реально измененные файлы (можно заменить на -v, если хотите просто список).
-a (archive) — сохраняет права, время и рекурсивно копирует.
-v (verbose) — выводит список файлов.
-n (dry-run) — главный флаг, показывает, что бы произошло, но не делает этого.
--delete — решение вашей проблемы. Говорит rsync удалять на приемнике (ВМ) файлы, которых нет в источнике (локально).
Важно: не забудьте поставить слэш / в конце пути к локальному проекту, иначе rsync скопирует саму папку внутрь папки на ВМ.
2. Копирование env (опционально)
scp -i C:\Users\MI\.ssh\hansel -r "C:\Users\MI\Documents\job\HAN_new_life\HANapp\Production\.env" root@135.106.164.58:/opt/han-chat/backend
На ВМ:
```sh
sudo install -d -o deploy -g deploy -m 0755 /opt/han-chat/backend
sudo -u deploy tar -C /opt/han-chat/backend \
-xzf /tmp/han-chat-backend.tar.gz
cd /opt/han-chat/backend
find . -type f \( -name '*.sh' -o -name 'validate-env' \) -exec dos2unix {} +
chmod +x scripts/validate-env deployment/scripts/*.sh redis/scripts/*.sh nginx/scripts/*.sh
docker compose --env-file .env build frontend-static keycloak
docker compose --env-file .env up -d \
--no-deps \
--force-recreate frontend-static keycloak
Посмотреть состояние контейнеров
docker compose ps --format "table {{.Service}}\t{{.Status}}"
docker compose ps --format "table {{.Service}}\t{{.Status}}\t{{.Ports}}"
# Архивный способ копирования:
cd /tmp
rm han-chat-backend.tar.gz
cd /opt/han-chat/backend
#команда складывает архив в ту папку, из которой запускается команда
cd C:\Users\MI\Documents\Assistent\
rm C:\Users\MI\Documents\Assistent\han-chat-backend.tar.gz
tar -C C:\Users\MI\Documents\Assistent\HAN_chat_specification\codebase\backend -czf han-chat-backend.tar.gz .
scp -i C:\Users\MI\.ssh\hansel C:\Users\MI\Documents\Assistent\han-chat-backend.tar.gz root@135.106.164.58:/tmp/han-chat-backend.tar.gz
tar -xzf /tmp/han-chat-backend.tar.gz
find . -type f \( -name '*.sh' -o -name 'validate-env' \) -exec dos2unix {} +
chmod +x scripts/validate-env deployment/scripts/*.sh redis/scripts/*.sh nginx/scripts/*.sh
docker compose --env-file .env build frontend-static keycloak
docker compose --env-file .env up -d \
--no-deps \
--force-recreate frontend-static keycloak
# Разворачиваем инфраструктуру в Селектел ч1
## Создание сети
## Создание групп безопасности для сети и для БД
Для сети открываем порты 80, 22, 443
Для БД открываем порты 5432, 5433 но только из CIDR (192.168.0.211\24)
## Создаем ВМ, подключаем к новой сети (через порт) и перезагружаем (либо руками вводить новые сетевые настройки - надо выбрать)
# Подключение к ВМ и первичный скрипт
++ ssh -i C:\Users\MI\.ssh\hansel root@135.106.164.58
++ scp -i C:\Users\MI\.ssh\hansel -r "C:\Users\MI\Documents\Assistent\HAN_chat_specification\codebase\backend\deployment\scripts\setup-vm.sh" root@135.106.164.58:/tmp/setup-vm.sh
chmod +x /tmp/setup-vm.sh
sudo /tmp/setup-vm.sh
# Скрипт создал деплой пользователя. Нужно Перенести туда публичный ключ и дать права на файл и папку
## Вставляем публичный ключ новой строкой Далее даем права
sudo nano /home/deploy/.ssh/authorized_keys
sudo chmod 700 /home/deploy/.ssh
sudo chmod 600 /home/deploy/.ssh/authorized_keys
sudo chown -R deploy:deploy /home/deploy/.ssh
## Пароль деплою для использования sudo
sudo passwd deploy
## После этого можно подключаться под деплой пользователем
ssh -i C:\Users\MI\.ssh\han_chat_deploy deploy@135.106.164.58
## GIT не работал. Проект пришлось копировать.
tar -C HAN_chat_specification/codebase/backend -czf han-chat-backend.tar.gz .
scp -i C:\Users\MI\.ssh\han_chat_deploy C:\Users\MI\Documents\Assistent\han-chat-backend.tar.gz deploy@135.106.164.58:/tmp/
scp -i C:\Users\MI\.ssh\hansel C:\Users\MI\Documents\Assistent\han-chat-backend.tar.gz root@135.106.164.58:/tmp/
## Дальше распаковка
cd /opt/han-chat/backend
tar -xzf /tmp/han-chat-backend.tar.gz
## Правим переносы строк и даем права на исполнение
find . -type f \( -name '*.sh' -o -name 'validate-env' \) -exec dos2unix {} +
chmod +x scripts/validate-env deployment/scripts/*.sh redis/scripts/*.sh nginx/scripts/*.sh
# Разворачиваем инфраструктуру в Селектел ч2
## Создаем БД
В базе подключаем pgcrypto
Чтобы корректно работал PgBouncer выбираем session pooling
### Копируем СА сертификат
Вариант Деплоя:
mkdir -p /opt/han-chat/backend/secrets/pg
scp -i C:\Users\MI\.ssh\han_chat_deploy -r C:\Users\MI\Documents\job\HAN_new_life\HANapp\Production\sertificates\CA.pem deploy@135.106.164.58:/opt/han-chat/backend/secrets/pg/ca.pem
chmod 644 /opt/han-chat/backend/secrets/pg/ca.pem
Вариант Селектела:
mkdir -p ~/.postgresql/
wget https://storage.dbaas.selcloud.ru/CA.pem -O ~/.postgresql/root.crt
chmod 0600 ~/.postgresql/root.crt
### Правки DNS-маршрутизации (в прошлый раз, какие-то трабблы были с базовой маршрутизацией) - скрипт ниже создаст
sudo tee /etc/netplan/99-han-dns.yaml <<'EOF'
network:
version: 2
ethernets:
eth0:
nameservers:
addresses:
- 8.8.8.8
- 1.1.1.1
search:
- selcloud.ru
eth1:
dhcp4-overrides:
use-dns: false
use-domains: false
EOF
sudo chmod 600 /etc/netplan/99-han-dns.yaml
sudo netplan apply
resolvectl flush-caches
### Проверка подключения к Postgers в ВМ
nc -zv 192.168.0.211 5433
sudo apt update
sudo apt install postgresql-client
psql "host=master.ef54e3e4-ad3d-4b80-a6af-d63269e0895a.c.dbaas.selcloud.ru \
port=5432 \
dbname=han_chat \
user=dbAdmin \
sslmode=verify-ca"
(psql "host=master.ef54e3e4-ad3d-4b80-a6af-d63269e0895a.c.dbaas.selcloud.ru port=5432 dbname=han_chat user=dbAdmin sslmode=verify-ca")
### Заводим пользователей и схемы
Пользователей создаем через интерфейс селектела.
Под админом даем права на создание в БД:
GRANT CREATE ON DATABASE han_chat TO han_app;
GRANT CREATE ON DATABASE han_chat TO bitrix_local_app;
GRANT CREATE ON DATABASE han_chat TO bitrix_sync_user;
GRANT CREATE ON DATABASE han_chat TO message_safety_app;
GRANT CREATE ON DATABASE han_chat TO keycloak_user;
GRANT CREATE ON DATABASE han_chat TO sms_user
Если создаем пользователей после того как отозвали права from public, надо давать гранты на коннект:
GRANT CONNECT ON DATABASE han_chat TO sms_user
Схемы создаем от лица пользователей, заходя каждым из них в БД.
+ Запрещаем всем посторонним входить в схему han_app и др.
CREATE SCHEMA IF NOT EXISTS han_app;
REVOKE ALL ON SCHEMA han_app FROM PUBLIC;
ALTER ROLE CURRENT_USER IN DATABASE han_chat SET search_path TO han_app;
SHOW search_path; --чтобы заработало надо переподключиться (должно быть han_app)
CREATE SCHEMA IF NOT EXISTS bitrix_local;
REVOKE ALL ON SCHEMA bitrix_local FROM PUBLIC;
ALTER ROLE CURRENT_USER IN DATABASE han_chat SET search_path TO bitrix_local;
SHOW search_path; --чтобы заработало надо переподключиться
CREATE SCHEMA IF NOT EXISTS bitrix_sync;
REVOKE ALL ON SCHEMA bitrix_sync FROM PUBLIC;
ALTER ROLE CURRENT_USER IN DATABASE han_chat SET search_path TO bitrix_sync;
SHOW search_path; --чтобы заработало надо переподключиться
CREATE SCHEMA IF NOT EXISTS message_safety;
REVOKE ALL ON SCHEMA message_safety FROM PUBLIC;
ALTER ROLE CURRENT_USER IN DATABASE han_chat SET search_path TO message_safety;
SHOW search_path; --чтобы заработало надо переподключиться
CREATE SCHEMA IF NOT EXISTS keycloak;
REVOKE ALL ON SCHEMA keycloak FROM PUBLIC;
ALTER ROLE CURRENT_USER IN DATABASE han_chat SET search_path TO keycloak;
SHOW search_path; --чтобы заработало надо переподключиться
CREATE SCHEMA IF NOT EXISTS sms AUTHORIZATION sms_user;
REVOKE ALL ON SCHEMA sms FROM PUBLIC;
ALTER ROLE sms_user IN DATABASE han_chat SET search_path TO sms, public;
SHOW search_path;
Проверка search_path
SELECT r.rolname, d.datname, s.setconfig
FROM pg_db_role_setting s
JOIN pg_roles r ON r.oid = s.setrole
JOIN pg_database d ON d.oid = s.setdatabase
WHERE r.rolname in ('han_app',
'bitrix_local_app',
'bitrix_sync_user',
'message_safety_app',
'keycloak_user');
После реализации bitrix_sync (проверить, вероятно не на все таблицы права нужны):
-- Даем право на чтение (SELECT) всех СУЩЕСТВУЮЩИХ таблиц в схеме
GRANT SELECT, INSERT ON ALL TABLES IN SCHEMA han_app TO bitrix_sync_user;
-- Настраиваем права по умолчанию для новых таблиц
ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES IN SCHEMA han_app
GRANT SELECT ON TABLES TO bitrix_sync_user;
-- Если нужно дать право на чтение и для новых последовательностей (sequences):
ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES IN SCHEMA han_app
GRANT USAGE, SELECT ON SEQUENCES TO bitrix_sync_user;
## Заводим S3 хранилища:
Создаем 2 сервисных пользователя и заводим им ключи:
- API backend SELECTEL_S3_ACCESS_KEY / SELECTEL_S3_SECRET_KEY
- Message Safety SELECTEL_S3_QUARANTINE_READ_ACCESS_KEY / SELECTEL_S3_QUARANTINE_READ_SECRET_KEY
Создаем 3 приватных бакета
- han-chat-quarantine (политика доступа API backend RW, Message Safety R)
- han-chat-attachments (политика доступа API backend RW)
- han-chat-documents (политика доступа API backend RW)
RW:
ListBucket
GetBucketLocation
PutObject
GetObject
DeleteObject
ListBucketMultipartUploads
ListMultipartUploadParts
AbortMultipartUpload
R:
ListBucket
GetBucketLocation
GetObject
ListBucketMultipartUploads
ListMultipartUploadParts
Политика CORS (бакет han-chat-quarantine, vHosted обязателен):
Allowed origin: https://chat.han0107.ru
Methods: POST, PUT, GET, HEAD
Headers: * (или явно content-type; wildcard x-amz-* в Selectel не работает)
Expose headers: ETag
# Тест инфраструктуры
mkdir -p /opt/han-chat/infratest
cd /opt/han-chat/infratest
scp -i C:\Users\MI\.ssh\hansel -r "C:\Users\MI\Documents\Assistent\HAN_chat_specification\infratest\*" root@135.106.164.58:/opt/han-chat/infratest
--настраиваю env на локальной машине и копирую на диск
scp -i C:\Users\MI\.ssh\hansel -r "C:\Users\MI\Documents\job\HAN_new_life\HANapp\Production\.env" root@135.106.164.58:/opt/han-chat/infratest/
Создаем изолированное окружение:
python3 -m venv .venv
. .venv/bin/activate
python3 -m pip install --upgrade pip
python3 -m pip install -r requirements.txt
Если не работает, то надо DNS переправить на eth0
resolvectl dns eth0 1.1.1.1 8.8.8.8
resolvectl domain eth0 '~.'
resolvectl flush-caches
resolvectl query pypi.org
# Подготовка к запуску
Сертификат рекомендуется скопировать в папку с секретами
cp /root/.postgresql/root.crt /opt/han-chat/backend/secrets/pg/root.crt
chmod 644 /opt/han-chat/backend/secrets/pg/root.crt
В битрикс регистрируем локальное приложение:
Установка: https://chat.example.ru/bitrix/install
Обработчик: https://chat.example.ru/bitrix/handler
??? (не понадобилось) Placement: https://chat.example.ru/bitrix/placement
--настраиваю env на локальной машине и копирую на диск
scp -i C:\Users\MI\.ssh\hansel -r "C:\Users\MI\Documents\job\HAN_new_life\HANapp\Production\.env" root@135.106.164.58:/opt/han-chat/backend
--Проверка .env
cd /opt/han-chat/backend
chmod 600 .env
sudo find . -type f \( -name '*.sh' -o -name 'validate-env' \
-o -name 'han-secrets' -o -name 'han-compose' \) \
-exec dos2unix {} +
sudo chmod 0755 scripts/validate-env deployment/scripts/*.sh \
deployment/secrets/han-secrets deployment/secrets/han-compose \
redis/scripts/*.sh nginx/scripts/*.sh
sudo deployment/scripts/setup-vm.sh
```
## 3. Несекретная конфигурация
`.env` создаётся на самой ВМ из `.env.example` и содержит только URL, resource
names, feature flags и `SECRETS_SOURCE`. Его разрешено передавать как обычный
config, но запрещено добавлять credential-bearing DSN, password, token и key.
```sh
cp .env.example .env
chmod 0600 .env
nano .env
./scripts/validate-env .env
docker compose --env-file .env config --quiet
docker compose --env-file .env config --services
```
## 4. Selectel Secrets Manager
Выполните `deployment/secrets/SELECTEL_RUNBOOK.ru.md`:
1. отдельный проект и service user;
2. provider secrets и audit alerts;
3. root-only JSON-карта;
4. encrypted systemd credential;
5. `SECRETS_SOURCE=selectel`.
Не передавайте значение секрета аргументом команды, через `export`, тикет или
shell history. Старые значения из прежнего `.env` после cutover ротируются.
## 5. Проверка и запуск
```sh
sudo systemctl daemon-reload
sudo systemctl enable han-secrets@production.service
sudo systemctl restart han-secrets@production.service
sudo ./scripts/validate-env .env \
--runtime-manifest /run/han-chat/secrets/manifest
sudo deployment/secrets/han-compose config --quiet
python3 -m unittest discover -s tests -v
--Проверка портов (Публиковаться должны только 80 и 443 у nginx)
docker compose --env-file .env config | grep -n 'published:'
--Собираем локальные образы:
docker compose --env-file .env build --pull
docker compose --env-file .env images
## Миграции БД и начальные настройки
cd /opt/han-chat/backend
PITR_MARKER_CONFIRMED=true deployment/scripts/migrate.sh
deployment/scripts/seed.sh
## Запуск внутренних сервисов
Сначала запустите Redis:
```sh
docker compose --env-file .env up -d redis
docker compose --env-file .env ps redis
sudo deployment/secrets/han-compose build --pull
sudo deployment/scripts/migrate.sh
sudo deployment/secrets/han-compose up -d --wait
sudo deployment/scripts/smoke.sh
```
Затем Keycloak и OpenTelemetry:
Для диагностики используйте `han-compose ps` и ограниченные logs. Не выводите
resolved Compose config, `docker inspect` environment, полный `env` или secret
files.
## 6. Откат
Откат приложения использует immutable image/release ID и подтверждённую
совместимость схемы:
```sh
docker compose --env-file .env up -d keycloak otel-collector
docker compose --env-file .env ps keycloak otel-collector
sudo SCHEMA_BACKWARD_COMPATIBLE_CONFIRMED=true \
deployment/scripts/rollback.sh <PREVIOUS_RELEASE>
```
Первый запуск Keycloak может занять несколько минут: он создаст свои таблицы и
импортирует realm `han-chat`.
Откат секрета выполняется активацией предыдущей версии в Selectel, повторным
sync и пересозданием только затронутых сервисов. Snapshot старого `.env` не
создаётся.
После готовности Keycloak:
## 7. Break-glass
```sh
docker compose --env-file .env up -d message-safety
docker compose --env-file .env up -d api-backend
docker compose --env-file .env up -d bitrix-local-app bitrix-sync
docker compose --env-file .env up -d \
delivery-worker safety-recovery-worker cleanup-worker
docker compose --env-file .env ps
```
Если сервис не становится healthy:
```sh
docker compose --env-file .env logs --tail=200 <SERVICE_NAME>
docker inspect "$(docker compose --env-file .env ps -q <SERVICE_NAME>)"
```
## Первоначальный выпуск TLS-сертификата
Для ACME требуется работающий nginx по HTTP. В `.env` оставьте
`NGINX_TLS_ENABLED=true`, но первый nginx запустите с временным переопределением:
```sh
NGINX_TLS_ENABLED=false \
docker compose --env-file .env up -d frontend-static nginx
```
Проверьте HTTP:
```sh
curl -I http://chat.han0107.ru/
```
Сначала рекомендуется проверить Certbot через staging:
```sh
docker compose --env-file .env --profile certbot run --rm certbot certonly \
--staging \
--webroot -w /var/www/certbot \
-d chat.han0107.ru \
--cert-name chat.han0107.ru-staging \
--email ap@han.ru \
--agree-tos --no-eff-email --non-interactive
```
После успешного staging-теста выпустите рабочий сертификат с основным cert-name
без `--staging`:
```sh
docker compose --env-file .env --profile certbot run --rm certbot certonly \
--webroot -w /var/www/certbot \
-d chat.han0107.ru \
--cert-name chat.han0107.ru \
--email ap@han.ru \
--agree-tos --no-eff-email --non-interactive
```
Пересоздайте nginx уже с TLS:
```sh
docker compose --env-file .env up -d --force-recreate nginx
docker compose --env-file .env exec -T nginx nginx -t -c /tmp/nginx.conf
curl -I https://chat.han0107.ru/
```
Повторно запустите VM setup, чтобы он обнаружил проект и установил systemd-таймер
продления сертификата:
```sh
sudo /opt/han-chat/backend/deployment/scripts/setup-vm.sh
systemctl status han-chat-ssl-renew.timer
## Запуск всего контура
Теперь можно привести весь проект к состоянию, описанному Compose:
```sh
cd /opt/han-chat/backend
docker compose --env-file .env up -d
docker compose --env-file .env up -d --wait \
api-backend keycloak sms-service bitrix-local-app
# Nginx разрешает имена upstream при загрузке конфигурации. Если upstream
# был пересоздан и получил новый Docker IP, без reload edge продолжит ходить
# на старый адрес и вернёт 502.
docker compose --env-file .env exec -T nginx nginx -t -c /tmp/nginx.conf
docker compose --env-file .env kill -s HUP nginx
docker compose --env-file .env ps
```
Проверьте, что контейнеры не перезапускаются:
```sh
docker compose --env-file .env ps
docker compose --env-file .env logs --since=10m
```
## Публичная проверка
Запустите smoke-тест:
```sh
cd /opt/han-chat/backend
deployment/scripts/smoke.sh
```
Также вручную проверьте:
```sh
curl -fsS https://chat.han0107.ru/api/v1/public/app-config | jq
curl -fsS https://chat.han0107.ru/api/v1/public/content | jq
curl -fsS \
https://chat.han0107.ru/auth/realms/han-chat/.well-known/openid-configuration | jq
```
Если после `up`, `build`, `pull`, rollback или `--force-recreate` менялись
`api-backend`, `keycloak`, `sms-service` либо `bitrix-local-app`, всегда
повторяйте проверку `/tmp/nginx.conf` и `docker compose kill -s HUP nginx`.
Команды `nginx -t`/`nginx -s reload` без `-c /tmp/nginx.conf` здесь неверны:
контейнер read-only и рабочий PID расположен в `/tmp/nginx.pid`.
Внутренний API не должен быть опубликован:
```sh
curl -i https://chat.han0107.ru/internal/safety/v1/messages/check
```
Ожидаемый статус — `404`.
Откройте в браузере:
```text
https://chat.example.ru/
```
Для тестовой авторизации используйте значение `KEYCLOAK_OTP_MOCK_CODE` из `.env`.
Настройки keykcloack:
Для битрикса код установки приложения:
docker compose --env-file .env exec -T api-backend python - <<'PY'
import os
import urllib.request
base = os.environ["BITRIX_LOCAL_APP_BASE_URL"]
token = os.environ["BITRIX_LOCAL_APP_INTERNAL_TOKEN"]
request = urllib.request.Request(
base + "/internal/openlines/v1/setup/retry",
method="POST",
headers={"Authorization": "Bearer " + token},
)
print(urllib.request.urlopen(request).read().decode())
PY
## План включения реальной SMS-авторизации
Этот раздел — чек-лист будущего release из `modules/module-11-idgtl-sms.md`, а не подтверждение готовности текущего Compose. Пока отсутствуют реализованные `sms-service`/worker, migrations, callback route и env validation, оставлять `KEYCLOAK_OTP_MOCK_ENABLED=true`.
Prerequisites без placeholders:
- согласованные i-Digital sender и active approved template `auth_otp` с placeholders `code`, `ttl_min`;
- выданный Direct `TOKEN_1` (`IDGTL_SMS_API_KEY`, без повторного Base64);
- отдельные random callback username/password и публичный HTTPS URL;
- повторно подтверждённый source IP callback Direct;
- фактический статический egress IP, измеренный из `sms-worker`, записанный в inventory и переданный Direct для allowlist; при динамическом IP сначала настроить NAT/static IP.
Rollout:
1. Seed новых `otp.phone.*` в App DB.
2. Создать schema/role `sms`, применить versioned migrations и seed template/settings.
3. Проверить Keycloak→`sms-service`→локальный mock Direct в test environment.
4. Развернуть production `sms-service`/worker и nginx callback route, не выключая mock.
5. Применить Keycloak expand migration/SPI; прежние незавершённые challenges истечь по module-11.
6. Выполнить provider smoke на контролируемом номере; проверить `sms_message_id`, journal, callback и redaction.
7. Переключить `KEYCLOAK_OTP_MOCK_ENABLED=false`.
8. Проверить resend→`superseded`, expiry snapshot, limits и то, что Direct reject/timeout после durable order не меняет verify.
Rollback: вернуть Keycloak в mock mode; не удалять schema/journal. Остановить новые real orders, дать worker завершить либо зафиксировать in-flight/`uncertain`. Schema downgrade только при доказанной backward compatibility, иначе forward-fix.
Только при подтверждённом инциденте доставьте root-only recovery file из
защищённой офлайн-копии, установите `SECRETS_SOURCE=file`, выполните
sync/validate/recreate и зафиксируйте событие. Автоматический fallback запрещён.
После восстановления Selectel верните штатный режим и удалите recovery file.